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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines tax disputes adjudicated by investor-state tribunals. I argue that the 
nature of taxation – a compulsory levy – is unlike any other state regulatory measure such as 
an environmental or a public health measure. I suggest that tax-related investment disputes 
constitute a unique category of foreign investment disputes, and that investment tribunals 
should recognize them as such. Not all arbitral tribunals, however, acknowledge the distinct 
character of taxation which leads to inconsistent jurisprudence. 
Apart from the nature of tax, tax carve outs are another important factor that distinguish tax- 
related investment disputes from other investment disputes.   I  show that  tax  carve  outs 
are included in IIAs in order to prevent overlap with tax treaties. Tax carve outs determine 
the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and limit the substantive obligations that are 
applicable to a state’s taxation measures; but since tax carve outs are worded differently and 
vary in scope, each arbitral tribunal needs to establish its jurisdiction carefully. While some 
tribunals have been careful to clearly demarcate their jurisdiction, others have been 
imprecise. 
An analysis of the arbitral awards reveals that the approaches of investment tribunals in tax- 
related investment disputes differ as to expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and non- 
discrimination. For expropriation claims, some tribunals regard tax measures as a unique 
category and correctly set a high threshold for taxation measures to qualify as expropriation. 
With respect to non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment claims, investment 
tribunals tend to assimilate tax measures to all other measures. 
These differences reflect not only the distinct nature of the obligations, but also tribunals’ 
failure to recognize that tax-related investment disputes constitute a unique category. In the 
future, it is likely that the lower threshold for fair and equitable treatment and non- 
discrimination will lead investors to rely primarily on these standards in tax-related 
investment disputes. 
Additionally, international tax law (ITL) has played a limited role in tax-related investment 
disputes. Investment tribunals, instead, prefer to rely on WTO jurisprudence in their analysis 
and findings. I argue that there are general principles of law in ITL which tribunals should 
include in their analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International tax law (ITL) has traditionally attracted limited attention from international 
lawyers.1 International lawyers do not generally consider ITL to be part of international law, 
even though most of ITL is found in a large and growing network of bilateral treaties.2 At the 
same time, scholarship on ITL focuses on the tax implications of transnational economic 
transactions. International lawyers, even if they engage with ITL, do not examine the 
interaction of ITL with other sub-disciplines of international law.3 In this chapter, I show how 
international law can provide useful insights on various aspects of ITL – its history, 
development and some of the ongoing challenges in ITL such as tax competition. 
To begin with, it is useful to outline two general features of ITL. First, a state’s jurisdiction to 
tax. A state can exercise its jurisdiction to tax only when there exists a nexus with the taxed 
activity. While there are certain general principles in ITL,4 their non-binding nature allows 
each state to enact its own tax laws and list its own criteria of what constitutes a nexus. This 
raises the prospect of international double taxation that tax treaties aim to mitigate.5 The 
two most important jurisdictional bases for taxation are the residence and the source 
principle.6 Pursuant to the residence principle, a state may tax a particular economic 
transaction because the concerned person is a resident in its territory. Simultaneously, 
another state may advance a competing jurisdictional claim to tax by asserting that the 
 
1 
See generally Diane M. Ring, ‘The Promise of International Tax Scholarship and its Implications for 
Research Design, Theory and Methodology’ (2010) 55 Saint Louis Univ L J 307. 
2 
There two major kinds of bilateral treaties in ITL: Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (tax 
treaties) and Bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreements (tax information exchange agreements). 
3 
There are a few exceptions. For example, see Ali Lazem, ‘The Treatment of Tax in Investor-state 
arbitration of expropriation and national treatment protection’ (2014) (PhD Thesis, Brunel University) 
(Lazem’s thesis does not make a case for existence of general principles of law in ITL nor does it 
expressly endorse the argument that tax- related investment disputes constitute a unique category. 
Both these claims form a major part of my thesis); See Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 below that examine the 
different aspects of tax-related investment disputes such as admissibility, jurisdiction and substantive 
obligations of expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and non- discrimination respectively. 
4 
See Section V below. 
5 
See, for example, Peter Harris, David Oliver, International Commercial Tax (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 45. 
6 
See generally Mogens Rasmussen, International Double Taxation (Kluwer Law International 2011). 
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transaction took place in its territory – relying on the source principle. Tax treaties and the 
relevant provisions in the domestic tax laws of various states seek to resolve these 
jurisdictional conflicts. Nevertheless, not all states are signatories to tax treaties. Further the 
scope of tax treaties is limited - they ordinarily only apply to taxes relating to income and 
capital. When transactions do not fall within the scope of tax treaties or the relevant states 
have not entered into tax treaties, no rules of customary law can assist states to resolve 
competing jurisdictional claims. In the absence of customary norms in ITL, the non-signatory 
states either resolve the disputes in an ad hoc manner or rely on some of the rules contained 
in the tax treaties (that do not bind the relevant states formally), to the extent they help to 
resolve the dispute. In either case, the absence of universally applicable international norms 
in ITL means that there is considerable ambiguity on the scope of state jurisdiction to tax. 
Second, no universal organisation occupies centre stage in ITL, unlike with the World Trade 
Organisation (the WTO) in the international trade regime. In early 20th century, the League of 
Nations (the League) played a central role in laying the foundation of ITL.7 Since early 1960s, 
the most prominent and vocal voice in ITL and policy has been the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (the OECD) – an organisation dominated by developed 
European and North American states.8 While the great majority of tax treaties are bilateral, 
the OECD has been extremely successful in widely disseminating international taxation rules.9 
The OECD influences and shapes the debate on international tax policy through the extensive 
use of peer review, consensus building among its members, publishing reports on different 
aspects of international tax and continually updating the OECD Model Tax Convention.10 The 
UN, a generalist and universal international organisation, has not invested time or resources 
to meaningfully intervene in ITL and guide international tax policy.11 
This chapter examines these and other aspects of ITL. Section II discusses arbitral awards and 
cases dating back to the early 20th century with a view to examine jurisdiction to tax in 
international law. I argue that lack of customary norms in ITL contributed to lack of 
 
7 
For details see Section III below. 
8 
See http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (for details on the membership of the OECD). 
9 
Harold Wurzel, ‘Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation’ (1938) 38 Columbia L Rev 809 
(Wurzel noted that states no longer ignore the revenue laws of other states and that the bilateral tax 
treaties had created a common framework enabling the tax officials of different states to interact with 
each other). 
10 
See James Salzman, ‘Decentralised Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 190. 
11 
See Frances M. Horner, ‘Do We Need an International Tax Organisation?’ (2001) 24 Tax Notes Int’l 179. 
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coherence in early arbitral awards.12 Additionally, I suggest that a focus on jurisdiction can 
offer a perspective to examine the role of international law in tax. Section III examines the 
development of ITL – the initial efforts of the League, the role of the OECD as the primary 
international organisation in ITL and the marginal role of the UN. Section IV looks at the 
foremost challenge in ITL currently – the issue of tax competition. Thereafter, in Section IV.B, 
building on Section IV.A, I elaborate the common concern of treaty shopping in ITL and IIL and 
suggest the possible use of IIL jurisprudence in ITL. In Section V, I engage with Reuven S. Avi- 
Yonah’s view that some principles of tax treaties are customary norms. I instead suggest that 
the argument about the existence of customary norms is pre-mature but some principles in 
tax treaties should be viewed as general principles of law; these should in turn be used by 
investor-state tribunals in tax-related investment disputes. Section VI concludes. 
II. STATE JURISDICTION TO TAX 
Early jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of a state to tax did not develop in a systemic manner. 
Still, it offers an interesting perspective on tax as one gets a glimpse into the nature of early 
disputes. The arbitral awards inform us how tribunals addressed the legal issues such as 
imposition of retrospective taxes, withdrawal of tax exemptions and the relation between a 
state’s authority to impose taxes and sovereignty, which in turn is related to the exercise of 
control over territory.13 
In the Brewer, Moller & Co case, the claimants paid taxes on their warehouses. The 
municipality of San Cristóbal in Venezuela assessed the taxes. Subsequently, the claimants 
sought to recover the amount paid as taxes by arguing that the taxes were irregular and 
illegal. The umpire held that there is no ground to sustain the claim and upheld the absolute 
right of a state to impose tax. He further observed that it is very doubtful that the Republic of 
Venezuela could under any circumstances be held liable for the irregular or illegal taxes 
collected by one of its municipal districts.14 In George Cook v United Mexican States, the 
claimant’s building was exempt from a real estate tax under a statute that provided tax 
 
12 
Even though I would not ordinarily expect coherence in the early arbitral awards (especially since 
they involved interpretation of different legal instruments), my limited point here is to suggest that a 
lack of customary norms was one of the contributing factors in the lack of coherence. 
13 
See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 
204. 
14 
Brewer, Moller and Co. Case, (1903) X Reports of Int’l Arbitral Awards 423 (the umpire, however, did 
acknowledge that if the claimants were able to show that they were unlawfully classified because of 
their (German) nationality, the claim could be considered to have some merit). 
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exemption for twenty years. However, before the passage of twenty years, the local 
municipality collected the tax on the claimant’s building. The claimant paid the tax under 
protest and later challenged the authority of the state to revoke the tax exemption. The 
umpire rejected the claim and held that: 
For tax exemptions, it is necessary to bear in mind the generally accepted 
standards of construction. The right of the State to levy taxes constitutes an 
inherent part of its sovereignty. It is a function necessary to its very existence 
and it has often been alleged, not only in Mexico, but in the United States and 
other countries that legislatures, whether of states or of the Federation cannot 
legally create exemptions which restrict the free exercise of the sovereign 
power of the State in this regard.15 
In both these cases, the right of a state to levy tax was not only interpreted as integral to its 
sovereignty but it was also interpreted to be unfettered - without any exceptions.16 This 
categorical position is incorrect and outdated.17 Imposing taxes is an important part of the 
sovereign function but the state cannot act in breach of its own laws or its obligations under 
an international treaty without facing legal action. In a domestic court, irregular or illegal 
taxes will ordinarily be refunded. Recent jurisprudence and developments in international law 
do not support the decisions in Brewer, Moller & Co and the George Cook cases. For instance, 
if a promised tax exemption by a state is revoked, the state could either be held liable for 
breach of a contract or for violation of its obligations under an investment treaty.18 In fact, 
 
15 
George Cook v United Mexican States, (1927) IV Reports of Int’l Arbitral Awards 217. 
16 
Also see Kügele v Polish State (1932) 6 ILR 69 (the reported facts state that the claimant, a trader, 
owned a brewery in Upper Polish Silesia. As a result of a series of licence fees successively imposed by 
the authorities, the claimant’s business ceased to be profitable and the claimant was eventually 
obliged to close it. The tribunal held that the trader did not lose his right to engage in a trade simply 
because tax (licence fee) increases led him to close his business. The conclusion in the award is 
questionable for if a right cannot be realised, it is effectively extinguished). 
17 
Over the past few decades, states have entered into international agreements such as the WTO, IIAs 
and tax treaties, which restrict the scope of a state’s authority to impose taxes. See, for example, 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSB10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (WTO Appellate 
Body, 4 October 1999); Ali Lazem, lias Bantekas, ‘The Treatment of tax as expropriation in Investor-
state Arbitration’ (2015) 31 Arb Int’l 1; Peter Harris, David Oliver, supra note 5. 
18 
The liability of the state would depend on factors such as the nature and duration of promised tax 
exemptions, the manner and circumstances of revocation of tax exemption. See, for instance, Total 
S.A. v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1 (Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010) (where 
Total argued that because Argentina retroactively withdrew the promised exemption from custom 
duties, it was liable for breach of its substantive obligations such as fair and equitable treatment under 
the investment treaty). For a detailed discussion on the award see Chapter 5 below. 
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the above-mentioned awards are not only inconsistent with the recent developments in 
jurisprudence but they are also not supported by some of the other early 20th century rulings. 
In the Japanese House Tax, the dispute revolved around the settlements for foreign residents 
built in certain Japanese ports.19 The award endorses the view that a state can restrict its 
ability to tax once it voluntarily agrees to narrow its jurisdiction to tax. Foreign nationals had 
limited property rights in Japan and they held land under a lease in perpetuity with Japan. A 
dispute arose about the scope of the tax exemption extended to foreign nationals. Japan 
argued that it had the right to tax the buildings built on the land since the tax exemption 
extended only to the land. France, Germany and Britain defended the absolute character of 
the tax exemptions. Japan argued that fiscal immunity to foreigners was a sovereign act of 
limited applicability. Granting complete tax immunity would be akin to restricting it from 
performing a vital sovereign act.20 The tribunal rejected Japan’s argument and held that the 
treaties protected both - the land and the building of any description constructed on the land 
from any taxes, charges or contributions.21 It is arguable whether Japan intended the tax 
exemption to extend to the land as well as the buildings. However, this restrictive notion of 
jurisdiction to tax even though articulated in the context of specific treaties shows that even 
in early 20th century, tribunals did articulate a nuanced view of the sovereign right to impose 
taxes. 
States continue to enjoy discretion about extending tax exemptions. In Permanent Mission of 
India v City of New York, the issue was whether foreign governments were liable to pay taxes 
on property owned by them and which were used to house diplomatic staff of missions to the 
UN and staff of consulates in New York.22 The New York District Court held that properties 
owned by India in New York were subject to taxes. However, thereafter the US State 
Department under the Foreign Missions Act of 1982 granted India an exemption. The Federal 
 
19 
France, Germany and Great Britain v Japan (PCA, Award of the Tribunal, 22 May 1905). 
20 
The argument was, in part, based on the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. Article 18 of the 
Anglo- Japanese Treaty 1894 provided that: ‘The several foreign settlements in Japan shall be 
incorporated with the respected Japanese Commune, and shall thenceforth form part of the general 
municipal system of Japan.’ 
21 
See Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 171; Contemporary courts have also interpreted terms such as ‘land’ 
and ‘lease’ in tax disputes with a certain degree of elasticity. See Maierhofer v Finanzamt Augsburg-
Land (Case C-315/10) [2003]  ECR I-563 (the court held that even if the structure can be demolished 
any time within ten days, it still constitutes an immovable property for tax purposes. There was no 
need for the structure to be inseverably fixed to or in the ground.); Cottage Holiday Associates Ltd v 
Customs and Excise Comrs (Case C-269/00) [1983] QB 735 (where the court held that use of holiday 
cottage for one week a year over an 80 year period was a legal lease.). Both cases were decided under 
the UK Value Added Tax Act, 1994. 
22 
551 US 193 (2007). 
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Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the State Department.23 The decision of the State 
Department was aimed to gain reciprocal advantage – tax exemptions for US owned property 
overseas.24 The decisions relating to taxes are an important attribute of sovereignty. 
Sovereign right to tax also translates into a state’s complete authority to impose taxes in the 
territory under its control. However, once state waives its right to tax a certain category of 
economic activity or a certain class of persons - it cannot revoke it without a valid reason or 
without paying compensation to the affected persons.25 
Consequently, a permanent loss of territory would entail a permanent loss of right to tax. But, 
if a state loses and then regains control over a territory, its authority to impose taxes for the 
intervening period becomes questionable. In the Guastini case, the umpire held that the 
legitimate government when back in power could not enforce a second payment of taxes once 
paid to revolutionary authorities.26 From May 1898 to May 1900, the Venezuelan government 
had lost control over large portions of its territory to the Matos revolutionaries. During these 
two years, the residents and businessmen in the territories controlled by the revolutionaries, 
paid taxes to them. The Venezuelan government, on regaining the territory sought to levy 
taxes on the people - even for the period it did not have control over the territory. The 
businessmen challenged the retrospective imposition of taxes by the Venezuelan government. 
The umpire observed that when the revolutionaries were in control of the territory, they 
were, for that period the de facto government.27 The umpire concluded that if the person 
running his business in that territory paid his taxes to the revolutionaries he cannot be forced 
to pay the taxes again once the government regains control of the territory.28 
In the Santa Clara Estates award, the umpire observed that there is no question that the 
collection of taxes by the government for the period during which it had lost its sovereignty 
over the territory in question is defensible in law, logic, and ethics.29 It further held that: 
 
23 
City of New York v Permanent Mission of India 618 F 3d 172 (2d Cir 2010). 
24 
Ibid; In another dispute in 2009, the US initially refused to pay VAT for goods and services bought in 
the UK for the construction of its embassy in London. However, the US later agreed to pay the tax. See 
http://www.exaronews.com/articles/4168/us-agrees-to-pay-vat-for-new-london-embassy 
25 
See John B. Okie (U.S.A.) v United Mexican States (1926) IV Reports of Int’l Arbitral Awards 54, at 
55-57. 
26 
Guastini Case (Italy v Venezuela) (1903) X Reports of Int’l Arbitral Awards 561. 
27 
Ibid. 
28 
This view was re-affirmed in the same year in the Santa Clara Estates award which arose from the 
same facts as in the Guastini case above. 
29 
Santa Clara Estates Case (Supplementary Claims) (1903) IX Reports of Int’l Arbitral Awards 455, at 459. 
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the effect of the respondent Government in claiming and receiving a payment 
of taxes for a period of time when it had lost its sovereignty over the district in 
question, and could neither render protection nor receive obedience, is simply 
to make the respondent Government liable for a return of those illegally 
exacted taxes.30 
Both the above-mentioned awards recognised a simple underlying principle - that a loss of 
control of territory implies a co-extensive loss of jurisdiction to impose taxes.31 This 
limitation is especially significant since domestically, the ability of a state to impose taxes 
retrospectively is widely recognised. The Guastini and Santa Clara Estates awards suggest 
that a state’s extensive power to tax retrospectively cannot possibly extend back in time 
when the state did not have control over the territory or during the time period when the 
state temporarily lost of a certain territory. 
The fact that the power to impose taxes is co-terminus with control over the territory is also 
witnessed in some of the contemporary disputes over territorial control. For example, the 
power to levy taxes in Palestinian territories is shared between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). The former collects import duties and VAT on goods. Israel collects the taxes 
on behalf of the PA and then, after certain deductions, transfers the tax collections to the PA 
at regular intervals. The latter in turn also imposes direct taxes in the Palestinian territories 
to generate revenue.32 Similarly, in Kashmir – both India and Pakistan impose taxes on persons 
and property in the territory under their control;33 even though both the states continue to 
claim that the territory under other’s control is part of their state’s territory.34 It is doubtful, 
however, that if one of the two states gains control over the entire disputed territory, it could 
levy tax in the newly acquired territory retrospectively. 
 
30 
Ibid. 
31 
Also see Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom) [1953] ICJ 3. 
32 
See Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Adel Zagha, ‘Taxation and State Formation in Palestine 1994-2000’ in 
Mushtaq Husain Khan, et al (eds.), State Formation in Palestine Viability and Governance during a 
Social Transformation (Routledge Curzon 2004) 192. 
33 
In Azad Kashmir (controlled by Pakistan), the taxes are levied by the Azad Government and generally 
collected  by the Azad Kashmir Council consisting almost exclusively of officers from the Pakistan civil 
service. In Jammu and Kashmir (under Indian control), the taxes are levied by the State Legislature and 
collection is supervised by the Finance Department of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. See 
generally Christopher Snedden, Kashmir The Unwritten History (HarperCollins 2013). 
34 
Ibid; Also see Art 370, Constitution of India (provides for autonomous status of Kashmir in the Indian 
constitutional scheme). 
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The above mentioned awards suggest that in early 20th century, tribunals and courts failed to 
articulate the limitations on the state’s jurisdiction to tax in a systematic or a cohesive 
manner. The inconsistency in the above-mentioned decisions and arbitral awards is not 
surprising. The issues that the courts and tribunals were required to adjudicate on were still 
pre-dominantly domestic in nature and the claims were based on different legal instruments, 
such that the inconsistency is more apparent than real. However, the observations of the 
tribunal in Brewer, Moller & Co. and George Cook are categorically in favour of an absolute 
sovereign right to tax unlike in the Japanese House Tax case and the Guastini case that 
recognised a more limited right to tax. In my view, it is doubtful if the inconsistency arises 
merely because different legal instruments were involved. The tribunals, in fact, also 
endorsed different views on the limitations of a state’s right to tax. 
However, in one aspect there is considerable uniformity among all the above discussed 
arbitral awards – the lack of any reference to customary norms in ITL. Admittedly, the courts 
and tribunals never had occasion to apply international law directly, but at no point do any of 
the tribunals or umpires refer or take support or otherwise rely on customary norms, state 
practice or general principles of international law to decide the disputes. Even in the 
Japanese House Tax case where there was an occasion to refer to international norms – the 
arbitral tribunal did not mention them. The above-mentioned awards and decisions reveal 
that in early 20th century, there were no customary norms in ITL.35 The position has changed 
marginally. While customary norms still do not exist in ITL; I argue in Section V below that 
some of the principles in tax treaties should now be considered as general principles of law.36 
The varied opinions on the extent of state jurisdiction to tax have still not yet been settled 
conclusively. There is also no unanimity on how to address simultaneous state claims of 
jurisdiction to tax, especially outside the tax treaty network. It is in part due to the 
limitations of international law. As far as disputes are within the scope of tax treaties, a 
fragile consensus exists that the state’s power to tax has limits but there is no agreement 
beyond this general proposition. 
 
35 
See generally Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in International Law: Theory and 
Practice of Legislative Fiscal Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1989). 
36 
See generally Asif H. Qureshi (ed.), Public International Law of Taxation: Text, Cases Materials (Kluwer 
Law International 1994). 
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A focus on jurisdiction to tax would help us to further evaluate the role of international law in 
taxation.37 For instance, one possible extrapolation from the early patchwork jurisprudence 
discussed above is that a state’s jurisdiction to tax has limits. Constraints on state’s 
jurisdiction to tax are recognised in general international law. Arguably, however, these limits 
are minimal and do not bind a state in any meaningful way.38 The focus on jurisdiction helps 
us focus on whether a state’s claim to tax a particular income is justified – not just under 
domestic tax law but also ITL. 
Further, a greater emphasis on jurisdiction is also important since tax jurisdiction continues to 
evolve. First, the International Sea Bed Authority has since 1982 has had the authority to 
impose taxes despite not being a state.39 Second, the longstanding rule against enforcement 
of taxation laws of one state in another state is also being challenged.40 Third, states like the 
United States are using their domestic law (e.g. the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA)) to require financial intermediaries - even those located outside US, to divulge 
information in order to combat international tax evasion.41 More states are likely to follow the 
example of US.42 In fact, the Common Reporting Standard as proposed by the OECD has 
similarities with the FATCA, as both require the financial institutions to be important 
intermediaries in the collection of information.43 
 
37 
See generally, Lea Brilmayer, et al, ‘A General Look at Jurisdiction’ (1988) 66 Texas L Rev 722; 
Lea Brilmayer, ‘Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory’ (1987) 39 Univ Florida L Rev 293. 
38 
See generally Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 35, at 9-11. 
39 
International Seabed Authority is an intergovernmental body that has been established under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Its mandate is to regulate mineral-related 
activities in the international seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. The Authority is yet to become 
operational and has not yet imposed any taxes. One of the reasons that the US has not joined the 
UNCLOS is that it imposes ‘tax’ on US development of seabed to be paid to the International Sea Bed 
Authority. See Frederick E. Snyder, Surakiart Sathirathai, Third World Attitudes Towards International 
Law: An Introduction (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) 482. 
40 
See Jason Sharman, ‘Seeing Like the OECD on Tax’ (2012) 17 New Pol Eco 17 (arguing that when the 
tax authority of one state passes information to another state, it amounts to enforcement of tax laws 
of one state in another or at least amounts to a duty to assist in the administration of tax laws of 
another state.); Also see Diane M. Ring, ‘Transparency and Disclosure’ in Alexander Trepelkov, Harry 
Tonino, et al (eds.), United Nations Handbook on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of 
Developing Countries (UN 2015) 497. 
41 
Allison Christians, ‘Putting the Reign back in Sovereign: Advice for the Second Obama 
Administration’ (2013) 40 Pepperdine L Rev 1; Itai Grinberg, ‘Taxing Capital Income in Emerging 
Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?’ (2013) 5 World Tax L J 325. 
42 
Ronen Palan, Duncan Wigan, ‘Herding Cats and Taming Tax Havens: The US Strategy of ‘Not in my 
Backyard’ (2014) 5 Global Policy 334. 
43 
See OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters Implementation 
Handbook 
(2016) 87-101 (containing a comparison of the FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard). 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
A. The League of Nations as the Initial Catalyst 
In 1919, the newly founded International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) began international 
efforts to reduce double taxation.44 In 1920, the Brussels International Financial Conference 
also passed a resolution suggesting that the League undertake a study on the issues of capital 
flight, tax evasion and double taxation.45 In 1921, the League commissioned an expert report 
from its Financial Committee. The Committee further entrusted the task of preparing a 
theoretical report on double taxation to four economists.46 In 1922, the Financial Committee 
delegated the task of studying double taxation to a group of tax administrators and requested 
a report from a practical and an administrative viewpoint.47 The four economists prepared 
and submitted a report in 1923.48 The tax administrators submitted their report in 1925.49 The 
1923 report adopted the criteria of economic allegiance that it contended was based on 
taxpayer’s ability to pay.50 The report’s recommendations favoured the capital exporting or 
the resident states.51 The 1925 report, which in part relied on the 1923 report, recommended 
that due to imbalance in the capital movements between the states the jurisdiction to tax 
should be shared between the source and the resident states. The 1925 report refrained from 
offering a single solution to double taxation and stated that in the case of impersonal 
 
44 
In 1920, the Organisation Meeting of the ICC in Paris considered international double taxation to be 
one of the most important items on its agenda. See Michael J. Graetz, Michael M. O’Hear, ‘The 
“Original Intent” of US International Taxation’ (1997) 51 Duke L J 1021 (stating that the role and 
contribution of the ICC in ITL is often ignored); Also see Stefano Simontacchi, Taxation of Capital Gains 
under the OECD Model Convention (Kluwer Law International 2007) 1-10. 
45 
See Louis W. Pauly, ‘International Financial Institutions and National Economic Governance: Aspects 
of the New Adjustment Agenda in Historical Perspective’ in Marc Flandreau, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, et 
al (eds.), International Financial History in the Twentieth Century System and Anarchy (Cambridge 
University Press 2003) 239. 
46 
The four economists were called ‘Academic Experts.’ Their names were: Gijsbert Bruins, Luigi Einaudi, 
Edwin Seligman and Josiah Stamp. 
47 
The tax administrators were from seven different European states: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland. 
48 
League of Nations, Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors 
Bivens, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, Doc. E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923) (hereinafter 1923 report). 
49 
League of Nations, Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations, Doc. F. 212 (1925) (hereinafter 1925 report). 
50 
See 1923 report, supra note 48; Also see Peter Harris, David Oliver, supra note 5, at 43-86 (discussing 
that the principle of economic allegiance principle is not related to the ability of a taxpayer to pay but 
the territory from which benefits are derived); K Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income: A 
Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part I)’ (1988) 16 Intertax 216. 
51 
1923 report, supra note 48, at 22. 
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taxes/scheduler taxes52 the idea of origin is important while in the case of personal taxes (tax 
on income or capital) the idea of domicile is of importance.53 
After the League accepted the recommendations contained in the 1925 report, the Fiscal 
Committee then requested the tax administrators/technical experts to prepare preliminary 
Model Conventions based on the 1925 report. The technical experts issued a report in 1927 
which inter alia contained four Model Conventions along with commentaries: the Bilateral 
Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Direct Taxes dealing 
with Income and Property Taxes, the Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double 
Taxation in the Special Matter of Succession Duties, the Bilateral Convention on Administrative 
Assistance in Matters of Taxation and the Bilateral Convention on Judicial Assistance in the 
Collection of Taxes.54 The 1927 report also mentioned that bilateral tax treaties were 
preferable to a multilateral treaty for: ‘the fiscal systems of the various countries are so 
fundamentally different that it seems at present practically impossible to draft a collective 
convention, unless it were worded in such general terms as to be of no practical value.’55 
In 1928, the League called for a General Meeting of government experts to discuss the 1927 
report. The General Meeting recommended certain changes and prepared three versions of 
the first 1927 Model Convention. The three Model Conventions prepared in 1928 were – 
‘Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Direct 
Taxes’, No. 1a, 1b and 1c.56 The General Meeting of 1928, in a sense, marked the end of the 
most influential period of the efforts made by the League. The Model Conventions that were 
prepared and the reports that were submitted during the period of 1923-1928 laid a very 
strong foundation for ITL. They continue to influence the texts of contemporary tax treaties. 
However, the efforts of the League continued thereafter. 
 
52 
The scheduler taxes were common in Europe during the early 1900s. Under the scheduler system, tax 
was imposed on different kinds of income classified under the ‘schedule’ of the relevant tax law. 
53 
1925 report, supra note 49, at 8. 
54 
League of Nations, Report submitted by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and 
Tax Evasion 
Doc. C. 216.M.85.1927.II (1927)(hereinafter 1927 report). 
55 
Ibid, at 26. 
56 
League of Nations, Report presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion C.562.M.178.1928.II (1928) (the League mentioned that the first Model 
Convention proposed in 1927 applied to states which levied impersonal tax and a general personal tax. 
The two additional versions prepared in 1928 were intended to apply to states which did not distinguish 
between personal and impersonal taxes). 
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In 1933, the Fiscal Committee of the League approved the text of a Model Multilateral Tax 
Convention to eliminate double taxation of the profits of enterprises.57 In 1935, the 
Committee recognised that few states had shown interest in signing the proposed 1933 Model 
Multilateral Tax Convention.58 The Fiscal Committee concluded that the idea of a multilateral 
tax treaty should be discarded in the favour of bilateral tax treaties.59 Thereafter, the Fiscal 
Committee continued its work on bilateral tax treaties. The Committee drafted a Model 
Convention in 1943 at Mexico. Due to World War II, mainly Latin American states attended the 
meeting and it reflected the priorities of capital importing states. Later, in 1946 at London 
another Model Convention was drafted.60 Both capital exporting and capital importing states 
attended the meeting. The Model Convention that was adopted had a more favourable view 
of the residence principle.61 With the League dissolved in April 1946, the London Model 
Convention was League’s final contribution to the development of ITL. In the absence of any 
customary norms or general principles of law at the time, the efforts of the League were the 
first significant effort by the international community to develop principles of ITL that had 
the approval of many states. 
The League played a leading role in laying the foundations of modern ITL. The approach of 
the League has influenced the content and nature of ITL in multiple ways, I shall emphasise 
two that are relevant to the aim and scope of this thesis – the emphasis on bilateral 
instruments and the use of Model Conventions. The League prudently recognised the 
impracticability of formalising a multilateral tax agreement and did not spend too much time 
or effort in persuading states to adopt a multilateral instrument. The League understood the 
importance of bilateral approaches in international tax and laid the foundation for ‘hegemony 
of bilateral instruments’ in ITL.62 The reports submitted to the League stated that the 
dissimilarities in the tax laws of different states were a reason for the impracticality of a 
57   
See  League  of  Nations,  Fiscal  Committee,  Report  to  the  Council  on  the  Fourth  Session  of  the 
Committee 
C.399.M.204.1933.II.A (1933). 
58 
See League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee 
C.252.M.124.1935.II.A (1935) (hereinafter 1935 report). 
59 
Ibid, at 3 (‘The Committee is of the opinion, however, that progress is more likely to achieved by 
means of bilateral agreements’. It was further clarified that the state’s unwillingness to conclude a 
multilateral agreement was not due to any disagreement with the Model Conventions, but because of 
the reason that bilateral treaties were viewed as more appropriate by the states.). 
60 
See League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and 
Text 
C.88.M.88.1946.II.A (1946) (hereinafter 1946 report). 
61 
Ibid. 
62 
Maria Amparo Grau Ruiz, Mutual Assistance for the Recovery of the Claims (Kluwer Law International 
2002) 104- 115 (describing the presence of huge number of bilateral tax treaties as ‘the traditional 
hegemony of bilateral instruments’). 
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multilateral tax treaty.63 But, the League also realised the importance and advantages of 
bilateral relations in ITL. It noted that the constant extension of the network of tax treaties 
was due to their ‘cumulative effect.’64 Each time a new clause was incorporated in the Model 
Convention it was included in the subsequent treaties and states which had entered into 
treaties earlier sought to amend their treaties.65 The frequent amendment of treaties would 
have been difficult if a multilateral approach was adopted because of the need to convince a 
larger number of states. Insisting on a multilateral approach in the founding phase of ITL 
would have impeded its progress and development. The League wisely emphasised on 
bilateral relations. 
Additionally, the soft law approach adopted by the League continues to be a primary tool to 
address contentious issues in ITL today.66 Non-binding Model Conventions have become a 
characteristic feature of ITL – binding agreements, pre-dominantly bilateral, are usually 
concluded by relying on a non-binding Model Convention. The use of non-binding Model 
Conventions by the League ensured that states had the discretion to modify the treaties they 
eventually signed and ensure protection of their interests. Additionally, as discussed above, 
the League continually revised the Model Conventions and various drafts were prepared. The 
Model Conventions, thus, instead of constraining states had the effect of providing states with 
additional options. The provisions in the bilateral tax treaties vary, to reflect the interests of 
the signatory states; but, at the same time, reliance on the Model Conventions has ensured a 
remarkable stability and consistency – in structure, language and aim of the tax treaties. It 
also needs to be acknowledged that historically the reliance on Model Conventions resulted 
from the absence of any generally recognised principles in ITL and lack of customary norms. 
Model Conventions became an important vehicle for the League to articulate the principles on 
which the states agreed and accommodate the rapidly evolving views of the state by means of 
revised Model Conventions. 
The approach adopted by the League has endured and has to a large extent contributed to 
successfully address the issue of international double taxation. However, the stability and 
 
63 
See, for instance, 1927 report, supra note 54. 
64 
See 1935 report, supra note 58, at 1-4. 
65 
Ibid. 
66 
See generally Diane M. Ring, ‘Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International Organizations as 
Power Players in a High Stakes World’ (2009) 33 Fordham Int’l L J 649. 
 14
success of the initial efforts in ITL contains the ‘seeds of its own undermining.’67 Thomas 
Rixen argues that the initial narrow focus in ITL on preventing double taxation led to the 
problem of international tax evasion and tax competition that acquired prominence in late 
1990s.68 He further suggests that while the League did foresee the problem of tax avoidance 
and evasion, it did not give it a priority at the time of establishment of ITL.69 Thus, in a way 
the founding phase of the ITL regime contributed to surfacing of the problem of tax evasion 
and tax competition addressed that the OECD has focused on from 1996 onwards.70 
Rixen’s observations are important to understand the difficulty of changing international tax 
rules. The efforts of the League certainly laid the foundation of ITL and provided a certain 
measure of continuity and predictability to ITL; it helped to partially overcome the earlier 
patchwork of arbitral awards and uncertain rules. The compromise between the source and 
the residence principle in the Model Conventions has, by and large, survived for more than 
eight decades. However, it is also possible to mistakenly believe that the stability is due to 
adequate rules. Thomas Rixen suggests that path dependency and inability of states to bring 
about meaningful change could in fact be the reasons for the continuity and stability of ITL 
and the continued inability of ITL to successfully address tax competition. 
Furthermore, as compared to other sub-disciplines of international economic law, the basic 
features of ITL have essentially remained unchanged since the interwar period. I suggest that 
this is due to two reasons: first, due to the League’s leadership and the ICC’s lobbying, the 
period from 1923-1946 saw an increase in the number of bilateral legal instruments (tax 
treaties) that aimed to remove a prominent barrier for international commerce in the form of 
international double taxation on capital and income. On the other hand, the same period in 
international trade is characterised by protectionism. It was only after World War-II that a 
comparatively more liberal international trade regime was adopted;71 second, the post-World 
War II period witnessed negotiations and attempts to establish new institutions dedicated 
exclusively to international finance and international trade. A large number of states that 
 
67 
Thomas Rixen, ‘From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax Competition: Explaining the Institutional Trajectory 
of International Tax Governance’ (2010) 18 Rev Int’l Pol Eco 197, at 197. 
68 
See Thomas Rixen, Philipp Genschel, ‘Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of 
International Taxation’ in Gregory Shaffer, Terence C. Halliday (eds.), Transnational Legal Orders 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 154. 
69 
Thomas Rixen, supra note 67, at 205. 
70 
For a detailed discussion on tax competition see Section IV.A below. 
71 
Thus, in a way, ITL foreshadowed the decisive shift that was seen in international trade and 
international  finance. 
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participated in the negotiations and the establishment of Bretton Woods institutions attracted 
considerable attention for it marked an important shift in the trajectory of international 
economic law.72 On the other hand, the passing of the baton in ITL – from the League to the 
OECD happened in a much quieter manner. The OECD essentially followed the path set by the 
League and importantly the relatively small and homogenous membership of the OECD has 
(for a large part) allowed it to avoid major internal conflicts.73 
B. The OECD as the Primary Standard-Setter since 1963 
The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created by 18 members in 
1948 under the Marshall Plan.74 In 1956, it organized its own Fiscal Committee to address 
double taxation.75 The OEEC was recreated as the OECD in 1961 with the addition of United 
States and Canada as members.76 The OECD continued the OEEC's work on international 
taxation and its first major success in ITL was in 1963 - the publication of the non-binding 
OECD Model Convention (OECD Model).77 
The OECD Model is a modern-day successor of the 1927 Model Conventions drafted by the 
League. The structure of the Model Convention and its contents - the compromise between 
the residence and source principle – were borrowed from the League’s earlier work. The OECD 
Model, however, retained the London Model Convention’s bias in favour of a greater share of 
revenue for residence states.78 In 1977, relying on the tax treaties concluded during the 
intervening period and after receiving feedback from the states, the OECD published an 
 
72 
This comparatively different history of ITL as compared to other sub-disciplines of international 
economic law is, in my view, another contributory factor in the neglect of ITL in international economic 
law scholarship. 
73 
For details on the OECD’s role in ITL see Section III.B below. 
74 
For details on the OECD’s early history see Robert Wolfe, ‘From Reconstructing Europe to 
Constructing Globalization: The OECD in Historical Perspective’ in Rianne Mahon, Stephen McBride 
(eds.), The OECD and Transnational Governance (UBC Press 2008) 77. 
75 
Some authors have suggested that the OEEC constituted the Fiscal Committee at the insistence of the 
ICC since the UN was unable to offer effective leadership in international tax policy after dissolution of 
the League. See, for instance, Jason Sharman, supra note 40; Also see Section III. C below. 
76 
The goals of the OECD were also reformulated and were no longer confined to the Marshall Plan. See 
Art 1, OECD Convention (inter alia providing that one of the aims of the OECD is to contribute to 
expansion of world trade, sound economic expansion in member and non-member states). 
77 
See generally Jeffrey Owens, ‘The Main Differences between the OECD and the United Nations’ Model 
Conventions’ in Richard Vann (ed.), OECD Proceedings. Tax Treaties. Linkages between OECD Member 
Countries and Dynamic Non-Member Economies (OECD 1996). 
78 
This wasn’t a surprising development given that the OECD member states are primarily capital 
exporting or for tax purposes - resident states. See supra note 8. 
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updated final version of the Model Convention.79 Many states have since concluded bilateral 
tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention.80 
One of the reasons why the OECD Model has been influential in ITL is due to lack of any viable 
alternatives. There were unsuccessful efforts at the regional levels to publish alternative 
Model Conventions.81 The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1976 adopted 
criteria for avoidance of double taxation between LAFTA member states and states outside 
the region.82 The alternate Model proposed by LAFTA did not gain traction because the OECD 
member states refused to sign treaties based on the LAFTA Model.83 Currently, there are only 
two other Models that exist apart from the OECD Model – the UN Model and the US Model. The 
UN Model, first published in 1980, is essentially designed to be used for negotiating and 
entering into tax treaties with developing states. The fundamental principles contained in the 
UN Model are similar to the OECD Model. The vital difference is the greater share of taxes for 
the source state in the UN Model. In this respect, the UN Model is based on the Mexico Model 
Convention of 1943.84 The drafting of the US Model was inspired more by the desire of the US 
to aggressively protect its fiscal powers.85 The fact that US adopts a unique worldwide 
taxation system which imposes taxes on US citizens irrespective of their place of residence 
probably also contributed to its efforts to develop a separate model for itself.86 Instead of 
providing an alternative to the OECD Model, the UN Model and the US Model in fact underline 
the influence of the OECD Model.87 
 
79 
The OECD Model Convention has since been regularly updated – the first update was in 1994 and the 
latest in 2010. 
80 
There are more than 3000 bilateral tax treaties in force. See IBFD(ed.), Tax Treaties Database, at 
http://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Products/Tax-Treaties-Database. 
81 
UN, Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention 
between the Developed and Developing Countries (2001) ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 xix (hereinafter UN 
Model Convention). 
82 
The Commission of the Cartagena Agreement also adopted a Model Convention to prevent double 
taxation within the Andean group. Ibid, at xx. 
83 
See Thomas Rixen, Philipp Genschel, supra note 68, at 156. 
84 
Supra note 60. 
85 
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Who Invented the Single Tax Principle?: An Essay on the History of 
U.S. Treaty Policy’ (2014) 59 NYL School L Rev 309; Also see P.D. Reese, ‘United States Tax Policy 
Towards Developing Countries’ (1987) 35 UCLA L Rev 369. 
86 
Surrey S. Stanley, ‘United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties between 
Developing Countries’ (1978) 19 Harvard Int’l L J 1. 
87 
See Michael Kobetsky, International Taxation of Permanent Establishments Principles and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 152-178. 
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The influence of the OECD Model can also be explained by path dependency. When new norms 
are adopted they are included in national policies and there is a tendency towards stasis.88 
Also, since states invest time and diplomatic resources in concluding treaties, they are rarely 
inclined to re-negotiate treaties immediately thereafter.89 In the context of ITL, it can be 
argued that states entered into tax treaties relying on the Model Conventions developed by 
the League over a period of almost two decades – 1927-1946. In the period from 1946 until 
1963 – when the OECD Model was first published, states continued to rely on the Models 
prepared by the League. The OECD Model released in 1963 was based on the earlier League 
Model of 1946 and thus states did not have to introduce wholesale changes to their tax 
treaties. Thus, the subsequent UN Model Convention proposed by the UN failed to gain much 
traction in ITL due to resistance to change. Also, states had accepted the residence-source 
compromise formula suggested under the aegis of the League. Had the UN proposed a 
radically different alternative, the international community would almost certainly have 
rejected it.90 For instance, if hypothetically the UN Model Convention had proposed that the 
source states have exclusive right to tax income of MNEs, capital importing states would have 
almost certainly not accepted the Convention. Thus, the UN Model proposed the least 
disruptive option – a greater share in revenue for source states than provided in the OECD 
Model. 
In addition to the wide influence of the OECD Model Convention, the OECD’s manner of 
working has also contributed to its success in shaping ITL. The OECD either adopts 
recommendations or binding decisions. Recommendations are non-binding agreements that 
generally represent policy advice and member states generally use recommendations as a 
means to influence domestic policy and/or as a precursor to a decision. Member states arrive 
at decisions with consensus.91 The decisions are binding on the member states though there 
are no known cases of the OECD imposing sanctions for noncompliance. One of the means 
through which the OECD has been able to achieve consensus among its member states is 
88 
Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku, The Dynamics of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 66. 
89 
Ibid. 
90 
See RJ Vann, ‘The UN Model and Agents: “Wholly or Almost Wholly”’ in Guglielmo Maisto, Angelo 
Nikolakakis, et al (eds.), Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward (IBFD 2012); Also see Henry 
S. Bloch, Cyril E. Heilemann, ‘International Tax Relations’ (1946) 55 Yale L J 1158, at 1164 (discussing 
the role of the UN in developing tax conventions). 
91 
Art 6, OECD Convention (requires consensus for adoption of Recommendations and Decisions, though 
members may abstain and thereby enter the equivalent of a reservation); For a criticism of OECD’s 
consensus approach see Hugh Ault, ‘Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax 
Norms’ (2009) 34 Brook J Int’l L 757, at 763 (‘… if a country A says the world is flat and country B says 
the world is round, after a long discussion, the OECD issues a report that says the world is an attractive 
shape and declares a consensus has been reached...’). 
18
through peer review.92 The OECD uses peer review extensively which ‘has been facilitated by 
the homogeneous membership and the high degree of trust shared among the member 
countries.’93 The membership of the OECD makes it a unique international organisation. It is 
more diverse than other regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) but less diverse than the UN.94 
It reflects the OECD’s uniqueness that that its standards are neither utopian in nature nor a 
mere re-statement of the existing national practices of its various members.95 The OECD sets 
standards which are generally incorporated and adhered to by the member states. JC 
Sharman observes that the ‘very process of having its principles adopted as ‘the international 
standard’ by other international institutions simultaneously strengthens and disguises the 
OECD’s policy influence’.96 There are various reasons for the success of the OECD in ITL – first, 
the OECD effectively became the successor organisation to the League. It benefitted from the 
earlier pioneering work done by various experts and administrators and consolidated their 
efforts. The most visible source of benefit is the OECD Model Tax Convention. Second, in 1955 
when the OECD (then the OEEC) began working on ITL, a significant number of tax treaties 
had already been signed by the states based on the League’s models treaties. 
Thus, the principles proposed in the Model Conventions of the League had begun to be 
accepted by the states. The OECD benefitted from the increasing state acceptance of the 
residence-source compromise formula contained in the tax treaties. Thus, in its initial efforts 
in ITL, the OECD could rely on the treaties in force and the increasing acceptance of the 
source-residence compromise and did not have to propose any radical new rules; unlike the 
League, it did not have to start from scratch. The flipside of the OECD following in the 
footsteps of the League is that like the League, the OECD views ITL as a self-contained world 
of technical tax rules and there is little engagement with international law. The League’s view 
of ITL – as a discipline that was insulated from general international law was partly out 
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of necessity since there were no customary norms or general principles of ITL to rely on. The 
OECD, on the other hand, has paid little attention to the fact that the principles contained in 
tax treaties have been in force for more than seven decades; and whether during this period, 
some of the provisions of the tax treaties have acquired the nature of soft law or general 
principles of law or even customary norms.97 The OECD, however, continues to be a highly 
successful standard-setter in ITL.98 
The nature of the OECD as an organisation has contributed to its success and eventually its 
virtual monopoly in setting standards for international tax policy. First, the membership of 
the OECD is homogenous and allows for a more focused approach. All member states of the 
OECD are democracies and a significant number of member states are capital exporters. Thus, 
the interests of member states are mostly aligned. For instance, all the OECD member states 
have a common interest that the resident states have a greater share in taxing international 
income of multinational enterprises (MNEs).99 Second, it is in part due to the image of the 
OECD as a rich club of liberal democracies that its views have influence beyond the member 
states.100 The OECD’s decisions, reports and recommendations cannot impose legal obligations 
on non-member states101 but they can comply with the OECD endorsed rules as a matter of 
choice – and non-member states have increasingly done so. In my view, the adoption of rules 
and tax practices suggested by the OECD helps in shaping the identity of the non-member 
states as market friendly and receptive to business.102 The adoption of the OECD 
recommended practices by non-member states further solidifies the OECD’s status as the 
primary standard setting organisation in ITL. 
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C. The UN’s Marginal Role since 1945 
After drafting the Model Convention at London in 1946, the Fiscal Committee of the League 
observed in its report that ‘that the work done both in Mexico and in London could be usefully 
reviewed and developed by a balanced group of tax administrators and experts from both 
capital-importing and capital exporting countries and from economically-advanced and less- 
advanced countries, when the League work on international problems is taken over by the 
United Nations.’103 It was against this background that the Economic and Social Council of the 
UN, in its resolution 2 (III) of 1 October 1946, set up a Fiscal Commission which was requested 
to ‘[S]tudy and advise the Council in the field of public finance, particularly in its legal, 
administrative and technical aspects.’104 The Fiscal Commission on International Tax 
Relations, however, stopped functioning in 1954. It is unknown if the working of the 
Commission was stopped due to lack of resources, expertise or any other reason.105 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that since the end of World War II, the UN has played a marginal 
and insignificant role in international taxation policy. The contribution of the UN to ITL has 
essentially been limited to the publication of the UN Model Convention. However, since 2001 
the UN attempted to participate more actively in discussions on international taxation issues. 
It has initiated a Financing for Development initiative. 
The First International Conference on Financing for Development (held in 2002 at Monterrey, 
Mexico) pushed for improvements in international tax co-operation.106 The Second 
International Conference (held in 2008 at Doha) reviewed the progress made since 2002 and 
produced some general statements which included an acknowledgment of the need to 
increase co-operation in international taxation matters.107 The Third Conference (held in 2015 
at Addis Ababa) reiterated the need to increase national regulation and greater international 
co-operation.108 The reports  produced at the above  mentioned conferences  suggest that the 
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focus of the UN is more on domestic resource mobilization and increasing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of domestic tax systems. While the objective is laudable, ITL only appears as 
one of the UN’s many concerns and that is visible mainly in language on the need to increase 
co-operation among states to prevent evasion. 
In 2015, at Addis Ababa, the proposal for an intergovernmental committee on tax under the 
aegis of the UN did not materialise.109 The United Kingdom (UK) and US blocked the proposal 
claiming that the OECD was taking the lead on tax issues.110 The UN Secretary-General in 2011 
had endorsed the need for a representative international body in ITL.111 The proposal for an 
intergovernmental body under the aegis of the UN was a step forward in that direction.112 The 
Committee of Experts that is currently responsible for taxation matters at the UN has limited 
resources and a narrow mandate. However, preventing the shifting of the venue from the 
OECD to the UN, represents the desire of the developed states to let the OECD be the 
exclusive standard setter in ITL. It reflects the desire of influential states to preserve the 
current structure of standard-setting in ITL that is more responsive to their needs. 
Benvenisti and Downs have analysed that powerful states adopt four ‘fragmentation 
strategies’ in order to maintain and exercise disproportionate influence in international 
regulatory agenda.113 They argue that one strategy adopted by the developed states is to shift 
to or create an alternate venue when the original one becomes responsive to the interest of 
weaker states and their agents.114 In the context of ITL, the failed negotiations at Addis Ababa 
suggest that the fragmentation strategy of developed states is to prevent the shifting to an 
alternative venue; for an intergovernmental body at the UN may be more responsive to and 
representative of the needs and priorities of the developing states and would thereby entail a 
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decrease in the influence of the OECD and the developed states.115 Given its membership, the 
OECD is unlikely to prioritise concerns of developing states. States like the UK and the US 
have an interest in preserving the OECD’s pre-eminence in ITL. In view of the above described 
scenario, Arthur J Cockfield’s observation that the OECD is an informal ‘World Tax 
Organisation’116 is accurate and likely to remain true in the near future. 
IV. THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF TAX COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
Tax competition or the competition between states to offer low tax rates or tax incentives to 
investors, constitutes one of the foremost challenges in ITL today.117 Tax competition leads to 
tax arbitrage and is also a contributing cause to tax evasion by MNEs.118 Section IV.A below 
elaborates the past and ongoing efforts of the OECD to address the issue of tax evasion and 
under taxation of MNEs.119 Several states, individually and collectively, are still developing 
legislative and policy responses to address tax evasion. I intend to discuss the issue of tax 
competition among states and tax evasion to foreground my discussion of tax evasion in IIL. In 
investor-state arbitration the issue of tax evasion arises in two forms: first, when investors 
challenge a host state’s tax measures as violative of substantive obligations in IIAs,120 but the 
state takes the defence that the tax measures in questions aim to curb tax evasion; secondly, 
host states raising counterclaims that an investor has not complied with its tax laws and is 
guilty of tax evasion.121 Also, I argue that there is a common concern of treaty shopping in ITL 
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and IIL and the jurisprudence of latter can be used meaningfully in the former. I discuss the 
latter aspect in Section IV.B below.122 
A. The OECD and Harmful Tax Competition 
Until the early 1990s, tax evasion was pre-dominantly a national concern. The US’ adoption of 
measures relating to foreign sales corporations in 1962 was one of the most prominent efforts 
by a state to tackle tax evasion.123 Even the OECD in 1984 suggested that its member states 
should adopt unilateral anti-avoidance measures.124 Ronen Palan argues that in the early 
1990s left-of-center governments came to power in major industrialized states and while 
these governments were committed to socialised education and healthcare, they were not 
prepared to sacrifice the goal of low taxation and hence combating tax evasion became a 
political priority.125 The newly appointed governments’ aim to preserve their tax base in order 
to maintain low tax rates combined with Clinton administration’s identification of direct links 
between money laundering and tax evasion. This led to serious international and multilateral 
efforts to address tax evasion and tax competition.126 The OECD led the most significant 
international effort. 
In May 1996, an OECD Ministerial Communiqué stated the need to develop measures to 
counter the effects of harmful tax competition on investment and financial decisions.127 In 
September 1996, Heads of States of the G-7 ‘strongly urge[d]’ the OECD to vigorously pursue 
its work in the field of harmful tax competition.128 In October 1996, the European Union (EU) 
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issued a report on the development of tax systems in Europe.129 The report endorsed the need 
to eliminate harmful tax competition and supported the need to work with the OECD.130 Due 
to the above mentioned developments, the OECD began its harmful tax competition project. 
In 1998, the OECD published a report that developed criteria to identify harmful tax 
competition and preferential regimes.131 It was followed by subsequent related reports.132 
Even though the OECD’s reports were not binding on the non-member states, the OECD 
curiously adopted an unusually aggressive approach in its harmful tax competition project. In 
the 2000 report, the OECD listed a set of defensive measures that the member states may 
take against jurisdictions that do not co-operate to eliminate their harmful tax practices.133 
The targeted jurisdictions, identified as ‘harmful’, questioned the legitimacy of the OECD’s 
initiative and termed them as undue interference with their national tax sovereignty.134 Later 
in 2000, a newly established organisation – the Centre for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP) - 
began lobbying the US Congress against participation in the OECD project.135 
Partly as a result of extensive lobbying by the CFP, in May 2001, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Paul O‘Neill stated that: ‘The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country 
what its own tax rates or tax systems should be, and will not participate in any initiative to 
harmonize world tax systems. The United States simply has no interest in stifling the 
competition that forces governments – like businesses—to create efficiencies.’136 The 
statement is widely believed to have contributed to undercutting the OECD’s efforts and 
marked an effective end to the OECD project.137 Thereafter, the OECD narrowed the focus of 
its efforts and concentrated on increasing transparency in jurisdictions and began stressing 
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the need for better exchange of tax-related information between states to curb international 
tax evasion.138 
Allison Christians argues that the harmful tax competition project was the first time that the 
OECD articulated the existence of a global social contract among states.139 In other words, in 
trying to persuade states not to adopt harmful tax practices, the OECD was urging states to 
recognise their international responsibility towards other states. Allison Christians’ argument 
is convincing and highlights the change in the OECD’s vocabulary. OECD’s language, however, 
still falls short of acknowledging that ITL is part of general international law. Thus, to 
reiterate, that there is one constant feature of ITL that has continued from the League to the 
present-day work of the OECD – a limited engagement of ITL with general international law, 
the lack of any reference to customary norms or general principles of law in ITL, existing or 
emerging. 
Given the original aims and the actual achievement – the OECD harmful tax competition 
project is widely (and correctly) believed to have fallen short of its goals. The project 
nonetheless, due to its timing and the OECD’s approach was an important development in ITL. 
I argue that the OECD’s harmful tax competition project significantly shifted the nature and 
trajectory of ITL. Additionally, I also suggest that the harmful tax competition project has 
altered the OECD’s approach and its position in international tax policy. 
First, due to harmful tax competition, the focus in ITL since 1998 has changed significantly. 
ITL’s primary aim moved from the prevention of international double taxation to the 
prevention of tax evasion. In the 1927 report, the League had emphasised on the importance 
of the principle - that incomes should be taxed once.140 But, for seven decades, the 
prevention of tax evasion was ancillary to the goal of preventing double taxation. Provisions 
relating to exchange of tax information were included in tax treaties, but tax evasion was 
effectively relegated to the domestic sphere – the fight against it was perceived to be the 
individual responsibility of national tax authorities. Also, the League and states did not 
foresee the importance that intangibles such as intellectual property would acquire in 
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international taxation.141 The shift of focus was evident when in 2002 the OECD released a 
Model Tax Convention on Tax Information Exchange. Since 2002, various states have entered 
into standalone bilateral tax information exchange agreements based on the aforementioned 
Model. In 2013, the OECD has also launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project 
with a view to comprehensively address international tax evasion. The OECD has since 
released comprehensive reports detailing the changes required to curb international tax 
evasion.142 Thus, while states gave primacy from 1923-1998 to curb international double 
taxation, the fight against international tax evasion became ITL’s dominant concern from 1998 
onwards. 
Second, the reactions to the OECD’s harmful tax competition project have once again brought 
sovereignty-related argument in ITL to the fore. States framed their opposition to the OECD- 
led project primarily framed in sovereignty terms.143 The failure of the OECD’s harmful tax 
competition project has lent additional credibility to the argument that states possess wide, 
if not complete discretion, in taxation policy. In my view, the inability of the OECD’s harmful 
tax competition project to achieve its immediate aims also means that bilateral efforts in ITL 
will continue to be the norm and states will continue to resist any multilateral efforts by 
claiming that the sovereign right to tax is unfettered by any international norms. In fact, the 
OECD’s post-2002 emphasis on tax information exchange mirrors the pre-1998 strategy used in 
ITL – a non-binding OECD Model Convention has been released and states are entering into an 
increasing number of bilateral tax information exchange treaties based on the Model 
Convention.144 Thomas Rixen observes that while the challenges before ITL ‘lead us to expect 
reform efforts in the direction of multilateralism, but due to systemic rigidity change will only 
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be partial and incremental.’145 Tax competition continues to remain an important challenge 
partly because of the increased prominence of sovereignty in international tax relations. 
Third, the harmful tax competition project has also altered the OECD’s subsequent modus 
operandi. Whether this change in the OECD’s approach is permanent or temporary remains to 
be seen, but two important developments are evident. First, as a result of the severe 
criticism and backlash it received from civil society and non-member states on its harmful tax 
competition project, the OECD has tried to engage non member states in its recent 
initiatives. One of the OECD’s earlier initiatives – a proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) was unsuccessful partly due to successful lobbying by civil society against 
the OECD.146 On the other hand, the harmful tax competition failed, in part, due to lack of 
proper communication with the non-member states which were targeted for supporting 
harmful tax practices. While the MAI experience underlined the importance of engaging with 
the civil society, the harmful tax competition project has made the OECD aware of the need 
to engage with non-member states. The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes represents the OECD’s efforts to engage with more states beyond 
Europe and North America.147 It is doubtful, however, if the engagement that has taken place 
to date is meaningful. Even though the OECD mentions that all members of the Forum have 
‘an equal footing’, the role of Forum is to ensure implementation of transparency standards.
148 Non-member states are unlikely to influence the content of the transparency standards. 
Second, the OECD is now working closely with other organisations like the G-20 on combating 
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OECD will hereafter work with the G-20 on a permanent basis or only on certain projects. The 
implications of the OECD/G-20 partnership are discussed below. 
The G-20 is marginally more representative than the OECD, because it includes developed and 
developing states. Thus certain states like China, India, Russia and South Africa which are not 
members of the OECD can contribute to developments in ITL by using their G-20 membership. 
Also, it is likely that that the partnership will have a complementary effect – the OECD’s 
technical expertise and the political leadership of the G-20 can together drive the reform 
process in ITL. Critically, the OECD/G-20 partnership is likely to help ITL emerge as a more 
prominent sub-discipline of international economic law. This is because even though the G-20 
engages with general international law only to a limited extent, it currently influences the 
work of various other organisations that contribute to international economic governance – 
the Basel Committee, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commission among others.150 The aforementioned organisations are 
standard setters in international finance. The inclusion of the OECD alongside the above- 
mentioned organisations that work with the G-20 would bring a greater focus on the role of 
the OECD in ITL. The OECD has previously worked with organisations like the FATF but its 
importance in international economic governance, especially in ITL, is not emphasised 
enough.151 
The nature of the OECD/G-20 partnership is uncertain but it is likely to be beneficial to the 
OECD. By working closely with the G-20, even if temporarily, the OECD is benefitting from the 
political salience that international tax evasion has recently acquired.152 The OECD has been 
careful to maintain its central position in ITL and has ensured that the G-20 does not become 
the sole and more important player in ITL. Currently, it seems the partnership with the G-20 
is likely to strengthen the OECDs’ position as the primary standard setting organisation in ITL 
and remain the pre-dominant organisation in ITL. 
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Beyond the efforts of the OECD and the G-20, there are also proposals for a multilateral tax 
treaty.153 It is argued that bilateral tax treaties cannot adequately curtail international tax 
evasion and a multilateral agreement would be more effective.154 However, in almost all the 
recommendations and proposals advocating a multilateral tax treaty, one witnesses a lack of 
reference to either general international law or other sub-disciplines of international 
economic law.155 I suggest that viewing ITL as a discipline that is completely removed from 
general international law is not appropriate. In particular, I suggest that taking into account 
the jurisprudence in other sub-disciplines such as IIL, could add useful insights on how to 
address tax competition and the related problem of tax evasion. 
B. The Common Concern of Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law and 
International Tax Law156 
Investors incorporate companies in certain jurisdictions to benefit from favourable tax 
policies and tax treaties. Additionally, investors are also attracted by the possibility of seeking 
IIA protection. The tribunal in Aguas del Tunari has observed that absent a particular 
limitation, it is ‘not illegal to locate one’s operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a 
beneficial regulatory and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the 
substantive law of the jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.’157 However, some IIAs 
do provide certain limitations and contracting states reserve the right to deny an investor the 
benefits of the IIA. These limitations are contained in so-called denial-of-benefits clauses. 
Article 17 of the ECT provides that a contracting state may deny benefits to ‘a legal entity if 
citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if that entity has no 
 
153 
See Diane M. Ring, ‘Prospects for a Multilateral Tax Treaty’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn J Int’l L 1699; Michael 
Lang, et al (eds.), Multilateral Tax Treaties New Developments in International Tax Law (Kluwer Law 
International 1998) 197 (contains a proposed draft of a multilateral tax treaty). 
154 
See, for instance, Richard J Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region (Part 1 and 
2)’ (1991) 45 Bull’n Int’l Fisc Doc 99, at 103. 
155 
OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties (2014) (a report 
endorsed by the G- 20, which concluded that a multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible); 
OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 – Final Report 
(2015). 
156 
See Jorun Baumgartner, Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2016 ) 7 (the author suggests that treaty shopping is a well-known problem in ITL and has increasingly 
started to appear in investor-state arbitration as well). 
157 
Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Republic of Bolivia ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 
October 2005) para 330. 
 30
substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized.’158 
The above mentioned provision endorses the principle that an investor seeking protection of 
an IIA needs to have an economic connection with the state whose nationality it claims.159 The 
failure to prove an economic connection can disqualify the investor from seeking the benefit 
of the relevant IIA. The denial of benefits clause is not part of every IIA and tribunals have 
stated that it is a deliberate choice of the state parties.160 At the same time, there is no 
single test to define the link required between the legal person seeking protection under an 
IIA and the contracting state under whose IIA the investor asks for protection.161 There is no 
consistent jurisprudence of investor-state tribunals on denial-of-benefits clause, though the 
tribunals in various awards have recognised the undesirability of treaty shopping by investors 
and their use of shell companies. 
In Mobil v Venezuela, the tribunal observed that restructuring by an investor in order to gain 
access to ICSID arbitration was a perfectly legitimate goal.162 However, the tribunal added 
that held that restructuring was legitimate only in respect of disputes arising after the 
restructuring and not in respect of disputes predating the restructuring and declined 
jurisdiction over the latter.163 In Phoenix Action, share transactions were conducted where an 
Israeli company purchased shares in a Czech company to file claim under the Czech Republic- 
Israel BIT. The tribunal declined jurisdiction and held that investment was made in bad faith, 
was an attempt to gain jurisdiction under the BIT and such disputes constitute an ‘abusive 
manipulation of the system of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention 
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and the BITs’.164 Other tribunals have shown ‘sympathy’ for the argument that shell 
companies should not be allowed to invoke provisions of IIAs but have respected the intention 
of the contracting states and treaty provisions.165 There are several other aspects of denial of 
benefits clause such as whether they can be applied retrospectively and whether they are 
related to jurisdiction or admissibility.166 It is not within the scope of this thesis to highlight 
all the aspects. The purpose of this section is to highlight that the tribunals have recognised 
and supported the underlying rationale for the denial of benefits clause – the prevention of 
treaty shopping. 
Treaty shopping is a prominent concern in ITL too. MNEs use the tax treaty network to their 
advantage and practice tax arbitrage. Typically, the strategy of tax treaty shopping is similar 
to IIL - a holding company is incorporated in a third jurisdiction to take advantage of a 
bilateral tax treaty which would not be possible otherwise. MNEs often use intra-group 
arrangements to shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.167 This 
practice is considered problematic because the profits reported in both jurisdictions are not 
commensurate with real economic activity in either of the two jurisdictions. Ordinarily, MNEs 
conduct a significant part of their business in bigger economies that are generally also high- 
tax jurisdictions but are able to report profits in a low-tax jurisdiction where a subsidiary is 
incorporated. The OECD has acknowledged that the wide network of tax treaties provides 
opportunities for treaty shopping in ITL.168 It has recommended that states can either 
characterise abuse of tax treaty provisions as abuse of provisions of domestic law or states 
may treat treaty shopping as an abuse of the tax treaty itself. States have adopted various 
approaches such as piercing of corporate veil or ‘look through’ approach or the ‘substantial 
interest’ test. However, the OECD has stated that the various approaches adopted by the 
states are unsatisfactory.169 
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The inability of the domestic tax laws and tax treaties to prevent profit shifting forms the 
core concern of the OECD BEPS project.170 To curb international tax evasion, the OECD, inter 
alia, has proposed country-by-country reporting.171 The OECD’s proposal, in effect, suggests 
that profits declared in jurisdictions should be commensurate with the economic activity in 
the jurisdiction. Similar principle informs the denial-of-benefits clause in IIAs.172 Additionally, 
treaty shopping undermines the reciprocity that informs various tax treaties and IIAs. A state 
whose nationals can take advantage of treaties signed by other states has a less reason to 
conclude its own treaties.173 
The common concern of treaty shopping in ITL and IIL can be utilised in a meaningful manner. 
The purpose of this section is not to suggest that the approach in IIL to minimise treaty 
shopping can be adopted in ITL as is. Instead, the purpose is to highlight that the OECD’s 
approach to curb BEPS need not contain itself only to the limited universe of tax treaties. 
Other sub-disciplines of international law such as IIL can offer a useful insight and play a 
complementary role in curbing tax evasion. As elaborated above, the notion of states insisting 
on economic allegiance with the state whose nationality is claimed by an investor is not 
entirely novel in international law. It has been included in several IIAs and applied by 
tribunals. The OECD through its BEPS project is also trying to emphasise that MNEs should 
declare profits in jurisdictions where business is conducted. The jurisprudence of IIL can lend 
additional support to OECD’s proposals and efforts to curb international tax evasion and profit 
shifting. The OECD can anchor its suggestions in international law principles that are already 
recognised by states though in a different context.174 
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
In this Section, I engage with but disagree with Reuven S. Avi-Yonah’s argument that some 
principles in tax treaties have acquired the nature of customary norms. I suggest that viewing 
some of the principles in the tax treaties as customary norms is premature; instead it would 
170 
See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013). 
171 
See OECD, Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 
13: 2014 Deliverable (2014); OECD, Action 13: Guidance on the Implementation of Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (2015). 
172 
The nature of treaty shopping in ITL however can be broader in scope as compared to treaty 
shopping in IIL. The former tends to include concealment of income in certain jurisdictions and not 
merely profit shifting. 
173 
See Rachel Thorn, Jennifer Doucleff, supra note 161, at 21. 
174 
International law can be used in addition to anti-avoidance rules adopted by the states in their 
domestic tax laws. 
 33
be more appropriate to view them as general principles of law. I further suggest that these 
principles, though not customary norms, should be taken into account to resolve and 
adjudicate international tax disputes such as tax-related investment disputes. For instance, 
the tribunals in the Burlington and the Feldman awards referred to customary international 
law and taxation powers of a state without examining whether there are customary norms in 
ITL.175 Similarly, when addressing arguments on non-discrimination, tribunals can engage with 
the concept of non-discrimination as developed under ITL and how it constrains state 
behaviour.176 This could improve the accuracy of the awards, the reasoning and thereby 
influence the conclusions of the tribunals. 
Avi-Yonah argues that ITL can and should be understood as international law, and that parts of 
ITL are customary international law.177 Avi-Yonah observes that ‘we should not pretend that 
there are no binding, widely accepted international tax norms that we should flout only when 
significant national interests are at stake.’178 Avi-Yonah views ITL as a genuine sub- discipline 
of international law. He was the first to elaborately argue and conclude that the 
‘international tax regime rises to the level of customary international law.’179 More 
specifically, in his view the following are customary ITL norms: the principle of non- 
discrimination – that nationals of a treaty partner should not be treated worse than its own 
nationals is part of CIL;180 the arm’s length standard applied to transfer pricing by MNEs; and 
the restrictions on state jurisdiction to tax non-residents who have no connection with the 
state.181 
Yet I argue that there is no evidence of a sufficiently uniform state practice or opinio juris to 
acknowledge that some of the principles in tax treaties now have the nature of customary 
norms. To begin with, the existence of thousands of similar tax treaties alone does not 
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warrant the conclusion that some of their principles are customary.182 On the other hand, the 
widespread presence of tax treaties may suggest that there are certain general principles of 
law in ITL. Second, Avi-Yonah does not discuss opinio juris– the other element of custom.183 
Whether states act out of a legal obligation when not bound by bilateral tax treaties is an 
open question. I highlight the lack of uniform state practice and absence of opinio juris in the 
paragraphs below. 
The attribution of motives to states is a notoriously difficult.184 This makes the task of 
analysing opinio juris difficult. Opinio juris is the psychological element associated with the 
formation of a customary rule and helps characterise state practice – to determine whether 
states view it as binding or not.185 It has been acknowledged that the conduct of states is only 
an evidence of the subjectivities;186 since we cannot rethink what states will, we are stuck 
with the physical manifestations thereof.187 There is, however, no other way than to ascertain 
the existence of opinio juris from the fact of external existence. 
The belief of a state being under a legal obligation is absent in ITL. For instance, the fact that 
a particular state complies with the ‘single tax principle’ by granting foreign tax credits, 
deductions or exemptions, even in the absence of a tax treaties, does not necessarily mean 
that the state considers itself legally obliged to grant it. The context in which such tax reliefs 
are granted is vital to determine the existence of a legal obligation.188 In the absence of a tax 
treaty, a person seeking tax exemption from a non-signatory state typically does so under a 
provision of the domestic tax law of that particular state. The state can alleviate the burden 
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of the taxpayer by not imposing a tax the second time, but it also retains the discretion to 
not grant the relief. 
Let us consider a case where the state is a signatory to a tax treaty. Certain tax treaties 
provide for the maximum tax rate that a source state can apply to certain incomes such as 
royalties and technical fees. The resident state also imposes a tax on the same income. 
Strictly speaking, the same income is taxed twice.189 Thus, the single tax principle is not 
followed by states in all circumstances and for all incomes. In such a scenario, the argument 
that the single tax principle is a customary norm does not seem convincing.190 
There is, however, room for states to enter into special relationships in matters relating to 
international under-taxation or non-taxation.191 For instance, in certain states like India a 
substantial part of foreign investment is channelled through Mauritius and a similar 
relationship exists between China and Hong Kong. In these situations, the ‘single tax 
principle’ – that every international transaction should be taxed at least once can either be 
reiterated or dispensed with by states. Thus, states that share a special or close economic 
relationship can enter into an arrangement to tax certain transactions only once and the same 
principle can over time attain the status of a regional or a special customary norm binding on 
the relevant states or jurisdictions.192 
The other element of customary norms is state practice found, among others, in executive 
statements, legislations and court decisions of states.193 Domestic legislations that throw light 
on the manner of implementation of tax treaties are relevant and instructive. For instance, in 
the United Kingdom, rights and obligations contained in a constitutive treaty do not have 
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effect unless an implementing legislation is enacted. However, the provisions of a declaratory 
treaty will be applied automatically by domestic courts (qua customary law) even in the 
absence of specific incorporation by a statute.194 There are no known instances where 
provisions of tax treaties enforced in UK without an implementing legislation. 
Vik Kanwar accurately observes that national courts and administrative agencies are the 
central actors in ITL whereas international tribunals rarely deal with tax law; tax disputes 
reach the international plane only incidentally as part of a larger dispute involving other 
elements.195 Thus, in the absence of international tax jurisprudence,196 national court 
decisions are a central type of state practice in considering whether ITL represents customary 
international law.197 
Examining the role of national courts in creation of custom involves considering the status of 
courts interpreting international law, the composition of the courts and the possibility of 
inconsistency with other branches of government – legislature and executive.198 It is also 
important to examine the jurisprudence of a several states and not just a few dominant 
states. Avi-Yonah does not address the role of national courts in ITL, their jurisprudence or 
their interpretive approaches to tax treaties. Also, Avi-Yonah’s argument could be 
strengthened by greater reliance on the state practice of states other than the United States. 
Additionally, it needs to be noted that numerous international tax relations between states, 
treaty-based or otherwise, are unique and specific to those states. Admittedly, many bilateral 
tax treaties have identical provisions that could potentially amount to customary 
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international law.199 However, a closer look may suggest that the provisions in tax treaties 
may be insufficiently similar to constitute uniform state practice. For example, let us 
consider the definition of the Permanent Establishment (PE). The UK-Italy tax treaty, for 
instance, states that a PE shall include a building site which exists for more than 12 months;
200 the UK-India tax treaty however states that a PE shall include a building site which 
continues for a period not exceeding 6 months.201 The lower threshold for a PE is beneficial 
for the source state. Being a net capital importer it would serve its interests better for it 
would give it a right to tax an economic transaction even though the same took place on its 
territory for a comparatively short period; a net capital exporter on the other hand would 
prefer a higher threshold for a PE to preserve a greater scope for taxation as a residence 
state. Thus, the fact that the UN Model (to which India subscribes) prescribes a lower 
threshold for a PE led to a deviation from the OECD Model (to which the UK subscribes) in the 
eventual UK-India tax treaty that was finally concluded. The above mentioned provisions 
illustrate that amongst the tax treaties there are lots of variations driven by the quid pro quo 
nature of some of the provisions. The relation between two states often produces a specific 
kind of treaty introducing variations among tax treaties.202 The variations among tax treaties 
underscore the lack of uniformity among tax treaties. 
Furthermore, the absence of MFN clauses in tax treaties indicates the intention of the states 
to keep international tax relations strictly bilateral in nature – a notable difference to IIAs. 
Stephan Schill has argued that the presence of the MFN clause in BITs prevents a state from 
entering into bilateral quid pro quo bargains that extend preferential treatment to certain 
states and exclude its other treaty partners.203 Thus, he argues, MFN clauses contribute to 
multilateralizing the bilateral treaty relationships in IIL.204 Moreover, MFN clauses in IIAs are 
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not applicable to taxation measures of states; this is because states wish to preserve their 
autonomy to extend tax incentives to certain states while excluding other states.205 
While bilateralism has contributed to many tax treaties that are identically worded, national 
courts may not interpret them in similar fashion. And, crucially, the differently worded 
provisions in bilateral treaties prevent the emergence of sufficient uniformity among the tax 
treaties. As discussed above in Section III, bilateralism is pre-dominant in ITL primarily 
through the legal instrument of tax treaties. Due to more than 3000 bilateral tax treaties, 
certain principles of ITL are found in many legal systems.206 
The above discussion does establish that there is certainly a widespread presence of tax 
treaties. Also, certain principles of tax treaties are part of many domestic tax laws. In view of 
these factors, I suggest that certain principles should be accepted as general principles of 
law.207 Article 38(1), Statute of the ICJ recognizes ‘the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations’ as one of the sources of law. The general principles are generally understood 
as the principles found in almost all legal systems of the world.208 For instance, the principle 
of non-discrimination is applied in almost all jurisdictions to ensure the demands of justice 
are met in tax disputes. Similarly, a large majority of states accept that tax liability cannot be 
imposed without identifying a nexus – either source based or residence based. 
Certain elements of ITL are common to the tax laws of many due to the wide presence of tax 
treaties and their interpretation by domestic courts. This, in my view, leads to two 
conclusions: first, that with many bilateral treaties, ITL constitutes a sub-discipline of 
international law; second, that there are some general principles in ITL though they are yet 
to attain the nature of customary norms. As I elaborate in the latter part of this thesis, both 
these features of ITL should inform deliberations of investor-state tribunals in tax-related 
investment disputes. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
ITL has a long history, more than two thousand tax treaties, an increasing number of tax 
information exchange agreements, soft law in the form of Model Conventions and yet it has, 
by and large, escaped the attention of international lawyers. This chapter looked at ITL from 
the perspective of public international law. In the absence of any customary norms, the 
League, a trailblazer in ITL, extrapolated certain principles from domestic tax laws and 
invited its members to formulate rules to prevent international double taxation. The tax 
treaties signed by states thereafter have to a large extent managed to combat international 
double taxation, but, addressing international tax evasion continues to be a challenge. 
The OECD is currently the dominant organisation in ITL and the successor of the League. Due 
to the UN’s own incapability and developed states pursuing their own interests, the UN has 
been unable to make any major impact on international tax policy. The OECD’s position as 
the sole standard setter in ITL has been further strengthened due to its recent partnership 
with the G-20 in the Global Transparency and the BEPS project. It may provide the OECD 
more visibility in international economic governance and bring a greater focus on its role in 
ITL. Additionally, the OECD is looking to find a solution to international tax evasion. I suggest 
that the OECD should address one major shortcoming in its approach – viewing ITL in isolation 
and instead should consider it as part of the broader discipline of international law. In my 
view, correcting its perspective may make the OECD’s efforts more effective. I suggest that 
there is a common concern of treaty shopping in ITL and IIL – and that the jurisprudence of 
latter can prove useful in ITL. 
I argue that the principle underlying the denial of benefits clauses in IIAs and the 
jurisprudence in IIL can be meaningfully used in ITL. A coherent approach of preventing treaty 
shopping anchored in international law can be proposed by the OECD as part of its BEPS 
project aimed at addressing international tax evasion. By taking cognizance of other sub- 
disciplines of international law, it is argued, a comprehensive solution to international tax 
evasion can be proposed. Thereafter, I discuss the argument of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah that some 
of the principles contained in tax treaties have acquired the nature of customary norms. I 
highlight the limitations of Avi-Yonah’s argument and point out that the principles contained 
in tax treaties have acquired the nature of general principles of law. These principles, I 
suggest, should inform our understanding of ITL especially by investor-state tribunals when 
adjudicating on tax-related investment disputes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPARING DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER TAX TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares and examines dispute resolution mechanisms under tax treaties and 
IIAs i.e. the Mutual Agreement Procedure (the MAP) and tax arbitration as provided under the 
former and investor-state arbitration under the latter. Taxpayers and tax practitioners have 
widely criticised the MAP for it involves delays, lacks transparency and does not offer the 
assurance that the dispute will eventually be resolved.209 To overcome some of the limitations 
of the MAP, certain states have incorporated tax arbitration in their tax treaties.210 
Additionally, tax-related disputes have also arisen under IIAs.211 While the nature and kind of 
disputes that arise under IIAs are different from the ones that arise under tax treaties,212 I 
suggest that comparing dispute resolution mechanisms of tax treaties and IIAs is instructive to 
examine the role provided in each for the states and private parties.213 
Under the MAP, competent authorities of the contracting states can resolve a dispute through 
administrative negotiations. A taxpayer (resident of either of the contracting states) can 
initiate the MAP if in its opinion the tax imposed or likely to be imposed contravenes the tax 
treaty. Recognising that the authorities are not always able to arrive at an agreement under 
the MAP, certain states have also introduced the additional remedy of tax arbitration.214 If 
unresolved under the MAP, either the taxpayer or the competent authorities refer the dispute, 
or unresolved elements of the dispute to arbitration.215 Under tax arbitration, the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction is limited to choosing the positions presented by the parties with each side 
making its ‘last best offer.’ 
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Under IIAs, investor-state arbitration is the primary method to resolve tax-related investment 
disputes. If the investor believes that a certain tax measure or interpretation of a tax law or 
administration of tax law violates the substantive obligations of the state under an IIA, it can 
argue its case before the arbitral tribunal. The characteristic feature of investor-state 
arbitration is the ability of an investor to directly initiate proceedings against the host state. 
The investor does not have to depend on its home state to begin the arbitral proceedings. 
However, the crucial difference between tax-related investment disputes and other 
investment disputes is the tax veto. In tax-related investment disputes, the tax veto is an 
important procedural step that involves filtering of arbitration claims by the competent 
authorities of the contracting states.216 
There are significant differences in the dispute resolution mechanisms provided under tax 
treaties and IIAs. To begin with, the MAP is a consultative mechanism and is at best an 
administrative remedy; while, arbitral awards by investor-state arbitral tribunals are binding 
on the states and investors. Further, states dominate dispute resolution under tax treaties 
through their ‘competent authorities’.217 Under tax treaties, the taxpayer only has the right 
to initiate the MAP proceedings; whereas competent authorities of the signatory states 
control the duration and pace of the entire dispute resolution process. Under IIAs, state have 
a pre-dominant role in exercising the tax veto, but during arbitral proceedings, the investor 
can fully participate in the proceedings. However, there are also certain commonalities and 
overlaps in the dispute resolution mechanisms of tax treaties and IIAs. For example, certain 
IIAs provide that investor-state tribunals can adjudicate disputes arising under tax treaties 
under certain circumstances.218 
There is an increasing emphasis in IIL on the need for a more balanced and nuanced 
interpretive approach by the investor-state tribunals. Tribunals have been criticised for their 
inclination towards protection of the investor.219 In addition, investors have greater control 
over the dispute resolution process under IIAs since they can independently initiate and fully 
participate in proceedings before investor-state tribunals. To recalibrate the balance between 
the states and investors, it has been argued that states must exercise their ongoing role in 
the interpretation of IIAs and ensure a greater involvement of the states in the 
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adjudicative process.220 In contrast, in ITL, the pendulum has started to swing towards more 
involvement of taxpayers in dispute resolution. The recent introduction of tax arbitration in 
some tax treaties represents a partial recognition of the need for greater involvement of 
taxpayers in the dispute resolution process. The ICC has also proposed a tax arbitration 
system whereby taxpayers are given direct access to arbitration.221 The ‘direct’ form of tax 
arbitration that the ICC proposed has yet to be implemented, partly because the OECD 
member states disagree on the need and desirability of providing a remedy whereby a 
taxpayer may directly initiate a claim against a state in an international forum.222 In an 
attempt to examine and compare the dispute resolution under tax treaties and IIAs, this 
chapter proceeds as follows: 
Section II critically examines the dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the tax 
treaties - the MAP and tax arbitration, and highlights their shortcomings. In Section III, I 
examine tax veto, a special procedural mechanism under IIAs for tax-related investment 
disputes. Tax veto, I argue, is unduly balanced in favour of states, especially when compared 
to the advantages that investor-state arbitration provides to investors in disputes that are not 
tax related. I also compare tax veto with the MAP to bring out their differences and 
similarities. Additionally, I examine the provision in certain IIAs that allows taxpayers direct 
access to investor-state arbitral tribunals for disputes arising under tax treaties. Section IV 
discusses the possible role that states can play in disputes relating to international tax. I 
examine the role of joint interpretive statements in ITL and suggest that state-state 
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arbitration could be a better alternative to tax arbitration (as it currently exists) for 
international tax disputes. Section V concludes. 
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER TAX TREATIES 
The UN Charter requires parties to any dispute to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.223 Tax treaties provide for a 
combination of these various possible means to settle disputes. The pre-dominant form of 
dispute resolution mechanism in tax treaties – the MAP - is a form of consultative mechanism 
between the competent authorities of the contracting states. In 2008, the OECD also 
incorporated a provision for tax arbitration in the OECD Model.224 The UN also subsequently 
incorporated arbitration in the UN Model.225 The introduction of tax arbitration has prompted 
speculation about the impact and role of arbitration in international tax disputes.226 In the 
sub-sections below, I examine the nature of both the MAP and tax arbitration. 
A. Absence of Dispute Resolution Provisions in 19thcentury Tax Treaties 
The earliest international agreement relating to international taxation was signed in 1843 
between Belgium and France.227 The agreement did not contain a dispute resolution provision 
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and only referred to mutual assistance and co-operation among the contracting states.228 
States signed a number of treaties on mutual assistance during this period but they did not 
contain a dispute resolution mechanism in the strict sense of the term.229 Even the 
agreements concerning income tax merely provided that any potential dispute may be 
resolved by an understanding between the parties and thereafter steps may be taken in 
accordance with the understanding.230 There was no specific mention of the taxpayer’s right 
to petition any of the states or an obligation on the states that required them to arrive at an 
understanding.231 
B. Dispute Resolution Provisions in the Model Conventions of the League 
In 1927, the League prepared four Model Conventions. Article 14 of the Bilateral Convention 
for the Prevention of Double Taxation provided for the resolution of disputes for the first 
time.232 It provided that the two contracting states should directly settle a dispute regarding 
the interpretation or application of the convention. If the states failed to settle the dispute, 
they could submit it to a technical body which the Council of the League may appoint. The 
technical body would give an advisory opinion after hearing the states and arrange a meeting 
between them if necessary. The provision further provided that the states may agree, 
beforehand, to regard the advisory opinion given by the technical body as final. In the 
absence of such an agreement, the opinion was non-binding and states were free to have 
further recourse to any arbitral or judicial procedure.233 In 1928, the League prepared three 
versions of the above mentioned Model Convention and in each version retained the same 
dispute resolution provision mentioned above.234 The Model Convention revised in 1935 also 
retained the same dispute resolution provision.235 
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Some of the earlier tax treaties incorporated interesting dispute resolution provisions. The 
1926 treaty between United Kingdom and Irish Free State provided that any dispute in 
relation to the interpretation of the agreement shall be determined by such tribunal as may 
be agreed by the parties and that the decision of the tribunal shall be binding on the parties.
236 In a similar fashion, a treaty between Romania and Czechoslovak Republic in 1934 on 
succession duties required that the states shall submit the dispute to such technical 
organisation that the Fiscal Committee of the League may determine and the award shall be 
binding without any right of appeal.237 The agreement among the parties agreeing to be 
bound by the decision of an independent tribunal on a tax dispute was exceptional. It 
reflected a certain degree of trust reposed by states in the tribunals and the League.238 As 
Chapter 1 showed, from 1921-1946 the League played a central role in the development of 
ITL. It is perhaps a reflection of the League’s prominence in international tax policy from 
1921 onwards that a treaty signed by states in 1934 involved the League in the dispute 
resolution process.239 The above-mentioned dispute resolution provisions of the Model 
Conventions and the treaties, however, later gave way to the MAP. 
The MAP appeared in the Model Conventions of the League for the first time in the Mexico 
Model Convention of 1943. Article XVI of the Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of 
the Double Taxation of Income provided that when a taxpayer shows proof that the action of 
the tax administration of one of the contracting states has resulted in double taxation, he 
shall be entitled to lodge a claim with the tax administration of the state in which he has his 
fiscal domicile or of which he is a national. If the claim was admitted, the competent tax 
administration of that state shall consult directly with the competent authority of the other 
state with a view to reaching an agreement for an equitable avoidance of double taxation. 
The provision in the Mexico Model Convention prepared in 1943 was retained in the London 
Model Convention prepared in 1946 (Art XVII). Essentially the same provision is part of every 
modern bilateral tax treaty and tax information exchange agreement. 
236 
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The Commentaries to the London and the Mexico Model Conventions do not provide any 
insight or explain the reason for the change in the dispute resolution provision. The removal 
of the earlier provision which provided that a technical body may give an advisory opinion is 
puzzling.240 This is especially because states had the discretion to agree beforehand whether 
they would be bound by the opinion of the technical body or not. The Commentaries to the 
London and Mexico Model Conventions emphasise two aspects of the dispute resolution 
mechanisms contained in the Model Conventions: first, the League emphasised that the 
taxpayers’ right to appeal to the tax administration was intended to supplement and not 
replace the judicial remedies available domestically; second, the League clarified that the 
dispute settlement procedure provided in the Model Conventions was designed as a 
consultation between the two tax administrations and not as a judicial procedure.241 
Since 1946, states have rarely agreed to be bound by the award of an independent tribunal in 
international tax disputes.242 The norm has been that in relation to any dispute under a tax 
treaty, both states will seek to arrive at an understanding to resolve the dispute. 
C. The Mutual Agreement Procedure and its Limitations243 
Tax treaties typically provide that any person who is a resident of either contracting state can 
initiate the MAP if it considers that the actions of one or both of the contracting states result 
or will result for that person in taxation not in accordance with the tax treaty.244 There are 
various in-built filters in this provision that ensure state control over the MAP: firstly, the 
competent authority of the residence state can reject the request if it deems it to be 
unqualified; secondly, the competent authority can arrive at a solution unilaterally – 
unilateral solution is generally possible where the complaint relating to double taxation is due 
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to the actions or measures of the residence state itself; thirdly, if the competent authority is 
unable to resolve the case unilaterally, the obligation is to endeavour to resolve the case by 
mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other contracting state; fourthly, the 
obligation on the competent authorities is that they ‘shall endeavour’ to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution. Put differently, the competent authorities are not bound to resolve the 
dispute, or to do so within a specified period. Further, the MAP lacks transparency as no case 
studies are publicly available. 
At the outset of the MAP, the competent authority of the resident state decides whether the 
complaint is justified.245 A unilateral decision is generally not possible because if the 
measures of the resident state are responsible for double taxation then it is unlikely to undo 
its own decision unless it is a blatantly erroneous imposition of tax. In this respect, the OECD 
has recommended that taxpayers can initially approach the competent authority of either of 
the two contracting states, rather than just the resident state.246 Thus, at the initial stage 
itself both the authorities can give their opinion on the legality or otherwise of the tax 
liability. The OECD has clarified that in such a scenario, the initial opinions of both the 
competent authorities will be independent assessments of the complaint of the taxpayer. 
Thus, the next stage – consultations between the two authorities would still be an option even 
if both authorities are approached at the initial stage.247 It is a welcome suggestion and 
should be incorporated in the tax treaties. It will help improve access to the MAP. 
The OECD has also stressed other additional measures to better access to the MAP.248 It has 
recommended that states should publish rules, guidelines, and procedures to provide better 
access to the MAP. According to the OECD, it is important that states should draft the rules in 
plain language, make them transparent and readily accessible to the public.249 The OECD’s 
emphasis on providing a better access to the MAP is to increase awareness of the competent 
authorities of states on the importance of the MAP and prevent them from casually rejecting 
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a taxpayer’s request. The OECD’s suggestions if incorporated by states will certainly improve 
access to the MAP.250 
If the dispute is not resolved at the first stage, the competent authorities are required to 
address it mutually. However, it is possible for the other competent authority to refuse to 
enter into negotiations and also it is not under any obligation to disclose the reasons for the 
refusal. It is only when both the competent authorities agree to negotiate the dispute, that 
the obligation to endeavour to resolve the dispute is triggered.251 This obligation is, however, 
without a corresponding obligation to actually arrive at a decision. Thus, the MAP, as it exists 
today, can be understood by the League’s original characterisation of the dispute settlement 
in tax treaties – a consultative mechanism and not an adjudication of the dispute. 
Apart from the lack of an obligation to arrive at a joint decision, the lack of any definite 
period for the consultation between the competent authorities of two states is another major 
limitation of the MAP. The OECD has suggested that states should commit to a timely 
resolution of the MAP cases. It has proposed that states should commit to resolution of the 
MAP disputes within an average time frame of 24 months.252 This again is a useful suggestion 
by the OECD and the time period recommended is adequate. The states should consider 
committing to this period; it will be a significant contribution in improving the MAP. 
Another shortcoming of the MAP is the continuing lack of transparency. The demand for 
publishing the agreements reached under the MAP is a long standing one and bodies like the 
International Fiscal Association have highlighted it repeatedly.253 It has been argued that since 
states ‘club different cases’ and frequently resolve disputes together it prevents publishing of 
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results.254 Unless there is unprincipled trading of favours during the MAP negotiations, 
clubbing or bundling of cases should not stop states from publishing the results of the MAP. 
Nonetheless, there is little progress on this front. 
Apart from the opaque functioning of the competent authorities, the marginalisation of the 
taxpayer is another serious drawback of the MAP. The aggrieved taxpayer has no control over 
the proceedings.255 The taxpayer can only make a complaint to the competent authorities and 
initiate the MAP, but this is ordinarily where the involvement of the taxpayer starts and ends. 
The only concession for this limited role of the taxpayer seems to be that if a mutually 
acceptable solution is finally arrived at – it is not binding on the taxpayer. The taxpayer may 
choose to reject the final solution proposed, in which case, the taxpayer either negotiates 
with both the states individually or pursues the remedies in the national courts of the states. 
Because of limited participation in the proceedings, the taxpayer remains in the dark about 
the result of the dispute that may continue for a lengthy period.256 Further, because the 
taxpayer learns of the decision on an informal basis, it does not result in the formation of a 
reliable precedent for other taxpayers.257 If the competent authorities arrive at a decision, 
they need to publish it. In my view, the major drawbacks of the MAP are that states have an 
almost complete control of the dispute resolution process and the corresponding lack of 
transparency.258 
Additionally, the MAP is so structured that it does not incentivize either the taxpayer or the 
competent authorities to actively seek a solution. A taxpayer is not formally part of the 
process and is not completely invested in the process. It is an avenue that a taxpayer avails to 
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seek a solution but apart from a few informal discussions and presenting the facts of the case, 
a taxpayer is not truly part of dispute resolution. Similarly, the competent authorities are 
unlikely to pursue the disputes with enthusiasm if they are aware that the taxpayer has the 
power to reject the eventual solution. William P. Park, writing in 2001-02 observed: 
At present, neither taxpayers nor governments possess any reliable way to 
resolve tax treaty disputes. National judicial proceedings lack political 
neutrality, and efforts at mutual agreement among competent authorities are 
fraught with delays, uncertainty and gamesmanship.259 
In a similar vein, Sol Picciotto has remarked that while the international coordination of 
taxation has increasingly relied on administrative cooperation, the basis for this cooperation 
is still seriously inadequate. He further notes that the larger problem is that administrative 
assistance is viewed narrowly as means of reciprocal resolution of conflicts not to enforce the 
effectiveness of national taxation as applied to international business. Sol Piccciotto’s 
remarks underline the nature of the MAP as an administrative remedy (unlike the remedy 
provided to investors in IIAs) and how the competent authorities under the MAP have not 
prioritised the broader picture of improving the national tax systems. Instead, the MAP has 
become susceptible to trading favours between the authorities in charge.260 Viewed either as 
a consultative mechanism or as an administrative remedy, there is little disagreement that 
the MAP remains an inadequate remedy. 
To conclude this section, the MAP as means of resolving disputes under tax treaties suffers 
from serious deficiencies. The shortcomings in the MAP mentioned in the above paragraphs 
show that there is enough room for improvement in the dispute resolution mechanism of the 
tax treaties. In partial recognition of these concerns, and as mentioned above, the OECD 
introduced the provision of tax arbitration in its Model Tax Convention. The following section 
examines tax arbitration, as proposed by the OECD and implemented in certain tax treaties, 
and the manner in which it addresses the shortcomings of the MAP. 
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D. The Promise of Tax Arbitration 
In 1984, the OECD in its report on transfer pricing decided against recommending compulsory 
arbitration for the resolution of transfer pricing disputes between tax authorities.261 The 
OECD opined that the introduction of mandatory tax arbitration would involve ‘an 
unprecedented surrender of fiscal sovereignty’;262 and that any system of dispute resolution 
such as arbitration will need to ‘provide adequately for the interests of both taxpayers and 
tax authorities.’263 The OECD pointed out that various issues will need to be considered before 
introducing tax arbitration – the confidentiality of the proceedings, the relation of arbitration 
with the domestic law of the contracting states, the finality of the arbitration, the appeal 
process and whether tax arbitration is a mere extension of the MAP or an independent dispute 
resolution mechanism.264 The proposal for introducing arbitration for international tax 
disputes continued to be discussed by the International Fiscal Association especially in the 
Congress of 1993.265 
In 2000 (and later in 2002), the ICC suggested arbitration in taxation matters. It 
recommended that if tax authorities are unable to resolve a particular tax dispute, it should 
be transferred to an arbitral tribunal independent of the control of the parties.266 In 2004, the 
OECD released a progress report for public comment –‘Improving the Process for Resolving 
International Tax Disputes’. In this report, the OECD expressly recognised the need  to 
improve the MAP and also more significantly the need for a supplementary dispute resolution 
mechanism.267 In 2006, in its public discussion draft entitled ‘Proposals for Improving 
Mechanisms for the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes’, it reiterated the need to supplement 
the MAP with an additional dispute resolution mechanism.268 Eventually, the OECD 
unequivocally supported arbitration as an additional dispute resolution technique. 
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In 2008, the OECD added paragraph 5 to Article 25 of its Model Convention that provided for 
arbitration of disputes under tax treaties. The provision states that if the competent 
authorities are unable to resolve a dispute within two years, any unresolved issue shall be 
submitted to arbitration if the taxpayer so requests.269 Further, if the person directly affected 
by the case accepts the arbitration decision, the decision shall be binding on both contracting 
states and shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic laws of the 
contracting states. The provision is only aimed to be a ‘model provision’ and is subject to 
negotiation between the contracting parties. However, it leaves many issues unresolved – 
balancing the involvement of states and the taxpayer in the dispute resolution proceedings, 
relation with domestic remedies, jurisdiction of the arbitration panel, independence of the 
arbitrators and the issue of transparency of the proceedings among other issues. 
One of the central concerns about the MAP has been that taxpayers have not been given an 
adequate procedural ‘voice’. A taxpayer cannot participate in the proceedings beyond the 
initiation of the dispute resolution. The tax arbitration proposal by the OECD addresses this 
aspect. The OECD Model Convention envisages that the initiation of arbitration shall be at the 
request of the taxpayer if the competent authorities fail to resolve the case under the MAP 
within two years. This is understood as mandatory arbitration since the onus on commencing 
the arbitration is on the taxpayer and not the competent authorities of the states. However, 
several tax treaties have only introduced voluntary arbitration and provided that the 
reference of dispute to arbitration shall occur only if the competent authorities so desire.270 
The OECD Model recommending mandatory arbitration is, in my opinion, a better alternative 
to voluntary arbitration. It allows the taxpayer to make an important decision regarding the 
resolution of the dispute and is an improvement over the MAP. 
Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that preventing double taxation is only one of the two 
broad aims of tax treaties.271 The other aim is prevention of international double non- 
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taxation. Ideally, dispute resolution mechanism should serve both purposes is ignored. 
However, it seems the second purpose of preventing tax evasion is ignored. McIntyre argues 
that mandatory and binding arbitration could in fact facilitate double non-taxation.272 The 
rationale for his argument is that an arbitration panel will only implement the existing 
international tax laws which are the root cause of international tax evasion. 
Since these are the same rules that taxpayers utilize to achieve double non-taxation, 
acceptance of the position of the taxpayer in certain cases will eventually result in the 
enforcement of double non-taxation. Given the post-2002 focus in ITL on international tax 
evasion, the OECD needs to take into account if tax arbitration as proposed in the OECD 
Model Convention can adequately curb international tax evasion.273 Currently, it does not 
seem to be the case.274 In this respect, it is also instructive to look at the dispute resolution 
provision incorporated in tax information exchange agreements – legal instruments that the 
OECD has supported in its attempt to curb international tax evasion. 
In 2002, the OECD released the OECD Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement. Article 13 
of the Model provides that ‘Where difficulties or doubts arise between the Contracting Parties 
regarding the implementation or interpretation of this Agreement, the competent authorities 
shall endeavour to resolve the matter by mutual agreement.’ This provision is similar to the 
MAP contained in tax treaties. Tax information exchange agreements have gained prominence 
relatively recently and it is not possible to state with certainty the nature and frequency of 
disputes that arise with respect to tax information exchange requests. It is thus difficult to 
suggest if arbitration is the adequate dispute resolution mechanism for tax information 
exchange agreements. However, the OECD should certainly invite suggestions from states on 
the adequacy of dispute resolution provisions in tax information exchange agreements and 
whether the current mechanism is serving the intended purpose of the agreements. 
In respect of tax arbitration in tax treaties, another aspect is unclear. It is doubtful if tax 
arbitration, as proposed by the OECD, will be useful to resolve triangular cases in ITL. 
Triangular cases in tax typically involve a taxpayer who is resident in more than one state 
(dual resident for tax purposes) and has financial interest or income sourced in a third state. 
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Here all the three states may claim jurisdiction to tax on the basis of residence and source 
respectively. Co-ordinating the consultations of the competent authorities of the three states 
to avoid multiple taxation is in the interest of the taxpayer. But, bilateral tax treaties have 
been unable to provide an adequate framework for resolving such triangular disputes.275 The 
OECD has suggested that states need to include and develop guidelines on multilateral MAPs.
276 The OECD has indicated that it in its next update of the OECD Commentary it will address 
the issue of multilateral cases that arise before the MAPs.277 It is, however, unclear if the 
OECD will also address the ability/inability of tax arbitration to resolve triangular or 
multilateral cases. 
The question of independence of arbitrators in tax arbitration is also unresolved, not least 
because of the opaqueness that surrounds the dispute resolution process in tax treaties.278 
The arbitrators shall be experts in tax which is likely to pose another problem in international 
tax dispute resolution.279 The problem of finding tax experts in arbitration is contentious. 
Many international tax disputes are related to transfer pricing that involve MNEs and most tax 
experts lend their expertise to the potential parties of international tax arbitration. In such 
cases, it may be difficult to find experts who are not ‘also connected in some way with the 
relevant enterprise.’280 Even if it may be possible to find tax arbitrators with no conflicts of 
interest, they are more likely to be from the developed world - a potentially disadvantageous 
situation for the developing states. This is not to suggest that tax experts from developed 
states are likely to be immune to the concerns of the developing states, but there may not be 
adequate representation of developing states.281 
Another drawback of the provision in the OECD Model on tax arbitration is that the arbitrators 
have limited jurisdiction. Article 25(5) of the OECD Model provides that the taxpayer can only 
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refer unresolved issues to the arbitrators – not the entire dispute. It is doubtful if a complete 
demarcation of the various issues of the dispute will be possible in every case. If the 
unresolved issues are linked to the issues on which competent authorities have agreed – 
should arbitrators decline to adjudicate? This issue assumes more importance because in 
certain tax treaties a simplistic form of arbitration – ‘baseball arbitration’ has been adopted 
and the scope of duties of an arbitrator is to make an either/or choice.282 The arbitration 
board is to resolve the issue by simply choosing the position of one of the parties to the 
dispute.283 This approach also called a ‘last best offer’ approach, narrows the function of 
arbitration and the role of arbitrators. This is markedly different from the kind of arbitration 
typically included under other international agreements such as IIAs.284 
The nature of tax arbitration included in the OECD Model Convention also raises the question 
if it is really arbitration or is it an expert determination? Allison Christians suggests that the 
non-binding nature of arbitration makes it more akin to expert determination.285 But tax 
arbitration is not purely factual and requires application of legal rules, making it akin to 
arbitration.286 However, in baseball arbitration, incorporated in some tax treaties, there are 
unlikely to be any reasoned decisions and also the decisions are not binding unless specifically 
agreed to. In my opinion, the provision for tax arbitration in the OECD Model is an updated 
version of the dispute resolution provision initially incorporated in the 1927 Model Convention 
of the League mentioned above. Instead of the term ‘technical body’ used by the League, the 
OECD has used the term ‘arbitration’ but tax arbitration does not have all the elements of an 
adjudicative mechanism. The discretion of the parties to follow the decision has been 
retained and the essential character of the procedure as a consultative mechanism (as 
originally envisaged by the League) has also remained unaltered. 
The issue of tax arbitration being akin to expert determination also arises partially because in 
the OECD’s design, tax arbitration has always been viewed as a supplement to the MAP and 
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not its replacement. In 1984, the view of the OECD was that arbitration ‘must be an integral 
part of the mutual agreement procedure and should not constitute an alternative route to 
solving tax treaty disputes between States, which would risk undermining the effectiveness of 
the mutual agreement procedure.’287 This remains OECD’s view even today.288 Adopting the 
view that tax arbitration is an extension of the MAP has prevented a swing from one extreme 
of complete state control over dispute resolution to another of no state control.289 On the 
flipside, it has also meant that tax arbitration inherits some of the drawbacks of the MAP. 
Most of the limitations of tax arbitration arise because arbitration of tax disputes is 
contingent upon the failure of the competent authorities to negotiate an agreement under 
the MAP and because ‘arbitration is an extension of the MAP and not an independent 
procedure.’290 A contrary opinion is that the inclusion of mandatory arbitration will only 
pressurise the competent authorities to arrive at a solution – ensuring disputes are not 
resolved by arbitration at all. In my view, the argument that inclusion of mandatory 
arbitration will ensure a speedy resolution of disputes under the MAP over-simplifies the 
complexity of disputes, the varied nature of bilateral tax relations between states and 
consequently the ability/inclination of competent authorities of the states to efficiently 
resolve tax disputes that arise under the tax treaties.291 
To summarise, the inclusion of tax  arbitration has only multiplied unresolved issues relating 
to international tax dispute resolution. There are certain positive developments such as the 
insistence on a two-year time period for consultation between the competent authorities 
under the MAP and a provision for mandatory arbitration. Overall, even though tax arbitration 
holds some promise, it raises more questions and provides few answers. The experience of 
the arbitral process will over a period of time lead to ironing out of some of the procedural 
issues, but the basic concerns in the MAP such as lack of transparency and absence of 
reasoned decisions have not been addressed. Tax arbitration is only a marginal improvement 
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over the MAP and not a significant step forward to improve dispute resolution under tax 
treaties. 
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
Tax-related investment disputes differ from other investment disputes in two respects: first, 
there is a special procedure prescribed for tax-related investment disputes – a claim cannot 
ordinarily be filed before an investor-state tribunal unless it is first referred to the competent 
authorities of the contracting states;292 second, due to tax carve outs only certain substantive 
obligations such as those relating to expropriation are applicable to tax-related measures 
adopted by a state. The combined effect of tax veto and tax carve outs is that tax-related 
investment disputes are placed in a different category from other investment disputes arising 
from state measures such as environmental or labour laws. The following section examines 
only the special procedural aspects of tax-related investment disputes. 
A. Investor-State Arbitration and Tax Veto 
For tax-related investment disputes many IIAs expressly recognise an interpretive role for 
states. A typical provision provides that no investor can invoke the provisions of an IIA and 
allege expropriation if the competent authorities have jointly determined that it is not an 
expropriation.293 This implies that the investor in the first instance has to refer the question 
of whether the taxation measure is an expropriation to the competent authorities of the 
contracting states. The competent authorities may consider it but may not agree that the 
measure is not an expropriation in which case the investor may then submit its claim for 
arbitration. This may be viewed as akin to the ability of the states to issue a joint interpretive 
statement under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.294 There are, however, three crucial differences in 
the interpretive authority prescribed under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and that contemplated in 
relation to tax-related investment disputes. 
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First, in tax-related investment disputes, the investor is required to first refer the dispute to 
the competent authorities of the state.295 This requirement is generally couched in a 
mandatory language and the investor cannot bypass it. If the investor does not refer the 
dispute to the competent authorities in the first place, the investor-state tribunal can 
potentially reject the claim on grounds of admissibility.296 Second, the states through their 
competent authorities are generally given a specific time period of 6 or 9 months to make a 
joint determination. Once the specified time period lapses and the states fail to make any 
determination, it is open for the investor to proceed with its claim before an arbitral tribunal. 
This marks a clear demarcation of the role of a state – it is empowered to influence the fate 
of the dispute as a treaty party but it ceases to act so once it becomes a respondent/
potential respondent in the dispute.297 Thus, it avoids the possible confusion that could be 
created with a state being a respondent in a dispute and simultaneously being able to issue a 
joint determination (in its capacity as a signatory to a treaty) that the taxation measures 
complained of do not amount to expropriation. A state cannot ordinarily assume the role of an 
interpreter during arbitral proceedings. Third, in tax-related investment disputes the states 
can only give a negative interpretation i.e. the joint statement issued by the states can only 
say that the taxation measures do not amount to expropriation. There is no scope for the 
states to clarify the scope of tax carve outs included in the IIA or otherwise issue a detailed 
interpretive note. However, it needs to be noted that some aspects of tax veto are still 
unclear. 
To begin with, if the authorities arrive at a joint determination after the prescribed period of 
6 or 9 months, as the case may be, is the arbitral tribunal obliged to take into account such 
determination? If so, what is the extent to which such determination should guide the findings 
of the tribunal? The ECT expressly mentions such a situation. It provides that where the 
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authorities arrive at a joint determination after the prescribed period, such joint 
determinations have a persuasive value before the tribunal.298 Thus, once the prescribed 
period is over, the arbitral tribunal is under no obligation to adhere to the conclusions of the 
competent tax authorities – the obligation is only to take the joint determination into 
account. In Yukos Universal, the tribunal went a step ahead and observed that the mechanism 
of referral to competent authorities is designed to assist the tribunals to distinguish between 
normal and abusive taxes. The tribunal added that if there was no possibility that the 
competent authorities would be able to come to some timely and meaningful conclusion on 
the dispute – referring the dispute to the competent authorities would be futile.299 The 
observations of the tribunal are not supported by Article 21 of the ECT which clearly provides 
that if the investor does not refer the dispute to the competent authorities, the adjudicating 
bodies called to settle the dispute ‘shall make a referral to the relevant Competent Tax 
Authorities.’300 
Agreements like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) have incorporated 
the provision for referral to the competent authorities, but it is not mandatory and the onus 
is on the respondent.301 The CETA provides that when the investor submits a request that the 
taxation measure of a state violates substantive obligations, ‘the respondent may refer the 
matter for consultation and joint determination by the Parties’.302 Further, the request by the 
respondent cannot be made later than the date the tribunal fixes for the respondent to 
submit its counter memorial.303 Additionally, the CETA provides that the joint determination 
by competent authorities must be between 180 days, but like most IIAs is silent about the 
value of a joint determination if it is arrived after 180 days. A clearer position on this aspect 
is required to prevent unnecessary complexity in arbitration proceedings. States need to 
clarify whether after the prescribed time period, the competent authorities no longer have 
the authority to issue a joint determination or whether a joint determination can still be 
issued but shall remain only of persuasive value. In my view, the former approach is better – 
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it shall clearly demarcate the authority of the competent authorities and the time period 
within which they can exercise it. 
With respect to another aspect of tax-related investment disputes, the Canadian Model BIT 
provides that ‘if an issue arises as to whether a measure of a Party is a taxation measure, a 
Party may refer the issue to the taxation authorities of the Parties.’304 It is provided that the 
decision of the tax authorities shall bind the arbitral tribunal and in case they do not arrive at 
a decision within 6 months of the referral, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the issue. It is 
interesting to note that in this case, the power to refer to the taxation authorities is given to 
‘a Party’ – the contracting states and not the investor. Thus, a respondent state can refer the 
dispute to the competent authorities even after the commencement of the arbitral 
proceedings. The rationale of the provision is unclear. Once arbitral proceedings have begun, 
why should the competent authorities be allowed to determine whether the complained 
measure is a taxation measure? In addition, why should their opinion be binding on the 
tribunal? If the intent is to get an expert opinion of the tax authorities, opinions of tax 
experts can be provided during the arbitral proceedings itself. If the intent is to give the 
competent authorities additional time to form their opinion about the complained measures – 
the time period when the measure is first referred to them can be extended. 
The above mentioned provision of the Canadian Model BIT casts suspicion on the ability of an 
arbitral tribunal to distinguish taxation measures from non-taxation measures. If tribunals can 
distinguish regulatory measures from expropriatory measures, they can certainly distinguish 
taxation measures from non-taxation measures or taxation measures disguised as 
expropriation. The above mentioned provision also gives the respondent state the ability to 
delay the arbitration proceedings. More often than not, especially in indirect expropriation, 
the state will affirm that the measure in dispute is a bona fide taxation measure. This 
provision allows the state to pursue delay tactics and unjustifiably increases state control 
over tax-related investment disputes - unjustifiably. 
The provisions relating to tax vetoes are also silent on the scope of jurisdiction vested in the 
competent authorities. It is unclear that if the authorities jointly determine that the measure 
does not amount to expropriation – can the investor still file a claim before the investor-state 
tribunal for denial of fair and equitable treatment and/or breach of non-discrimination? The 
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provisions of the IIAs do not provide a clear answer to this question.305 Alternately, if the 
investor only claims a violation of fair and equitable treatment and no expropriation claim – is 
it still obliged to first refer the dispute to the competent authorities. IIAs commonly only 
mention that the competent authorities can jointly determine that the measure is not an 
expropriation – there is no mention of other substantive obligations that are applicable to 
taxation measures. The dispute between Gottlieb and Canada illustrates this aspect. 
In October 2007, Gottlieb Investors Group issued a Notice of Intent under the NAFTA to 
Canada.306 Gottlieb claimed that due to Canada’s change in the tax treatment of income 
trusts in the energy sector, investors experienced capital losses. Gottlieb alleged that 
Canada’s actions were arbitrary, discriminatory and inconsistent with the obligations of 
Canada under the NAFTA to provide national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and to 
not expropriate an investment. In April 2008, the competent authorities of US and Canada 
reached a conclusion that the taxation measures of Canada cited in Gottlieb’s Notice of 
Intent are not an expropriation under Article 1110 NAFTA.307 Subsequent to the joint 
determination, Gottlieb did not pursue the arbitration against Canada. 
The above mentioned dispute between Gottlieb and Canada sheds some light on the provision 
of tax veto, at least in respect of the NAFTA. First, even though Gottlieb in its Notice of 
Intent alleged violation of various substantive obligations, the joint determination by US and 
Canada that there was no expropriation effectively ended the investor-state arbitration 
initiated by Gottlieb. It is possible to extrapolate from the above mentioned dispute that a 
joint determination by competent authorities effectively extinguishes an investor’s claim in 
tax-related investment dispute even if it relates to substantive obligations other than 
expropriation. However, the text of the NAFTA does not support the fact that an investor 
cannot pursue claims apart from expropriation even after a joint determination by the 
competent authorities.308 The joint determination is only applicable to expropriation. 
Secondly, the joint determination reveals that in exercising their power of tax veto, the 
305 
The Canadian Model BIT is an exception where it separately mentions the authority of the taxation 
authorities to determine that a measure is not in contravention of the BIT and the authority to 
determine that it is not an expropriation. See Art 16(3) and Art 16(4), Canada Model BIT (2004). 
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competent authorities need not provide any reasons for their conclusion.309 The competent 
authorities may just simply term that the state measure in dispute does not amount to 
expropriation. Thirdly, it is unclear that the exercise of tax veto is only limited to investor- 
state arbitration. It needs to be clarified that the exercise of tax veto does not (and should 
not) prejudice the investor from seeking compensation in domestic courts of the host state. It 
is well-established that an expropriation, lawful or otherwise, triggers an obligation on the 
state to pay compensation.310 Unless the state merely imposes a tax, using tax veto to decide 
that the alleged action of the host state does not amount to expropriation can prejudice the 
lawful claim of the investor to seek compensation for the loss of its property.311 This aspect 
needs more clarity to determine the effect of tax veto. 
Whether States exercise tax veto and arrive at a joint determination is influenced by various 
factors. Authorities can arrive at a joint determination due to the alignment of the interests 
of the home state and the investor, the alignment of the interests of the home state and the 
host state or due to the nature of the measure in question. Where the interests of the home 
state and investor align, the home state may not go to the extent of giving a joint 
determination, for it will scuttle the claim of the investor. Political circumstances permitting, 
the home state may attempt to negotiate and resolve the dispute but may not go beyond 
negotiations. Where the interest of the home state concurs with the host state – a joint 
determination may be more probable. For instance, where the home state anticipates that a 
similar claim can be made against it in the future, it may seek to co-operate with the host 
state in order to seek similar co-operation from it in the future. Thus unless a common 
interest is involved, joint determinations may not materialise. In addition to this, the nature 
of the measure complained of can also impact the probability of a joint determination. For 
instance, the facts may be insufficiently clear, the tax claim may be intertwined with other 
measures such as those relating to foreign exchange regulations or environment laws in such 
cases the competent authorities may simply be incapable of arriving at a joint determination 
due to complexity of facts. 
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 63
There are two implications of tax veto I would like to state before concluding this sub- 
section. Tax veto ensures state control. The underlying theme of tax veto is that as compared 
to other investment disputes there is a greater degree of state control in a tax-related 
investment dispute.312 The special procedural requirement for tax-related investment 
disputes has an ambivalent effect: it can be used as a cooling off provision to allow the 
competent authorities of both states to resolve the issue bilaterally and screen frivolous 
complaints; but since it also provides the power to block the arbitration – it can also be 
detrimental to the interests of the investors. This concern is amplified by the competent 
authorities’ lack of obligation to provide reasons for their joint determination – leaving it 
susceptible to misuse. The interpretive authority provided to the competent authorities does 
have certain advantages as compared to the general interpretive powers provided in the IIAs 
such as the prescription of a specific time period within which to exercise the power of tax 
veto, the limited interpretive authority to decide if the measure is expropriation or not; but 
it leaves several aspects unaddressed and uncertain. 
Also, IIAs provide for a procedural step like tax veto only for tax-related investment disputes. 
Thus, tax veto contributes to the uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes and 
distinguishes it from non-tax related investment disputes.313 
B. Tax Veto and the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Having examined the institutions of the tax veto and the MAP, I now compare tax veto under 
IIAs with the MAP under tax treaties. It will help us better understand the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of both the dispute resolution mechanisms. Table 1 below summaries the 
comparison between tax veto and the MAP on aspects such as transparency, nature of tax 
disputes, the time limit prescribed for each of the remedies. 
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See Andreas Kulick (ed.), Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) (for a detailed discussion on the various means through which states assert 
actually assert or try to assert control over the interpretation and application of IIAs. Withdrawal from 
IIAs, state-state arbitration, joint treaty interpretation and arbitrator selection are some of the means 
used by states to assert control in IIL.). 
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For a detailed argument on the uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes, see Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
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TABLE 1: A COMPARISON OF TAX VETO AND THE MAP 
As mentioned in the previous Section II.C, I understand the MAP as a consultative mechanism 
or at best an administrative remedy. The tax veto, on the other hand, is a procedural step, 
and ordinarily a mandatory step before initiating investor-arbitration in a tax-related 
investment dispute. If successfully exercised, it can filter arbitration claims. Under tax 
treaties, if no decision is reached under the MAP then the complainant can approach the 
domestic courts of the relevant state or alternately resolve the dispute under tax arbitration. 
Element of 
Comparison
Tax 
Veto
The 
MAP
Nature of the Remedy A filter for arbitrations A consultative mechanism between 
states
Nature of Tax Disputes Disputes relate to double taxation under tax treaties
Disputes relate to 
state obligations under IIAs
Transparency
No obligation to provide reasons No access to decisions
Role of the States
Investor does not participate Taxpayer is marginal to the 
proceedings
Duration of 
Proceedings
6-9 months As a rule, there is 
no prescribed time limit
Relationship 
to Arbitration
Independent of investor-
state arbitration
Tax arbitration extends 
the MAP
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The complainant retains the option of choosing either of the two paths even if an 
unsatisfactory decision is reached under the MAP. However, a tax veto, if successfully 
exercised, scuttles arbitration claims. Only if a tax veto is not exercised that the investor 
usually proceeds with the claim before an investor-state tribunal. Thus, while both the MAP 
and tax veto can be viewed as a step towards a judicial remedy or arbitration, the crucial 
difference is that tax veto has the power to scuttle arbitration claims. 
The second distinguishing factor is the nature of disputes that are handled under both dispute 
resolution mechanisms. It has been suggested that the disputes under tax treaties can called 
indirect international disputes since they usually do not start with an international character.
314 Usually it is the unresolved domestic tax disputes that become international tax disputes 
between the states.315 The persuasive value of such an argument aside, it is nonetheless 
undeniable that disputes under tax treaties relate to actual or potential double taxation, 
while in IIAs - the dispute centres around the protection of the investment, rights of the 
investor and protection of the investment. Thus, while tax is a common element, the nature 
of disputes that are handled under tax treaties and IIAs are very different. 
The previous Sections reveal that the prominent limitations of both the MAP and tax veto are 
the lack of transparency and the fact that there is a greater control by the states while the 
taxpayer/investor is marginalised. Both accord pre-eminent role to the state authorities or 
competent authorities and ensure significant state control over the dispute resolution 
mechanisms under the respective treaties. And, there is little access to the decisions under 
the MAP while the decisions under tax veto are unaccompanied by any reasoning. 
With respect to arbitration, the form of arbitration proposed and incorporated in some of the 
tax treaties is fundamentally different from investor-state arbitration that is part of IIAs. An 
investor has greater control and participation in arbitral proceedings before an investor-state 
tribunal. While, this is not the case in tax arbitration which has not been incorporated as an 
independent remedy but rather an extension of the MAP. Investor-state arbitration is, 
however, not an extension of tax veto – both mechanisms have a distinct role in resolving a 
tax-related investment dispute under the relevant IIA. The only time tax veto and investor- 
stare arbitration overlap is when the state authorities arrive at a decision after the prescribed 
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Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, The Settlement of International Disputes: The Contribution of Australia 
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Gerrit Groen, ‘Arbitration in Bilateral Tax Treaties’, Intertax, 30/1 (2002) 3. 
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period and the relevant IIA provides that the decision will have a persuasive value before the 
arbitral tribunal. 
C. Disputes under Tax Treaties and Investor-State Arbitration 
Certain IIAs contemplate that some disputes that arise under tax treaties can be adjudicated 
under IIAs. For instance, the Ecuador-US BIT provides that the dispute settlement provisions 
in the BIT do not apply to tax matters ‘to the extent they are not subject to the dispute 
settlement provisions of a tax treaty, or, if so subject, have been raised under a tax treaty’s 
dispute settlement procedures and are not resolved in a reasonable period of time.’316 The 
implication of such a provision is that disputes under tax treaties can theoretically be argued 
before an investor-state tribunal. There are no publicly known awards where this route has 
been utilised by a taxpayer, but it presents interesting possibilities. 
First, it suggests that there is a category of tax disputes that can be argued before an 
investor-state tribunal but need not be first subjected to the tax veto power of the 
competent authorities. The above mentioned provision states that if a taxpayer refers a 
dispute to the competent authorities under a tax treaty and the same is not resolved within a 
reasonable time, the additional option is to initiate investor-state arbitration. Before 
initiating investor-state arbitration, should a taxpayer again refer the claim to the competent 
authorities, but in their interpretive capacity prescribed under the IIA? If the intent of the 
above provision is to prevent further delay in the resolution of the dispute, it makes little 
sense to subject it to a procedural path that will further involve a minimum delay of 6-9 
months. If the intent of the provision is to provide an alternative dispute resolution forum for 
the tax dispute, it will be negated if the competent authorities under the tax treaty and the 
IIA are the same. In both scenarios, the reasonable option should be to allow the taxpayer to 
directly file a claim before an investor-state tribunal without insisting on the procedural 
requisite of tax veto.317 
Second, taxpayers may have recourse to investor-state arbitration when the dispute under the 
tax treaty has not been settled in a reasonable period of time. As pointed out in Section II.C 
above, most tax treaties only provide for the MAP under which the competent authorities are 
 
316 
Art X, US-Ecuador BIT (1993). 
317 
It is also possible that the investor may seek to avail investor-state arbitration if it is confident that 
tax veto will not be unjustly exercised since a successful exercise of tax veto will require the consent 
of investor’s home state. At the same time, if a tax veto has been exercised, the investor may not be 
able to initiate arbitration under the relevant BIT. 
 67
under no time-related obligations to arrive at an agreement. What should then be a 
reasonable period of time and who should decide if it is reasonable? Tax treaties that 
incorporate the provision of tax arbitration provide us a clue as to what could be construed as 
a reasonable period of time. Typically, tax treaties provide for tax arbitration if a dispute has 
not been resolved within 2 years by the competent authorities.318 A similar yardstick can be 
applied by an investor-state tribunal if a claim under the above mentioned provision is 
brought before it. The provision can then be interpreted to mean that if a claim under the 
MAP is not resolved within 2 years – the aggrieved taxpayer can then choose to file a claim 
before investor-state arbitration or to resolve the dispute under tax arbitration, if provided in 
the relevant tax treaty. Another possibility is to simultaneously pursue tax arbitration and 
investor-arbitration, which may bring with it the challenge to co-ordinate both the arbitration 
proceedings.319 
There is no known instance where a taxpayer has resorted to investor-state arbitration for a 
dispute arising under a tax treaty, but a possibility for the exercise of such an option remains 
open. The absence of any such claims by investors under IIAs should not be understood as 
their inability to actually bring such claims. This is especially when investor-state arbitration 
is being increasingly utilised for a wide scope of claims that were not earlier foreseeable.320 
Given that dispute resolution under tax treaties is controlled by the states and the taxpayer 
has little control and influence over proceedings – recourse to investor-state arbitration under 
the above mentioned provision is likely to be viewed with favour by many taxpayers who bring 
arbitration claims. 
To conclude this Section, there is state control of the dispute resolution mechanisms under 
both tax treaties and IIAs. While state control is pervasive under the former, the latter 
prescribe a procedural rule whereby states can pre-empt third part adjudication in tax- 
related investment disputes. A greater role for states in tax-related investment disputes is at 
times justified by reference to sovereignty considerations, but its counter-argument is that 
threats to a state’s sovereignty due to loss of power to make environmental regulations 
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constitute are no less a threat than the sovereign prerogative than tax.321 This need not 
necessarily lead to a complete absence of state control over tax dispute resolution – which is 
neither desirable nor feasible. At the same time, the current role of tax veto under IIAs 
suffers from various shortcomings of uncertainty and opaqueness. Also, proposals for 
improvement of tax arbitration are unlikely to yield desired results until the current opaque 
framework of dispute resolution process is reformed.322 It is suggested that an evaluation of 
the role that states can play through joint interpretive agreements combined with certain 
changes to the dispute resolution mechanism can go a long way in improving the rule of law 
for taxpayers. This is discussed in the following Section. 
IV. ROLE OF STATES – THE WAY FORWARD 
A state is not only a potential respondent in investor-state disputes but as a treaty party also 
has an interest in the interpretation of the IIA.323 Once a treaty is concluded between two or 
more states, irrespective of the nature or subject matter of the treaty, states can influence 
the interpretation of the treaties. This can be either through their subsequent practice or a 
subsequent agreement. Both are potentially very useful tools in the hands of the states 
especially, to prevent treaty interpretations by a third party dispute settlement mechanism 
that does not reflect their intentions. They are, however, rarely used by the states and 
partially due to the same reason rarely relied on by the courts and arbitral tribunals. In the 
sphere of international tax where sovereignty considerations are omnipresent and states seek 
to control all the decisions – subsequent agreements can help to resolve the challenge of 
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providing for independent third party adjudication and addressing state concerns about 
preservation of sovereignty. 
An ongoing project of the International Law Commission on ‘Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation of Treaties’ has released a few initial 
reports.324 The preliminary conclusion of this Study Group is that while there are some 
examples of tribunals using subsequent agreements by parties to interpret an ambiguous 
provision of a treaty – such as the Elements of Crimes adopted by the ICC Assembly of States 
Parties or the joint interpretive statement issued by the NAFTA parties under the auspices of 
the Free Trade Commission – as a general matter such interpretive statements are relatively 
rare.325 The report states that its survey of the specialized regimes has led to the conclusion 
that ‘adjudicatory bodies have rarely relied on subsequent agreements in the sense of Article 
31(3) (a) [of the] VCLT.’326 In the backdrop of this observation, in this Section I discuss the 
current and possible future role of subsequent agreements in ITL. 
A. The Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
A plain reading of Article 25 of the OECD Model suggests that it provides for three roles of 
competent authorities – to resolve claims of taxpayers unilaterally, to attempt to reach a joint 
agreement with its counterparts to resolve disputes and to resolve difficulties in the 
interpretation and application of the treaty. The first and second roles, as discussed above in 
Section II.C, overlap. Nonetheless, the joint interpretive functions as envisaged in the second 
and third roles need a more detailed analysis. Ordinarily tax treaties provide for two kinds of 
interpretive disputes that can be jointly resolved by the competent authorities – dispute 
resolution of the specific case brought to the notice of competent authorities by the taxpayer 
and second kind of disputes that involve resolving difficulties that arise from the 
interpretation and application of the tax treaty more generally. The role that the competent 
authorities play in both situations differs. 
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1. Interpretive Agreements on Specific Disputes 
Tax treaties provide that the competent authorities can jointly agree whether or not the tax 
imposed on the taxpayer is in accordance with the tax treaty. The primary role of the 
competent authorities in these situations is to resolve the dispute and arrive at a solution that 
alleviates the tax liability of the taxpayer. The concern of the authorities is to apply the tax 
treaty to the specific dispute brought to their attention. While the process of arriving at a 
joint agreement can certainly be improved, it is equally vital that the agreement should be 
publicly available.327 Irrespective of the taxpayer’s acceptance or rejection of the joint 
agreement, it should be made public. 
If the taxpayer does not accept the agreement reached under the MAP and proceeds to 
initiate or resume proceedings before a domestic court – the court can refer to and take into 
account the joint agreement reached by the competent authorities under the MAP. However, 
the current unavailability of the joint agreement denies such an opportunity to the national 
courts. If the joint agreement is made publicly available, it is possible to increase the 
likelihood of domestic courts of the contracting states interpreting the tax treaty more 
harmoniously instead of giving different and divergent interpretations of the same treaty.328 
The intention of the treaty parties can be more clearly spelled out in a joint agreement and it 
can aid the courts in interpreting the treaty. In my view, the joint agreement between 
competent authorities contemplated under tax treaties certainly qualifies as a subsequent 
agreement under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT. There is no bright dividing line between 
subsequent agreement and practice; but as long as the parties intend that their 
understanding forms a basis for treaty interpretation, it should be understood to constitute as 
a subsequent agreement.329 Thus, subsequent agreements can and should be used to interpret 
the tax treaties.330 The first step in that direction is to make the joint agreements public. 
2. Interpretive Agreements on ‘Interpretation and Application of the Convention’ 
The second kind of interpretive agreements tax treaties contemplate are of a more general 
nature. They do not concern a specific dispute or a taxpayer but provide for states to issue 
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joint interpretative statements that, for instance, may resolve doubts about the meaning of 
certain provisions. Even though the parties involved in issuing a general interpretation of the 
tax treaties are generally the same as those entrusted to resolve the specific disputes of the 
taxpayer, they act in a different capacity and the nature and function of the interpretative 
statements is different.331 First, in resolving specific disputes the competent authorities act 
as tax experts; the focus is on resolving the particular dispute before them. However, in 
issuing the interpretive statements – they act as treaty parties and potential respondents in 
the disputes that may arise in future under the treaties. Second, while acting as tax experts, 
the focus of the competent authorities is usually narrower and limited to the facts involved in 
the dispute. In contrast, when acting as interpreting bodies the aim is to facilitate a more 
coherent legal framework. General interpretive statements are usually not addressed to one 
particular taxpayer; they may be intended to reduce frequency of certain kinds of disputes or 
clarify ambiguity in certain provisions of the tax treaties. General interpretive statements can 
be extremely useful to many taxpayers and can provide a more predictable legal framework 
of tax liabilities since they are not limited to a specific taxpayer.332 The use of subsequent 
agreements may raise the possibility of states suffering from role confusion – role as treaty 
parties and role as an adjudicating body resolving disputes. However, in my opinion, the two 
functions are conceptually distinct and if the relevant state actors are discerning, confusion is 
unlikely. 
The joint interpretive statements by competent authorities, contemplated under tax treaties 
that concern the ‘interpretation and application of the convention’ also amount to 
subsequent agreements under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT. These interpretive statements can 
also be relied on by the domestic courts of both the states that are frequently required to 
interpret the tax treaties. Unfortunately, competent authorities rarely exercise this power. 
The rare use of joint interpretive mechanism provided in the tax treaties does not adequately 
serve the interests of taxpayers. Further, it prevents any development of rules and evolution 
of the jurisprudence in ITL. 
Interpretive statements in ITL also assume significance because tax treaties only contain a 
bare bone structure for demarcating the jurisdictions of the contracting states. The text of 
the tax treaties alone provides little guidance to taxpayers about the possible tax liabilities. 
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Similar provision of a tax treaty can be interpreted in divergent ways; for instance, 
interpretation of a particular provision can be influenced by various factors such as the 
interpretive practices of the national courts.333 In fact, the interpretation of tax treaties by 
national courts is a contributory factor in the development of ITL as a self-contained regime.
334 The bare bone structure of tax treaties thus makes the case for a publicly available and a 
more frequently issued joint interpretive statement even stronger. 
Currently, the common documents that are relied on by various national courts are the OECD 
Commentary and the UN Commentary.335 The reliance on commentaries and their relevance is 
contentious.336 Certain commentators are of the view that if a commentary has been updated 
since the conclusion of the tax treaty, the updated commentary is not relevant for tax 
disputes that arise under the treaty. This is because the updated commentary does not 
reflect the intention of the parties when they entered into the treaty.337 Others have 
suggested that an ambulatory approach to tax treaty interpretation (i.e. taking into account 
the updated commentary) should be adopted but only if the interpretation serves the object 
and purpose of the treaty.338 Both views are unconvincing. Completely ignoring the updates to 
the commentary may lead to ignoring any major changes that may be incorporated in the 
update in the intervening period. And, Juan Angel’s suggestion to refer to updates only to 
serve the aims and objectives of the treaty gives a qualified role to the updates but does not 
adequately elaborate as to how to apply it. Michael Lang has articulated a more nuanced 
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view. He suggests that the updated commentary can be referred to but it is not binding on the 
courts.339 He further suggests that since the OECD Commentary is not binding on the treaty 
parties, it does not constitute subsequent agreements under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT.340 He 
argues that the changes in the OECD Commentary are relevant as subsequent practice under 
Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.341 This is an important distinction. 
The ILC First Report also distinguishes between subsequent agreement and subsequent 
practice.342 The latter, it states, is ‘objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as 
to the meaning of the treaty’ while the former is ‘an authentic interpretation by the parties 
which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.’343 Relying on ILC Study 
Groups’ Report and Michael Lang’s distinction, I submit that the OECD and UN Commentaries 
constitute subsequent practice while joint interpretive agreements discussed above are 
subsequent agreements. This distinction, thus, indicates that joint interpretative statements 
can play a complementary role to the OECD and UN Commentaries. When states agree, they 
can issue joint interpretative statements. For instance, the definition of Permanent 
Establishment or the tax liability of income from royalties. On matters that states do not 
agree or where rules are still evolving - states and national courts can rely on the relevant 
Commentaries of either the OECD or the UN. Thus, apart from the Commentaries, the joint 
interpretative statements can serve as an additional reference document for national courts 
and competent authorities to interpret the tax treaties. 
Joint interpretive statements by states can be particularly useful if the tax treaty is between 
a developed and a developing state. Ordinarily, when a developed and a developing state 
enter into a tax treaty, the eventual treaty that emerges after negotiations generally 
incorporates provisions from both the models – the OECD Model and the UN Model.344 As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the OECD Model generally contains provisions which favour resident 
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states which in turn are primarily capital exporting states or resident states.345 The UN Model 
on the other hand contains provisions that are more inclined to the interests of the 
developing states – capital importing states or source states.346 In such situations, reliance on 
a single commentary – either of the OECD or the UN may not be particularly helpful. If the 
courts of one state rely on the OECD Commentary and the courts of the other contracting 
state rely on the UN Commentary – disputes on interpretation will be frequent. In such 
situations, joint interpretive statements can be a useful common document to assist in the 
interpretation of the tax treaty. Further, if in these situations there is contradiction between 
any Commentary and the joint interpretive statement – the latter should be given more 
weight. It is more likely to reflect the intention of the contracting parties. 
In addition to the provision for joint interpretive statements, competent authorities have 
been given a mandate to even ‘consult together for the elimination of double taxation in 
cases not provided for in the Convention.’347 This provision is generally intended to clarify 
matters that are not strictly speaking within the scope of the tax treaty but are closely 
related to the disputes that are within the scope of the tax treaties. Competent authorities 
can greatly improve the implementation of the tax treaties by more frequently identifying 
and pursuing opportunities to use this authority as well.348 
Thus, in totality, joint interpretive statements can be a very important tool in the 
interpretation of tax treaties and need to be used more frequently by the states.349 They can 
play a very important and useful role and contribute to the development of a common and 
coherent jurisprudence in ITL. Further, it has been suggested that joint interpretative 
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statements can also be used a ‘safety valve’ to prevent jurisprudence from developing in 
unintended directions.350 
B. International Tax Disputes – A Proposal for State-State Arbitration 
The 1925 report of the League stated that it would be desirable in the future to consider the 
creation of an international organisation that ‘would undertake the duties of conciliation or 
voluntary and advisory arbitration between States in regard to the interpretation of the 
conventions concluded between them.’351 The 1927 Model Convention of the League also 
mentioned that the Permanent Court of International Justice will be the last resort for states 
to resolve their disputes.352 However, even today, there is no international body that 
adjudicates on international tax disputes and neither is such a proposal under serious 
consideration.353 However, an alternative to an international organisation is worth 
considering. 
I propose that state-state arbitration – as an independent dispute resolution mechanism and 
unrelated to the MAP, can provide a better alternative to the existing dispute resolution 
mechanism under the tax treaties.354 State-state arbitration would be a better alternative for 
it would still allow the states to actively participate in dispute resolution, control various 
aspects of the adjudication process and it could be more transparent than the MAP and tax 
arbitration. By conceptualising state-state tax arbitration as an independent dispute 
resolution mechanism, the arbitral panel could be provided jurisdiction over the dispute in 
the first instance itself instead of requesting the arbitrators to address unresolved issues from 
the MAP. The jurisdiction of the tribunals can be decided beforehand under a common legal 
instrument. It would also allow formulation of rules that prevent conflicts of interest among 
the arbitrators and ensure the independence of arbitrators. 
Further, state-state arbitration also has the potential to address some of the other criticisms 
of tax arbitration discussed above in Section II.D. State-state arbitration will be a form of 
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adjudication and not a non-binding consultative mechanism. In this respect, state-state 
arbitration has the potential to contribute to the evolution of jurisprudence in ITL. Subject to 
privacy of the taxpayer, awards can be made public instead of competent authorities arriving 
at solutions in secrecy. There is also a greater possibility to address triangular cases that arise 
in international tax – the third state can join the arbitral proceedings as an interested party. 
State-state arbitration could allow the respective states to argue their positions and their 
respective interpretations of the tax treaties and relevant provisions of the domestic tax laws 
thereby establishing a more robust system of jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, there is a strong case for state-state arbitration if one looks at the nature of tax 
treaties. Tax treaties do not grant resident of either contracting states any substantive treaty 
rights. Tax treaties are best viewed as legal instruments that allocate jurisdiction of the 
contracting states and the resident is merely a beneficiary of the tax treaties; the benefit 
being the potential removal of the burden of international double taxation. The limited 
participation of the taxpayers in the dispute resolution of tax treaties is indicative that 
taxpayers have no enforceable rights under tax treaties. Enforceable remedies are available 
to a taxpayer only in the domestic courts. Anthea Roberts makes a persuasive case that IIAs 
should be reconceptualised as triangular treaties i.e. agreements between sovereign states 
that create enforceable rights for investors.355 It is doubtful if a similar case can be made in 
the context of tax treaties. Providing a taxpayer the right to directly bring a tax related claim 
against the contracting state is likely to change the nature of tax treaties; it would involve re-
conceptualising the nature of tax treaties that have remained largely unchanged since late 
1920s. Providing enforceable rights to a taxpayer would be a more preferable option for it 
may significantly improve dispute resolution under tax treaties. However, it is unlikely that 
states would agree to provide such a right to the taxpayer. In such a scenario, state-state 
arbitration where a contracting state brings claims before an arbitral tribunal is a more 
plausible option and in my view, more likely to be acceptable to the states. 
In IIL, the increasing number of investor-state disputes, the escalating costs of contesting the 
claims of the investors are some of the factors that have contributed to states seeking to play 
a more active role in international investment disputes. State-state arbitration is one of the 
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possible means by which the states can play a greater role.356 Anthea Roberts has correctly 
argued that IIL contemplates the co-existence of both kinds of arbitration – investor-state 
arbitration and state-state arbitration.357 In the specific context of tax-related investment 
disputes, an argument for considering the potential role of state-state arbitration is worth 
exploring given the drawbacks and some of the limitations of tax veto. 
Tax veto, as discussed above in Section III.A, has several shortcomings. States should 
reconsider if they desire to play a more active role in the adjudication of tax-related 
investment disputes. The tax veto, ordinarily, only allows the competent authorities of the 
contracting states to take a joint decision and disallow an investor’s claim. Partly due to the 
provision of tax veto, a priority to state’s role in tax-related investment disputes is evident; 
but in exercising their power of tax veto, states are under no obligation to provide reasons for 
the decision.358 This needs correction. Either the provision of tax veto should be re- 
formulated to provide that the competent authorities need to pass a reasoned order; else, 
state-state arbitration should be given priority over investor-state arbitration in tax-related 
investment disputes. In the latter case, tax veto should be removed altogether. Certain 
tribunals have indicated that taxation constitutes a special category in international 
investment disputes.359 Giving priority of state-state arbitration over investor-state 
arbitration in tax matters would not be inconsistent with the views of some of the investor-
state tribunals which have accorded comparatively greater deference to states in respect of 
taxation measures.360 
In my view, state-state arbitration can overcome the present shortcomings of dispute 
resolution – both under the tax treaties and the IIAs. While a greater role for state- state 
arbitration under tax treaties is certainly advisable, it not possible to say the same with 
certainty in respect of tax-related investment disputes. But the current manner of dispute 
resolution in IIAs has certain drawbacks that can be corrected by a better appreciation of the 
roles that the states seek to play in tax-related investment disputes. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Dispute resolution under tax treaties is not ideal due to the secrecy and uncertainty 
surrounding the entire process. The MAP is inefficient partially due to the involvement of 
states which are usually under no obligation to resolve a dispute within a specific period. 
With the introduction of tax arbitration, there is partial recognition of the need to increase 
the taxpayer’s involvement in dispute resolution under tax treaties. However, little headway 
is likely to be made unless the opaque nature of dispute resolution is removed and a more 
meaningful participation for the taxpayer is provided. The nature of dispute resolution in tax 
treaties still resembles the original dispute resolution proposed by the League in its Model 
Convention of 1927. Due to the fact that state dominates and the taxpayer is marginalised, it 
is fair to say that dispute resolution in tax treaties has not evolved significantly as compared 
to other sub-disciplines of international law such as IIL. 
In IIL, investor-state arbitration provides investors a direct remedy against the host state. 
However, in tax-related investment disputes states have a pre-emptive role. The provision of 
‘tax veto’ can scuttle initiation of arbitration by an investor. Here again, there is not 
complete transparency and states have extensive power to scuttle investor-state arbitration 
in tax-related investment disputes and that too without providing any reasons. Thus, both 
under tax treaties and IIAs, there is a common challenge to improve international tax dispute 
resolution by balancing the interests of the three parties involved – the taxpayer/investor and 
the two contracting states. 
To address the above mentioned challenge, I suggested that state-state arbitration should be 
introduced in tax treaties and its role in tax-related investment disputes should also be 
evaluated. I argue that state-state arbitration is a better dispute resolution mechanism than 
tax arbitration as proposed by the OECD and now also incorporated in some tax treaties. 
State-state arbitration, I suggest, will allow states to control various aspects of dispute 
resolution and at the same time allow for the evolution of a genuine ITL jurisprudence. It 
would be advantageous for the development of ITL as a sub-discipline of international law, 
provide more certainty to taxpayers and lead to a more coherent framework for resolution of 
disputes on international taxation. In IIL, states should consider if state-state arbitration 
should be given a priority over investor-state arbitration or else remove the various 
limitations of tax veto. 
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CHAPTER 3 
JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY, AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jurisdiction refers to the scope of a tribunal’s authority over the dispute while admissibility 
refers to the appropriateness of the claim at the time.361 Inadmissibility results from defects 
in the claim itself. While the tribunal may be empowered to adjudicate, the claimant may not 
have followed the prescribed procedure – for instance, it may have failed to exhaust local 
remedies. Both jurisdiction and admissibility concern the preliminary stages of the 
proceedings and tribunals frequently adjudicate on these threshold issues separately before 
proceeding to examine the merits of the claim. 
Despite numerous awards on jurisdiction, investor-state tribunals have not used the terms 
jurisdiction and admissibility consistently. At times, the same term - admissibility has been 
used in the same award by tribunals to mean different things.362 Even where there has been 
an opportunity to address the issue of distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction, 
tribunals have not articulated the difference with sufficient clarity.363 
This chapter looks at the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility with specific reference to 
tax-related investment disputes - disputes which belong to a separate category. I shall 
elaborate in this Chapter that due to tax carve outs, taxation measures are neither 
completely excluded from the purview of IIAs nor are they subject to scrutiny across the 
board like labour regulations.364 This makes the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility in tax- 
related investments unique. This chapter also examines the concept of arbitrability and its 
limited relevance to tax-related investment disputes. While ordinarily matters relating to 
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status, capacity and testamentary dispositions cannot be submitted to arbitration, tax 
disputes are not necessarily inarbitrable. Additionally, counterclaims are discussed in the 
context of tax-related investment disputes. Counterclaims are interesting in tax-related 
investment disputes because states often tend to present a defence and sometimes put forth 
a counterclaim that investors have evaded taxes. This raises issues of jurisdiction of the 
tribunal to hear a counterclaim, the enforcement of domestic tax laws by an investor-state 
tribunal and the role of counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes in general. I suggest 
that tribunals should allow a greater role for counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes 
by liberally interpreting the conditions for jurisdictional conditions in counterclaims.365 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section II examines the role of arbitrability in tax- 
related investment disputes. I suggest that arbitrability has limited role in informing the 
issues that arise before investor-state tribunals. Section III discusses the distinction between 
jurisdiction and admissibility and the importance of the distinction for tax-related investment 
disputes. The latter part of Section III examines the rationale and significance of tax carve 
outs before examining the implications of tax veto from the perspective of jurisdiction and 
admissibility. Section IV elaborates on counterclaims. It looks into the role of counterclaims in 
investor-state arbitration and the conditions for a tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over 
counterclaims. I suggest that states should rely on counterclaims more frequently in tax- 
related investment disputes. Section V concludes. 
II. THE LIMITED ROLE OF ARBITRABILITY IN TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
Is there a limitation on the subject matters that can be submitted to arbitration? In the 
context of international commercial arbitration, this question is generally answered with 
reference to the concept of arbitrability. Arbitrability limits the kinds of legal disputes that 
can be submitted to arbitration. Arbitrability is further sub-divided into two distinct concepts 
– subjective arbitrability and objective arbitrability.366 The former refers to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement or clause between the two parties. The latter refers to the legal 
disputes that are not inherently considered to be arbitrable – for instance, disputes 
concerning marital status or criminal offences. Submitting such disputes to arbitration is 
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either not allowed under the domestic laws of the state or the enforcement of such arbitral 
awards is considered against the public policy of the state. In investor-state arbitration, 
arbitrability is, however, rarely used as a tool to examine the scope of permissible 
adjudication.367 The questions that I seek to answer are – does arbitrability constrain state’s 
ability to submit tax-related investment disputes to investor-state tribunals? Can investor- 
state tribunals say that tax-related investment disputes are not arbitrable and thereby 
decline jurisdiction? 
Bernard Hanotiau states that the resolution of the question of arbitrability may depend on the 
stage at which the issue of arbitrability is raised.368 In investor-state arbitration, the issue of 
arbitrability may be relevant either at the preliminary stage or at the enforcement stage. In 
the preliminary stage, the state may argue that the claim of the investor is incapable of being 
adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal. However, a survey of the awards on tax-related 
investment disputes reveals that the states have generally formulated the argument in 
jurisdictional terms.369 It is either argued that the dispute is outside the scope of the IIA and 
by extension beyond the consent of the parties; or it is argued that the relevant taxation 
dispute is subject to jurisdiction of the domestic courts.370 In investor-state arbitration, a 
state has rarely raised the issue of tax disputes not being arbitrable per se. 
A possible argument that a state can raise is that under its domestic law, arbitration of 
taxation disputes is either not permissible or that arbitration is not a suitable avenue to 
adjudicate tax disputes. With respect to suitability of arbitration for tax disputes, a credible 
argument can be made that domestic courts armed with their well-developed jurisprudence 
are better suited to resolve tax disputes. For instance, domestic courts regularly examine the 
interpretation and application of tax treaties in combination with domestic taxation laws.371 
Nonetheless, the question of whether arbitration of tax disputes is allowed under a state’s 
domestic law brings forth the issue of incompatibility of domestic law and international law. 
In this respect, it is important to highlight an established principle of international 
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responsibility - that a state cannot evade its obligations under international law due to their 
alleged incompatibility with domestic law provisions.372 Thus, the question of whether states 
prefer domestic courts and whether domestic law of the state permits arbitral tribunals to 
adjudicate on tax disputes needs to be decided by the states at the time of entering into 
treaties. Subsequently, the provisions of the treaty in force prevail over the domestic law.373 I 
argue that the suggestion that tax-related investment disputes are not arbitrable lacks any 
merit. Tribunals need to defer to the scope of consent and cannot override it. It is not open to 
an investor-state tribunal to say that it refuses to adjudicate on a tax-related investment 
dispute even though the parties have validly agreed to arbitrate the matter.374 Thus, so far we 
see that the concept of arbitrability has limited use in investor-state arbitration. 
The enforcement stage is the second stage at which the arbitrability issue may arise. The 
effectiveness of international arbitration - commercial and investment, depends upon a 
widespread legal framework for enforcement. Enforcement of arbitral awards ensures that 
their legal effect is equivalent to binding judgment of a court. Investor-state arbitration 
awards are generally enforced under two multilateral conventions: either the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention or the New York Convention. 
Article V of the New York Convention, 1958 provides that the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award may be refused if the competent authority in the state where recognition 
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and enforcement is sought finds that: either the subject matter of the difference is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that state; or the recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that state. With 
reference to the first ground – incapable of judicial settlement, I’ve argued above that the 
consent of states is paramount in investor-state arbitration. The ground of incapable of 
judicial settlement is unlikely to be a hurdle in enforcement of tax-related investment 
awards. With respect to public policy, certain observations are necessary. 
National public policy generally performs the role of ‘eliminating’ certain arbitration 
agreements that are contrary to the core values or interests of the state. However, the role of 
national public policy is shrinking in arbitration. Disputes involving securities law, competition 
law and even intellectual property are being referred to arbitration.375 National public 
policies on arbitrability are thus becoming increasing liberal. It has been argued that recent 
domestic laws rarely regulate questions of arbitrability, nor do they set forth general rules of 
procedure applicable to arbitration of future disputes.376 Also, if one may extrapolate the 
attitude of the states from various IIAs – most states show a qualified acceptance to 
arbitrability of tax-related investment disputes.377 Thus, even if one adopts ‘international 
public policy’ as the frame of reference, the trend seems to be towards acceptance of a 
limited but definite authority of investor-state arbitral tribunals in tax disputes. The idea that 
certain kinds of tax disputes and certain aspects of tax disputes are arbitrable is finding its 
root in international public policy.378 Some authors have suggested that that there is no rule 
of international public policy opposing the arbitrability of tax disputes per se.379 This view is 
contestable and contingent on the definition of the term international public policy.380 
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Investor-state arbitral awards can alternatively also be enforced under the ICSID Convention. 
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention states that: ‘each Contracting State shall recognize an 
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations 
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State.’ Enforcement under ICSID Convention is not qualified by the two conditions provided in 
the New York Convention. However, Article 52 does provide that a party may request the 
annulment of the award if the tribunal has ‘manifestly exceeded its powers.’ The ICSID 
Convention contemplates annulment as the final challenge to the award of the investor-state 
tribunal. Once arguments about a tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction fail at the annulment as 
well – the award has to be enforced. There is no room for arguing that the award is not 
enforceable due to arbitrability or due to reasons related to public policy. Thus, arbitrability 
has no role to play at the enforcement stage as well if the award is sought to be enforced 
under the ICSID Convention. 
To conclude this Section, arbitrability may play a useful role in international commercial 
arbitration. However, in investor-state arbitration it does not inform the issues of jurisdiction 
or admissibility – especially, in tax-related investment disputes. Investor-state tribunals derive 
their authority and jurisdiction from the scope of the consent in the underlying treaty. In such 
a scenario, the incapability of certain disputes being arbitrable recedes into the background. 
In fact, the concept of arbitrability has no significance and fails to provide the required 
insight to address arguments about jurisdictional or admissibility that arise in tax- related 
investment disputes. Tax-related investment disputes have now become an important part of 
investor-state arbitration. Domestic courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over all kinds of 
tax disputes. Insofar as the taxation policies of states involve a breach of international 
obligations, there is a clear mandate and role for investor-state tribunals to perform. In such 
cases – arbitrability or public policy exception have no role to play. The only relevant 
questions are if the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the claims and whether the claims 
are admissible. 
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III. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY 
A. The Distinction between Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
The terms admissibility and jurisdiction are often used interchangeably with arbitrability, 
especially in the US. The US courts tend to use the term arbitrability, admissibility and 
jurisdiction to mean the same thing.381 This, at times, causes further confusion on the 
meaning of the three terms. It is not the object of this chapter to elucidate the meanings 
ascribed to these terms in different jurisdictions.382 It is suffice to say here that the term 
arbitrability is used in the same sense as in Section II above i.e. to reflect the meaning 
ascribed to it in international commercial arbitration.383 The distinction between admissibility 
and jurisdiction is discussed below. 
In accordance with the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, an arbitral tribunal has the power 
to determine its own jurisdiction. It can also simultaneously determine the question of 
admissibility. The questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are generally dealt by the tribunal 
in a preliminary stage before proceeding with the merits of the case.384 
Jurisdiction, simply put, involves the capacity of the tribunal to adjudicate the dispute 
brought before it.385 Jurisdiction has four dimensions: ratione materiae (jurisdiction over 
subject matter); ratione personae (jurisdiction over persons); ratione temporis (jurisdiction 
over time); ratione loci (jurisdiction over location).386 Further, the requirements of 
jurisdiction are fixed and immutable at the date of seisin and cannot be circumvented by 
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University Press 2009) 79; Duke Energy award, supra note 369, at 19-48. 
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supervening facts.387 By contrast, a challenge to admissibility is an attack on the particular 
claim brought forward by the investor.388 The boundary between the concepts of jurisdiction 
and admissibility is fluid.389 In fact, there is a viewpoint which doubts that jurisdiction and 
admissibility are separate concepts.390 However, in my view, a distinction can be made and in 
fact such distinction is useful in tax-related investment disputes. 
The award in SGS v Philippines is useful to understand the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility.391 The dispute between the two parties involved an investment contract 
which contained a stipulation that disputes arising out of it should be referred to a Philippine 
court. SGS, nonetheless sought an ICSID arbitration claiming failure of payment. The tribunal 
had to determine whether the broadly worded treaty encompassed contract claims and if the 
answer was in the affirmative, whether it should exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding the 
presence of choice of a forum clause. With respect to the former, the tribunal noted that the 
Switzerland-Philippines BIT gave it jurisdiction over essentially contractual claims against the 
respondent. As regards the latter, it observed that SGS’s claim was premature and must await 
a determination of the amount payable in accordance with contractually agreed process. The 
tribunal thus stayed the proceedings to await the judgment of the Philippine court.392 The 
tribunal in effect held that it had the jurisdiction to adjudicate but the claim was 
inadmissible due to a defect in the claim that could be cured. The tribunal treated the failure 
to first approach the Philippine court as a matter of admissibility without expressly saying so. 
Zachary Douglas states that the principles to distinguish jurisdiction and admissibility are 
twofold: first, if the sustenance of the preliminary objection leads to the conclusion that it is 
inappropriate for the tribunal to exercise its adjudicative power in any circumstances, then 
the issue is properly characterised as one of jurisdiction; second, if sustaining the preliminary 
objection would lead to the conclusion that it is inappropriate for the tribunal to rule on a 
specific claim or counterclaim then the issue is properly characterised as one of 
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admissibility.393 If the tribunal considers that its decision under the treaty would be 
premature, it can be classified as an issue of admissibility. A jurisdictional issue is subject to 
appeal for it relates to the adjudicative power of the tribunal itself while on the issue of 
admissibility the tribunal’s decision is final.394 This is a convincing way to distinguish 
jurisdiction and admissibility. I shall rely on the above stated distinction to further examine 
the importance of jurisdiction and admissibility in tax-related investment disputes. 
B. The Rationale and Significance of Tax Carve Outs 
In this sub-section, I examine tax carve-outs in detail. Tax carve outs contribute to the 
distinctive nature of tax-related investment disputes by limiting the applicability of IIA to a 
state’s taxation measures. The extent of jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals is determined 
by the wording of tax carve outs that in turn differs in each IIA. I begin by highlighting the 
different kinds of tax carve outs in a tabular form. The aim of this table is to show that tax 
carve outs are of different kinds and also that they have evolved over years. Thereafter, I 
examine the rationale for tax carve outs such as the need to avoid conflict with tax treaties. I 
specifically address the reasons for carving out the national treatment, Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) obligation and the fair and equitable treatment standard (FET standard). In the last 
sub-section, I highlight the significance of tax carve outs by discussing relevant arbitral 
awards. 
393 
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TABLE 2: TAX CARVE OUTS IN IIAs395 
 
395 
This Table is representative and not exhaustive. The aim is to show the various kinds of tax carve outs 
that are included in IIAs. 
IIA APPLICABILITY TO TAXATION MEASURE
Expropriatio
n
Fair and 
Equitabl
e 
Treatme
nt
National 
Treatme
nt
Most 
Favored 
Nation 
Treatment
ASEAN Agreement 
(1987)
US Model BIT (1983); US 
Model (2004)
×
Kenya-Netherlands 
BIT (1970)
× × × ×
Australia-China 
BIT (1988)
× × × ×
NAFTA (1994); ECT 
(1991)
× ×
US-Albania BIT (1995) × ×
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1. Rationale of Tax Carve Outs 
Tax carve outs are provisions in IIAs that partially exclude the applicability of substantive 
obligations to taxation measures. Tax carve outs did not appear in IIAs from the very 
beginning and have evolved over time. The first BIT between Germany and Pakistan did not 
contain any exception for taxation.396 The absence of any tax carve outs in IIAs continued in 
the 1960s.397 The substantive obligation of national treatment and the MFN obligation 
continued to apply to a state’s taxation measures even in the IIAs that were concluded in the 
1970s and the 1980s.398 For instance, the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-China BIT 
(1984) did not exclude taxation from the above mentioned substantive obligations. This 
position continued in a number of IIAs until the early 1990s. The prominent outlier in the 
initial phase was the US. The 1983 US Model BIT was the first to include a tax carve out and 
provided that the IIA shall apply to taxation matters only with respect to expropriation, 
transferability of payments related to investment and the observance and enforcement of an 
investment agreement.399 
The rationale for the presence of tax carve outs in IIAs is linked to the existence of thousands 
of tax treaties. Kenneth Vandevelde has argued that due to the existence of bilateral tax 
treaties between US and BIT partners, the BIT drafters excluded tax matters from the BIT 
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A S E A N 
C o m p r e h e n s i v e 
I n v e s t m e n t 
Agreement (2009)
×
CETA (2016) ×
Nigeria-Singapore 
BIT (2016); Japan-
Iran BIT 
(2016)
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provisions.400 He contends that the US BIT negotiators claimed that provisions relating to 
national treatment in BITs conflicted with tax treaties and hence taxation measures were 
carved out of BITs.401 At the same time, the goal of US BIT was to prevent taxation measures 
from infringing investor’s rights and thus substantive protections against expropriation and 
limits on transfers continued to be applicable to taxation measures.402 Currently, the 
exclusion of national treatment does not have the desired effect due to the development of 
non-discrimination aspect as part of the FET standard. 
National treatment precludes states from adopting discriminatory measures and almost all tax 
treaties oblige state not to discriminate.403 Thus, by excluding the applicability of the IIA’s 
national treatment to taxation measures, an overlap or a conflict with tax treaties was sought 
to be avoided. Though, in retrospect, the possibility of a conflict may have been overstated.
404 But, only some IIAs exempt taxation measures from the FET standard and non- 
discrimination now constitutes an important element of the FET standard.405 Thus, as long as 
states are obliged to provide FET with respect to taxation measures, an exception  for 
taxation measures with respect to national treatment does not work. 
Hypothetically, if national treatment was applied to taxation measures – what was the kind of 
conflict that the treaty negotiators were anticipating? Tax treaties aim to prevent double 
taxation while IIAs safeguard investors and their investments. There seems to be little overlap 
in the objectives of tax treaties and IIAs. There is only a limited jurisprudence on non- 
discrimination in tax-related investment disputes;406 but to the extent that tribunals have 
engaged with the non-discrimination standard in IIAs there is little to suggest any conflict 
with tax treaties.407 While the treaty negotiators may have reasons to expect conflict, there is 
little evidence of it in the arbitral awards. 
On the other hand, there exists a strong rationale for exempting tax measures from the MFN 
clause. The pre-dominance of bilateral tax relationships has been discussed in Chapter 1 
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above. For instance, states may negotiate to incorporate a certain rate of withholding tax in a 
tax treaty with one state and different rate with another state. By applying the MFN 
obligation, the withholding rates will move to the lowest level. The exclusion of tax measures 
from the MFN excludes this outcome. Similarly, states may prefer to extend tax-related 
incentives to only investors from a few specific states. This may not be possible if MFN 
obligations in IIAs apply to taxation measures of a state.408 Thus, the exclusion of taxation 
from the MFN obligation is defensible. It has also been suggested that measures such as anti- 
avoidance rules are not compatible with the MFN obligations.409 In the General Agreement on 
Trade and Services (GATS), taxation measures, unless they are arbitrary or discriminatory, are 
also carved out from MFN obligation.410 The rationale for tax carve outs for MFN obligation, in 
both IIAs and GATS, is to prevent conflict or overlap with tax treaties and preserve state 
discretion in taxation matters. Thus, the tax carve outs are justifiable in so far as MFN 
obligation is concerned. 
The premise that taxation matters are best addressed under tax treaties and thus should be 
excluded from IIAs is correct but it does not explain the inconsistent application to the 
national treatment, FET standard and the MFN obligation. Tax treaties allocate revenue 
jurisdiction among two or more states. IIAs aim to protect foreign investors from excesses of 
the host state. The aim of latter is to protect revenue generating activities against excessive 
state interference while the former provide a framework for dividing the revenue.411 Thus, 
while the functions of IIAs and tax treaties are complementary, they do not necessarily 
overlap in a significant manner. Also, while the argument that tax treaties are better suited to 
address taxation-related disputes is correct, it obviates the fact that tax-related disputes 
have varied facets and tax treaties may not be best suited to resolve all kinds of disputes. For 
instance, tax-related investment disputes are best addressed under IIAs. In my view, the 
different kinds of tax disputes that arise have not been fully appreciated before including tax 
carve outs in IIAs. 
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Further, the tax carve outs are drafted in unnecessarily complicated language.412 William W. 
Park has compared the tax carve out clauses to the Russian nested doll – matryoshka, where 
‘[O]ne carved figure opens to reveal another, which in turn unlocks to yield yet more 
diminutive figurines.’413 The most prominent examples are the NAFTA and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT).414 The latter especially contains one of the most complicated tax carve outs in 
IIAs.415 Other states have copied the tax carve outs in NAFTA and ECT for their IIAs.416 
Various states have adopted tax carve outs at different times and for different reasons. 
Among the states that were neither part of the NAFTA or the ECT, the approach to tax carve 
outs has varied. The ASEAN Agreement concluded in 1987 provides that the ‘Provision of this 
Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of the Contracting Parties. 
Such matters shall be governed by Avoidance of Double Taxation between Contracting Parties 
and the domestic laws of each Contracting Party’.417 The exclusion of taxation is unqualified, 
it even extends to expropriation.418 However, in IIAs signed by states like India in the mid- 
1990s, tax carve outs were absent.419 In fact, states like India have decided to include 
detailed tax carve outs in their IIAs only recently after receiving a notice for tax-related 
investment arbitration.420 The reasons for including tax carve outs may vary for different 
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states such as preventing conflicts with tax treaties or shrinking of domestic tax policy space, 
but tax carve outs have certainly become ubiquitous in IIAs over the last two decades. 
2. Significance of Tax Carve Outs 
In tax-related investment disputes, most preliminary objections of jurisdiction relate to the 
tax carve out provisions.421 Tax carve outs, as discussed above, essentially provide that the 
provisions of the IIA are not applicable to taxation measures except in certain circumstances. 
The contingent application of IIAs to taxation measures requires careful consideration by the 
tribunals to determine if they can exercise jurisdiction in the particular case. Tax carve outs 
are worded differently and consequently the extent to which taxation measures are excluded 
varies in each IIA. The text of the IIA and characterisation of the dispute are central factors 
for determining whether the tribunal is competent to adjudicate the dispute.422 Occidental 
and the EnCana awards are two leading examples of how differently worded treaties led to 
different consequences. 
In Occidental an important element of the dispute was whether Occidental was entitled to 
VAT refunds under a participation contract with Ecuador.423 Initially, Ecuador had refunded the 
VAT payments but later it changed its position. Occidental challenged the refusal of the VAT 
refunds. Ecuador challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal by primarily relying on the tax 
carve out in the US-Ecuador BIT. The tribunal examined the carve out provision – Article X of 
the BIT to address the objection.424 The tribunal observed that the reference in Article X to 
‘strive to accord fairness and equity’ in respect of tax policies is legally significant. The BIT, 
according to the tribunal, imposed on the host state an obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment no different from one in Article II of the BIT (which provided for fair and equitable 
treatment in respect of non-taxation measures). The nevertheless proviso in paragraph 2 did 
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not mean that in respect of tax policies the state could pursue unfair or inequitable 
treatment. It only meant ‘that such obligation [was] concerned with the three categories of 
tax matters therein listed.’425 
The tribunal then considered the three categories mentioned in Article X (2). The question of 
transfers did not arise in the case. It then considered the question of expropriation. The 
tribunal stated that normally claim of expropriation should be considered at the merits stage, 
but ‘it is so evident that there is no expropriation in this case that the Tribunal will deal with 
this claim as a question of admissibility.’426 The tribunal then elaborated that it was not 
persuaded by the claimant’s arguments on expropriation and concluded that ‘the claim 
concerning expropriation is inadmissible.’427 The declaration of the claim of expropriation as 
inadmissible was not meant to signify that the claim was pre-mature but that it was a weak 
claim. Thus, while the tribunal correctly dismissed the claim on expropriation the use of the 
term admissibility in the award was, in my opinion, was not appropriate. 
The next question before the tribunal was whether the dispute related to the observance and 
enforcement of the terms of an investment agreement concerning matters of taxation. The 
tribunal rejected the objection of Ecuador that the claims were contractual in nature. The 
tribunal observed that, ‘The characterization of the dispute by the Claimant probably would 
suffice alone for the Tribunal to reach a determination on jurisdiction.’428 The claim of VAT 
refunds by Occidental was based on the participation contract between Occidental and 
Ecuador which the tribunal concluded was as an investment agreement. The tribunal said that 
even though the claimant did not invoke its contractual rights but rather pursued its treaty 
rights, the dispute found its origins in the contract in so far the dispute on VAT reimbursement 
was concerned.429 The tribunal found that since the dispute concerned the observance and 
enforcement of the contract the tax dispute fell squarely within the exceptions of Article X 
and hence within its jurisdiction.430 
Crucial to the tribunal’s finding of jurisdiction was that tribunal accepted Occidental’s 
characterisation of claims as treaty claims. Occidental had not formulated its claim for the 
VAT refunds solely under the participation contract. However, the tribunal noted that it was 
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entitled to the VAT payments under the general tax law of Ecuador.431 The conclusion of the 
tribunal where it relied on the general tax law, was unusual since Occidental had made claims 
relying on breach of treaty obligations by Ecuador.432 
The dispute in EnCana, similar to the one in Occidental, concerned the refusal of VAT refunds 
by the state that the claimant had earlier claimed successfully.433 In response to the 
jurisdictional challenge, the tribunal examined the tax carve out provision.434 However, since 
the wording of the Canada-Ecuador BIT in EnCana differed from the US-Ecuador BIT in the 
Occidental arbitration, the tribunal correctly arrived at a different conclusion in EnCana.435 
The vital question for jurisdictional purposes was the meaning of the term ‘taxation 
measures’. The tribunal noted that though the term ‘taxation measure’ was not defined in 
the BIT, it ‘should be given its normal meaning in the context of the Treaty.’436 The tribunal 
observed that ‘taxation’ need not necessarily be limited to direct taxation. It also includes 
indirect taxes such as VAT refunds. In noting the meaning of ‘measure’, it remarked that there 
is no need to limit it to merely the provisions of the law which impose a tax. It observed, ‘all 
those aspects of the tax regime which go to determine how much tax is payable or refundable 
are part of the notion of “taxation measures”. Thus tax deductions, allowances or rebates 
are caught by the term.’437 Thus, the tribunal concluded, the law imposing an 
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obligation to account for VAT received, the law entitling the supplier to offset VAT paid to 
those from whom it has purchased goods and services, as well as law regulating the 
availability of refunds of VAT were ‘taxation measures’.438 For these reasons, the tribunal held 
that EnCana’s claim so far as it related to the entitlement of VAT refunds was partially 
excluded from the scope of the BIT and observed that its jurisdiction was limited only to 
EnCana’s expropriation claim . Interestingly, the tribunal not only noted the difference in the 
text of the relevant BITs in Occidental and EnCana but also the manner in which the claims 
had been characterised – the latter, in tribunal’s opinion also influenced the conclusions on 
jurisdiction.439 In Occidental, the dispute though related to a contract was characterised as a 
treaty dispute while in EnCana a similar claim was essentially advanced as a contractual claim 
itself – this partially contributed to different outcomes in both cases. 
The tribunal in the El Paso award, however, adopted an unusual approach. The tribunal 
addressed El Paso’s allegation that Argentina’s imposition of a withholding tax on energy 
companies discriminated against the energy sector and in particular El Paso. The tribunal 
analysed the arguments of El Paso and Argentina for six pages and concluded that: 
Last but not least, the Tribunal recalls that the application of standards in the 
BIT other than that of protection from expropriation is excluded for tax 
matters. The question that was discussed in the preceding paragraphs is 
therefore somewhat academic, although, if it had had to decide the issue, the 
Tribunal would have considered it important to state that, for the reasons 
presented, it held that there had been neither de jure nor de facto 
discrimination against El Paso during the Argentine crisis.440 (emphasis added) 
In my opinion, the tribunal should have been more categorical about its scope of jurisdiction 
and more precise in identifying the scope of the tax carve out clause. If in tribunal’s opinion, 
the non-discrimination obligation was not applicable to taxation measures and hence not 
within its jurisdiction, it should have refrained from examining the claimant’s arguments. A 
mere ‘academic’ opinion in an arbitral award was not necessary. 
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The above mentioned awards (especially EnCana) show that the meaning of the term ‘tax’ or 
‘taxation measures’ can have a significant impact in a tribunal asserting or declining 
jurisdiction.441 These terms are not usually defined in IIAs. Even double taxation treaties do 
not usually define the term tax in an informative manner.442 Investment agreements involving 
natural resources use terms such as levies, royalties, licence fees or taxes, and whether a 
tribunal has jurisdiction may hinge on the meaning of the term ‘tax’.443 In Link Trading v 
Moldova, the claimant argued that it enjoyed the right to custom duty stability for a period of 
ten years on its investment. It further claimed that by changing the customs rule the 
respondent state had violated the claimant’s right. The tribunal was required to interpret the 
term taxation in order to establish its jurisdiction. The tribunal gave a liberal meaning to the 
term taxation and observed that the term taxation as used in the Moldova-US BIT was ‘broad 
enough to cover customs duties and other forms of raising revenue that are within the State’s 
power.’444 
This meaning of the term ‘tax’ was also examined by the tribunal in Burlington.445 The 
dispute in Burlington concerned Ecuador’s legislation (Law 42) which increased the 
government’s share in production sharing contracts from around 22% to 50% (later increased 
to 99%). This was to avowedly increase the state’s share in extra-ordinary profits i.e. profits 
from oil prices which were in excess of the price of oil when the production sharing contracts 
were executed. The parties disagreed whether the increase in oil prices was unforeseen or 
foreseeable at the time of execution of the contract. Eventually the claimant invoked the US- 
Ecuador BIT and the tribunal at the jurisdiction stage examined Article X.446 After ruling that 
it had jurisdiction over Burlington’s expropriation claim, the tribunal examined jurisdiction 
objections concerning the non-expropriation claims. It sought to answer the question that 
whether the non-expropriation claims involve ‘matters of taxation’ under Article X of the BIT. 
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In order to answer that question, the tribunal first needed to answer the question ‘whether 
the impugned law – ‘Law 42’ is a tax for the purposes of Article X of BIT.’447 It rejected 
claimant’s contention that ‘Law 42’ can be a tax for the purposes of Article X only if it 
qualified as a tax under Ecuadorian law. The tribunal observed that Article X is part of a 
treaty and the question – ‘whether Law 42 is a tax?’, is governed by international law and not 
Ecuadorian law.448 Relying on the EnCana award, the tribunal observed that Law 42 is "tax" 
under Article X of the Treaty if the following four requirements are met: (i) there is a law; (ii) 
that imposes a liability on classes of persons; (iii) to pay money to the state; (iv) for public 
purposes. Under this definition, the tribunal held that Law 42 was a tax.449 The tribunal 
concluded that since Burlington's Law 42 was a tax, the non-expropriation claims raised 
"matters of taxation" within the meaning of Article X and hence the tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over the same.450 
While the tribunal was correct in relying on the robust reasoning of the EnCana award, its 
distinction between international law and domestic law was not entirely accurate. The term 
‘tax’ cannot be defined solely by recourse to international law – in fact, the widespread 
practice in ITL suggests completely otherwise. For instance, the UK-India tax treaty provides 
that ‘the term "tax" means United Kingdom tax or Indian tax’.451 In almost every tax treaty 
the term tax is equated to its meaning under the relevant domestic tax law. For an investor- 
state tribunal to treat international law and domestic law as completely separate while 
defining the term tax does not reflect an accurate understanding of ITL. 
Contrary to the Burlington award, the tribunal in Occidental(II) observed that the same ‘Law 
42’ is ‘neither a royalty, a tax, a levy or any other measure of taxation.’452 The tribunal added 
that Law 42 was merely a unilateral decision of the Ecuadorian Congress to ‘allocate to the 
Ecuadorian State’ a defined percentage of the revenues earned by contractor companies such 
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as Occidental under the participation contract they had signed with Ecuador.453 The tribunal 
unconvincingly attempted to distinguish between tax, royalty and levy. In my view, the 
approach of the tribunal in Burlington was comparatively more thorough and ‘Law 42’ 
enacted by Ecuador to tax windfall profits should have been characterised as a tax by the 
tribunal in Occidental(II).454 
In a similar vein, the tribunal in the Murphy award made an unconvincing observation that 
Ecuador’s ‘Law 42’ was not a tax or a matter of taxation under international law, but a 
unilateral change of its contract with the claimant.455 The tribunal concluded that under 
international law, ‘Law 42’ did not constitute a tax. However, the tribunal did not 
authoritatively elaborate as to how tax is defined under international law.456 
The tribunals in the Yukos awards tried to earmark a tribunal’s jurisdiction by distinguishing 
mala fide and bona fide taxation measures. For instance, in the Hulley award, the tribunal 
justifying its jurisdiction under the ECT observed that: 
in any event, the carve-out of Article 21(1) can apply only to bona fide taxation 
actions, i.e., actions that are motivated by the purpose of raising general 
revenue for the State. By contrast, actions that are taken only under the guise 
of taxation, but in reality aim to achieve an entirely unrelated purpose (such as 
the destruction of a company or the elimination of a political opponent) cannot 
qualify for exemption from the protection standards of the ECT under the tax 
carve-out in Article 21(1).457 
The premise of the tribunal – that only mala fide taxation measures can cause expropriation, 
is questionable. Bona fide tax measures can be expropriatory if they substantially deprive an 
investor of its investment. The tribunal, however, in its award on jurisdiction and 
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admissibility,458 correctly clarifies that it is not an appellate court and it shall not adjudicate 
on the correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the domestic courts of Russia. 
Almost every arbitral tribunal carefully scrutinises tax carve outs and the nature of the claim 
to determine whether the taxation measure in question is within the scope of the IIA. This is 
particularly important because investor-state tribunals are not appellate courts in tax 
matters. The tribunals need to carefully segregate the tax-related investment dispute from 
other issues or disputes that may be closely related but nonetheless are beyond their 
jurisdiction.459 The taxation measure in question needs to have a nexus with the investment 
for the tribunal to validly assume jurisdiction.460 The respondent raised this argument in the 
Duke Energy award.461 The dispute concerned the tax assessment of the claimant by the tax 
authorities of Peru and the eventual determination of the tax liability. The dispute 
concerning the assessment and tax liability had been adjudicated by Peruvian tax courts. One 
of the respondent’s objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal was that Peruvian tax courts 
had fully resolved the dispute. Peru contended that even if the tribunal found that the claims 
were admissible, it should decline to sit as an appellate body for the Peruvian Tax Court. The 
tribunal stated that it cannot accept the respondent’s argument because the issue before it 
was ‘not a dispute about taxes but, rather, an investment dispute arising out of the imposition 
of taxes.’462 
Further, the tribunal emphasised that the issues before it could not have been within the 
purview of the Peruvian tax court. The dispute before the tribunal involved determining the 
impact on investment as opposed to the general obligation under tax laws. Also, the tribunal 
noted, it was not required to determine whether the decision of the tax court was right or 
wrong as a matter of Peruvian tax law but whether the interpretation by the court was 
consistent with the claimant’s rights secured under the legal stability agreement. Since the 
tribunal would not adjudicate on the correctness of otherwise of the decisions of the tax 
courts, it was not an appellate court. The tribunal, thus, concluded that since the dispute 
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concerned the investment, it was within its jurisdiction.463 This line of reasoning adopted in 
the Duke Energy award echoed the EnCana award where the tribunal had observed that: 
provided a matter is sufficiently clearly connected to a taxation law or 
regulation (or to a procedure, requirement or practice of the taxation 
authorities in apparent reliance on such a law or regulation), its legality is a 
matter for the courts of the host State.464 
Thus, the discussion in this sub-section shows that tribunals have relied on the wording of the 
tax carve out clause and the meaning of the term tax to determine the scope of their 
jurisdiction. While the differently worded tax carve out clauses necessarily means that the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis; the term 
‘tax’ has invited different interpretations by tribunals. The tribunal in the EnCana award 
articulated a convincing definition, but the tribunals such as in the Murphy award have 
expressed disagreement with it. Further, it must be noted that apart from the Occidental 
award, most tribunals have correctly treated objections relating to tax carve out provisions as 
one of jurisdiction and not of admissibility. The issue of admissibility in tax-related 
investment disputes is also relevant when one considers the implications of provisions relating 
to tax veto in IIAs. 
C. Implications of the Tax Veto 
Apart from tax carve outs, the provision of tax veto is another unique aspect of tax-related 
investment disputes. Tax veto, as discussed in Chapter 2, provides that under the relevant 
IIA, the contracting states have the first right to determine if the relevant taxation measures 
do not amount to expropriation. The provision of tax veto is only for tax-related investment 
disputes and for no other kind of investment dispute. The implications that flow from tax veto 
are, however, unclear. 
From the viewpoint of admissibility of a claim, the provision of tax veto leaves several issues 
undressed. For instance, in the Yukos Universal award, the tribunal has interpreted that 
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under Article 21 of the ECT the reference to the competent tax authorities is contemplated as 
merely a step towards arbitration.465 The tribunal, in my view, has incorrectly categorised the 
requirement of reference to the competent authorities in a tax-related investment dispute 
with the requirement of the 6-month waiting period provided in various IIAs.466 The tribunal in 
EnCana observed that an ‘investor’s referral to the taxation authorities may be made out of 
an abundance of caution.’467I would like to submit that in both the awards, the tribunals did 
not fully appreciate that the provision of tax veto is different from the 6-month waiting or 
negotiating period provided for in certain IIAs.468 
In Sergei Paushok, the tribunal stated that the failure to abide by the negotiating period 
would not go to the jurisdiction and the tribunal would consider the failure to abide by the 
negotiation requirement under damages and not as part of the jurisdictional hearing.469 The 
negotiating period in this case did not refer to the treaty provision that incorporated tax veto 
and hence the observation of the tribunal was correct. However, in case the provision of tax 
veto is involved, the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is essential and can 
usefully inform tax-related investment disputes. 
In the event that the dispute is referred to the competent authorities and they fail to arrive 
at a joint determination within the specified time period, the dispute can thereafter be 
referred to the arbitral tribunal. In such a scenario, the tribunal will normally be confronted 
with an objection from the respondent state that taxation measures do not fall within the 
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scope of the relevant IIA. This objection may be classified as a matter of jurisdiction and the 
parties will have the opportunity to contest the tribunal’s decision.470 By contrast, if the 
parties are under an obligation to first refer the dispute to competent authorities but fail to 
do so – it should be classified as an issue of admissibility. If the claimant bypasses the 
requirement of informing the tax authorities or subsequent to informing them fails to comply 
with the stipulated waiting period; in such a case filing the claim before the tribunal will be 
premature and hence inadmissible.471 Once the prescribed time period has elapsed and no 
joint determination is issued by the authorities, it is open for the tribunal to adjudicate on 
the claim provided it establishes its jurisdiction. Hence, the classification of a matter as one 
of admissibility or jurisdiction is vital when the provision of tax veto is involved in tax-related 
investment disputes. This distinction is of course applicable to the IIAs where the provision to 
refer to tax veto is mandatory; if it is only enabling or discretionary, then the above 
distinction may not apply.472 
IV. A GREATER ROLE FOR COUNTERCLAIMS IN TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
A counterclaim is distinct from a defence on merits of the principal claim;473 it is autonomous 
but related to the principal claim.474 Advancing defence on merits allows the respondent to 
merely avoid losing while a successful counterclaim allows the respondent to seek redress for 
its own grievance.475 Counterclaims assume an additional significance in investor-state 
arbitration where states are usually the respondent as IIAs ordinarily only contain obligations 
for the host state and permit investors to initiate arbitration claiming damages for breach of 
the obligations. Counterclaims allow states to present their claims against the investor. 
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Various arbitration rules envisage counterclaims. Article 46 of the ICSID Convention states 
that: 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a 
party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising 
directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within 
the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.476 
The ICJ Rules also provide that the Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes 
within the jurisdiction of the court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of the 
claim of the other party.477 
In investor-state arbitration, counterclaims, if successfully advanced, can correct the 
asymmetry in favour of investors. Counterclaims not only allow the states to bring the 
conduct of the investor to the notice of the tribunal but they also advance state’s own claims 
against the investor.478 Despite the advantages of counterclaims, states have not resorted to 
counterclaims in investor-state arbitration frequently or successfully.479 
In this Section, I discuss the relevance of counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes 
with the help of a few arbitral awards. However, to advance counterclaims certain conditions 
need to be met. As mentioned above, the ICJ Rules and the ICSID Convention both contain two 
similar conditions: the adjudicating body should have jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims 
and the counterclaims should be directly connected to the subject-matter of the dispute. I 
argue that a more liberal interpretation of the latter condition can help in promoting a 
greater role of counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes. It would, to some extent, 
correct the asymmetry of investor-state arbitration currently in favour of investors. 
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A. Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction to hear counterclaims is essentially related to the scope of consent of the 
parties to the dispute. Zachary Douglas argues that the scope of consent by the investor in 
accepting the offer to arbitrate is not limited to the principal claim. The investor accepts the 
offer in its entirety and not a part of it.480 This, in my opinion, is the correct position. A 
modification of the offer to arbitrate is not an acceptance of the offer but a counter-offer. 
Similarly, accepting only a part of the offer to arbitrate is akin to segregating the offer into 
different parts. Such an option is only open to the investor if the state formulated its offer to 
arbitrate in a similar fashion. In the Roussalis award, the tribunal stated that it is not 
disputed that the respondent, Romania, expressed its consent to arbitration in the BIT and 
that the claimant accepted Romania’s offer to arbitrate. However, respondent contended that 
such consent included consent to arbitrate counterclaims. The tribunal observed that the 
scope of the consent can only be determined by reference to the dispute resolution clause 
contained in the BIT. The investor’s consent to the BIT’s arbitration clause can only exist in 
relation to counterclaims if such counterclaims come within the consent of the host state as 
expressed in the BIT.481 To extend the observations of the tribunal in Roussalis further – the 
wording of the IIA should determine if the tribunal is empowered to adjudicate on the 
counterclaims. The acceptance by the investor should not be construed as only limited to the 
claims submitted by it and the acceptance should be interpreted by referring to the text of 
the relevant IIA.482 
In Roussalis the tribunal rejected the counterclaim of the state by stating that the references 
made in the text of Article 9(1) of the BIT to ‘disputes … concerning an obligation of the 
latter’ undoubtedly limit the jurisdiction of the tribunal on claims brought by investors about 
obligations of the host state.483 Accordingly, the BIT does not provide for counterclaims to be 
introduced by the host state in relation to obligations of the investor. The meaning of the 
‘dispute’ was restricted to the issue of compliance by the state with the BIT.484 
However, Professor Reisman issued a dissenting opinion in which he disagreed with the 
majority’s decision to reject jurisdiction and stated: 
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… in my view, when the State Parties to a BIT contingently consent, inter alia, 
to ICSID jurisdiction, the consent component of Article 46 of the Washington 
Convention is ipso facto imported into any ICSID arbitration which an investor 
then elects to pursue. It is important to bear in mind that such counterclaim 
jurisdiction is not only concession to a State Party: Article 46 works to the 
benefit of both respondent state and investor. In rejecting ICSID jurisdiction 
over counterclaims, a neutral tribunal – which was, in fact, selected by the 
claimant – perforce directs the respondent State to pursue its claims in its own 
courts where the very investor who had sought a forum outside the state 
apparatus is now constrained to become the defendant.485 
While Professor Reisman is accurate in stating the aims that could be achieved by allowing the 
counterclaims, in my view, he places greater emphasis on the objectives of judicial economy 
and diminishes the importance of the scope of consent of the parties. As I stated in Section II 
above, the tribunals need to defer to the consent of the parties. The wording of the relevant 
IIA reveals the scope of consent of the parties and should be the controlling factor in 
allowing/disallowing a counterclaim. The objective of judicial economy is certainly worth 
pursuing but it cannot override the consent of the parties to the dispute.486 While I agree with 
the underlying intent of Professor Reisman’s opinion – a need for liberal stance on 
counterclaims, I disagree with the manner in which he approaches the issue.487 A liberal 
interpretation of the second requirement of counterclaims – close connection with the 
subject-matter of dispute, is in my opinion, preferable. 
B. Directly Related to the Subject-Matter of the Dispute 
The second requirement of counterclaims is that they should be connected to the subject- 
matter of the dispute. This condition serves the objective of judicial economy. The inclusion 
of counterclaims in proceedings can prevent multiple legal proceedings.488 Counterclaims 
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should not be irrelevant claims that unnecessarily delay the arbitral proceedings. The ICJ in 
the Armed Activities Case observed that ‘as a general rule, the existence of a direct 
connection between the counter-claim and the principal claim must be assessed both in fact 
and in law.’489 The requirement of connection with law assumes significance in investor-state 
arbitration because IIAs do not generally contain obligations for investors. The respondent 
state, will thus base its claims in a law other than the IIA. It has been observed that it is of 
capital importance to determine the governing law applicable in order to consider the source 
of jurisdiction of the counter-claim.490 Where the IIA specifies that the applicable law is the 
IIA itself, counterclaims usually fall outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.491 For example, in 
AMTO v Ukraine, the tribunal observed that the applicable law is the ECT and the rules and 
principles of international law. The tribunal observed that the respondent did not present any 
counterclaim in the applicable law and dismissed the counterclaim.492 
State have advanced counterclaims in a few tax-related investment disputes. When it comes 
to counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes, two aspects are important at the outset: 
first, counterclaims by states ordinarily arise from domestic tax laws as both IIAs and tax 
treaties do not usually impose any obligations on the investors; second, states can argue in 
counterclaims that investors should follow general principles of law, as recognised in ITL, 
even if they are not specifically incorporated in the provisions of the IIAs.493 But states have 
not relied on this argument. Nonetheless, as I proceed to discuss in the following paragraphs – 
the tribunals have not adequately appreciated the first aspect while the states have not 
relied on general principles of law in advancing counterclaims.494 
In Sergei Paushok, the state’s counterclaims inter alia asserted that the claimants owed taxes 
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rejected by the tribunal for three reasons: first, they were directed against a third party 
which was not party to the dispute; second, they did not have a close connection with the 
primary claim; third, the counterclaims did not arise out of the investment contract between 
the host state and the foreign investor but arose out of Mongolian public law including the tax 
law of Mongolia. The tribunal elaborated on the last reason and observed that Mongolia, 
through counterclaims, was seeking to ‘extend the extraterritorial application and 
enforcement of its public laws, and in particular its tax laws, to individuals and entities not 
subject to and not having accepted to submit to Mongolian public law or its courts.’495 The 
tribunal added that extending its jurisdiction over the counterclaims advanced by the 
respondent would amount to ‘acquiescing to a possible exorbitant extension of Mongolia’s 
legislative jurisdiction without any legal basis under international law to do so, since the 
generally accepted principle is the non-extraterritorial enforceability of national public laws 
and, specifically, of national tax laws.’496 In the context of the dispute the tribunal was 
correct since the counterclaims, inter alia, demanded that the tribunal declare that a 
corporation owed taxes to Mongolia but the said corporation was not a party to the dispute. 
However, the observations of the tribunal are not necessarily applicable in a case where the 
counterclaim of unpaid taxes is directed towards the claimant. Where the claimant is an 
investor in the territory of the host state, the issue of extraterritorial enforcement of 
taxation laws does not ordinarily arise. The tribunal, however, may be faced with the question 
of whether it has jurisdiction over the parent company incorporated in a different 
jurisdiction.497 
The other issue before the tribunal in such a case will be if it has the power to adjudicate on 
tax liability of the investor and whether in encroaches on the domain of the domestic courts 
of the host state. For example, in Amco v Indonesia No. 2,498 Indonesia raised a counterclaim 
for tax fraud on the part of the claimants and sought restitution of sums representing tax 
allegedly evaded by the claimants. The tribunal rejected the claim by stating that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. The tribunal observed that the obligation not to engage in 
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497 
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‘the relationship between [affiliated parties] is sufficiently close to enable the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
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tax fraud was a general obligation of Indonesian law and did not directly arise out of the 
investment.499 This similar to the observations of the tribunal in Sergei Paushok award which 
also rejected counterclaims for the reason that the counterclaims were based in the domestic 
law of the host state. This aspect of counterclaims, as stated above, needs a more careful 
approach in investor-state arbitration. 
In my view, the fact that a counterclaim arises from a different legal instrument is separate 
from the requirement that it should be connected to the subject-matter of the dispute. As 
long as applicable law did not restrict tribunal, connection with subject-matter is enough. 
Additionally, while Mongolia could have claimed the investor should follow the general 
principles of law in ITL and should not indulge in tax evasion. But, this argument was not 
raised before the tribunal. It remains to be seen how tribunals would address this argument – 
if and when it is raised by the states. 
States have also tried to present tax evasion by claimant as a defence. In Sergei Paushok, the 
respondent state also relied on the pre-arbitration conduct of the claimant. The respondent 
alleged that the claimant was involved in ‘systematic tax evasion by way of inter-company 
loans and service agreements.’500 This conduct of the claimant, the respondent argued, made 
its claim inadmissible. The tribunal correctly rejected this argument and stated that such 
conduct does not itself deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction or make the claims 
inadmissible. The tribunal added that the conduct of the claimant may influence its 
conclusion but it is an issue that is related to the merits of the case and is not an issue of 
jurisdiction or admissibility. The question of tax evasion by the claimant and abuse of tax 
treaties was raised by the respondent state more forcefully in the Yukos awards. 
In Yukos Universal, the tribunal, conceded to the argument of the respondent that an investor 
who had through violation of the laws of the host state brought itself within the scope of the 
ECT should not be allowed to benefit from it. However, the tribunal went ahead to make a 
distinction between the making of an investment and its performance. The tribunal observed: 
[T]here is no compelling reason to deny altogether the right to invoke the ECT 
to any investor who has breached the law of the host State in the course of its 
investment.  If  the  investor  acts  illegally,  the  host  state  can  request  it to 
499 
In Saluka Investments award, one of the counterclaims was denied on the ground that it was related 
to non-  compliance with the general law of the Czech Republic and was not sufficiently closely 
connected with the subject- matter of the original claim so as to fall within the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
under the IIA. See supra note 488. 
500 
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correct its behaviour and impose upon it sanctions available under domestic 
law, as the Russian Federation indeed purports to have done by reassessing 
taxes and imposing fines. However, if the investor believes these sanctions to 
be unjustified (as Claimants do in the present case), it must have the 
possibility of challenging their validity in accordance with the applicable 
investment treaty. It would undermine the purpose and object of the ECT to 
deny the investor the right to make its case before an arbitral tribunal based 
on the same alleged violations the existence of which the investor seeks to 
dispute on the merits.501 
In Yukos Universal, the respondent state raised the issue of tax evasion by the investor as a 
defence and not as a counterclaim. The intent of the respondent state was to underline that 
due to the conduct of the investor (namely tax evasion) during the course of investment, it 
should not be allowed access to investor-state arbitration. Like the tribunal in Sergei 
Paushok, the tribunal in Yukos Universal correctly observed that the illegality conducted by 
an investor during the course of investment does not affect a tribunal’s jurisdiction but may 
influence its conclusion on merits and the eventual damages that may be awarded. In my 
opinion, the arguments relating to tax evasion by an investor are better made as a counter- 
claim and not as a defence. Tribunals should, however, liberally allow counter claims. 
A signalling function to encourage more counterclaims is to liberally interpret the connection 
with the subject matter. In the context of counterclaims in tax-related investment disputes, 
the meaning of connection to subject-matter needs to be assessed more elaborately. The 
term ‘directly related to subject matter’ is expressly referred to in the ICSID Convention. 
Unless the relevant IIA mentions the applicable law and thereby restricts jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal, counterclaims should be allowed as long as they are ‘part of the same 
factual complex’.502 
A hurdle to this suggested liberal approach is the use of the terms principal claims and 
subject-matter of dispute interchangeably. In my view, viewing principal claims and subject- 
matter of the dispute as synonymous is not accurate. The former is likely to be narrower than 
the latter and thus if a connection with the principal claims is insisted then the respondent 
state is less likely to succeed in its counterclaims. 
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If tribunals insist on connection with a principal claim it will add another hurdle in tax-related 
investment disputes where the tribunals have not been inclined to accept counterclaims that 
rely on the domestic tax law of the host state. By adopting a distinction between principal 
claims and the subject-matter, counterclaims are more likely to provide a credible balance 
between the investor and the state in investor-state arbitration. It is submitted, that the 
normative function of enhancing procedural and judicial economy is captured by the 
requirement of connectivity with the subject-matter of dispute and not principal claims of 
the investor. This permissive approach can be followed by other tribunals similar to the 
relatively liberal approach adopted in Benvenuti v Congo.503 
Benvenuti and Bonfant entered into an agreement with the government of Congo to set up an 
establishment for the manufacture of plastic bottles and also a mineral water bottling plant. 
A company was incorporated where Congo held 60% of the shares. It was promised that the 
company will not be subject to any foreign competition and shall operate under a single tax 
regime. Later, the government interfered with the conduct of business and unilaterally fixed 
selling prices of bottles. Mr. Bonfant taking into account the changed circumstances 
concluded that the company had essentially become a state company but without any formal 
act of expropriation. Fearing for his personal safety he left Congo along with most of his 
Italian staff and the army later took over the head office of the company. Bonfant initiated 
arbitration and claimed damages under Article 12 of the agreement which provided recourse 
to ICSID. The government advanced counterclaims claiming damages for non-payment of 
duties and charges, over invoicing of raw materials and moral damages. 
With regard to its jurisdiction to hear counterclaims the tribunal simply observed that the 
‘counterclaim relates directly to the subject-matter of the dispute, that the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal has not been disputed and that it falls within the jurisdiction of the Centre.’504 
The tribunal, in a wide interpretation of its jurisdiction also claimed jurisdiction over the 
‘moral damages’ claimed by Congo.505 The claim for moral damages was eventually rejected 
on merits. As compared to the more recent decisions of the arbitral tribunals on 
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counterclaims, the tribunal adopted a more permissive approach towards the counterclaims.
506 
Perenco award is another example of a tribunal’s liberal view of jurisdiction in accepting 
counterclaims.507 In the Perenco award, the respondent state filed a counterclaim for 
environmental damages claiming that the claimant had failed to maintain the oil blocks and 
the infrastructure in a working condition. It was argued that the damage caused to the oil 
blocks violated Ecuador’s environmental law. The tribunal exercised jurisdiction over the 
counterclaims and found that the claimant had violated various provisions of the 
environmental law.508 From a jurisdictional perspective, this award is distinct from the above 
discussed awards for the tribunal exercised its jurisdiction under a contract and not a treaty.
509 Nonetheless, it was a liberal interpretation of jurisdiction to entertain an environmental 
counterclaim in what was essentially a tax-related investment dispute.510 
The liberal interpretation of jurisdiction in relation to counterclaims in Benvenuti and 
Perenco is, in my view, a desirable approach. It should be followed by tribunals as it allows a 
certain balancing act between states and investors and brings conduct of certain investors 
like tax evasion to the notice of the tribunals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Jurisdiction and admissibility acquire special importance in tax-related investment disputes 
due to tax carve outs and the tax veto. The former are worded differently which necessitates 
a careful scrutiny of the relevant tax carve out before the arbitral tribunal exercises 
jurisdiction. Similarly, some IIAs contain tax vetoes that require that investors first refer 
arbitration to the host state’s competent authorities; failure to do so likely leads to 
inadmissibility. However, there is some inconsistency in the way tribunals have used the term 
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admissibility. I suggest that a defect in the claim should be treated as a matter of 
admissibility. Jurisdiction, on the other hand, should be understood in reference to the 
competence of the tribunal to hear the claim. This distinction, I suggest, should be employed 
by tribunals at the preliminary stage of the arbitral proceedings. By contrast, arbitrability is 
of limited relevance in investor-state arbitration and offers little insight on whether an 
arbitral tribunal should accept an investor’s claims that challenge a state’s taxation measures. 
Additionally, I suggest that counterclaims can play a greater role in tax-related investment 
disputes. In tax-related investment disputes, counterclaims primarily arise because the host 
state argues that the investor evaded its tax obligations. I argue that such counterclaims can 
be encouraged by liberally interpreting the jurisdictional requirements that are prescribed for 
counterclaims. I specifically suggest that the requirement of ‘directly related to the subject- 
matter’ be interpreted liberally by arbitral tribunals. Since counterclaims in tax-related 
investment disputes are normally based in a legal instrument other than the IIA; I suggest that 
this factor should not always lead to rejection of counterclaims, unless the applicable law 
compels the opposite conclusion. At the same time, states should consider relying on general 
principles of law in ITL to advance their counterclaims. 
While investment tribunals are unlikely to adjudicate on tax liabilities that arise under 
domestic tax, tribunals can take the conduct of the investor including with respect to tax, 
into account. For instance, in the Yukos awards, investor’s the conduct on tax influenced the 
compensation that the tribunal awarded. Similar approach by other tribunals could help bring 
about the much required balance in investor-state arbitration that is currently perceived to 
be favourable to investors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TAXATION MEASURES AS EXPROPRIATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Investors frequently allege that the state’s taxation measures constitute expropriation.511 
Taxation measures include retrospective taxation, windfall profits taxes imposed due to 
sudden and exponential increase in the profits of the investor or a state withdrawing tax 
incentives which were earlier extended to an investor.512 Irrespective of the nature of tax 
measure in question, tribunals are extremely careful before concluding that taxation 
measures are expropriatory. The threshold of ‘expropriation by taxation’ has been set high 
and tribunals have acknowledged, expressly and impliedly, that taxation constitutes a special 
category in so far as expropriation is concerned. 
The high threshold is apparent when one looks at the approach of the tribunals in the 
Burlington and the Yukos awards. In the former it was the physical dispossession of the 
investor that was decisive in tribunal arriving at a finding of direct expropriation and not a 
tax rate of 99%. In the latter, again, it was auctioning of the assets of the claimant that was 
the primary reason for tribunal’s conclusion that the state’s actions constituted expropriation. 
The misuse of official tax administration and retrospective imposition of tax laws were only 
secondary factors. Similarly, in addressing arguments on indirect expropriation while most 
tribunals have relied on the ‘substantial deprivation’ test, one sees that tribunals hesitate to 
term a state’s taxation measures as expropriatory unless the tax measures result in transfer of 
property or investor’s dispossession. 
This chapter analyses the awards of the tribunals in tax-related investment disputes with a 
view to distil the canon of ‘expropriation by taxation’. This chapter makes two arguments. 
First, while tribunals have rightly acknowledged that taxation forms a special category in 
investor-state arbitrations, the rationale for treating taxation as a distinct category has not 
been explained satisfactorily. It is unclear if recognition of taxation as a special category 
flows from the high threshold set by the tribunals for ‘expropriation by taxation’ or the other 
way around. There are occasions when tribunals have unconvincingly justified the special 
511 
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status of taxation by obliquely referring to the ‘sovereignty argument’.513 I instead suggest 
that the nature of taxation which per se involves an involuntary transfer of money is the 
primary factor that distinguishes tax from other state measures and is an important reason for 
treating tax-related investment disputes as a separate category of disputes.514 Second, this 
chapter argues that (some) tribunals are correct in referring to international tax avoidance 
strategies of MNEs but relying on customary norms in international taxation may be a 
misguided approach.515 I rely on my argument in Chapter 1 to reiterate that there no 
customary norms in ITL. I suggest that the tribunals should view the principles in tax treaties 
as general principles of law in ITL.516 In my view, if arbitral tribunals take into account the 
general principles of law in ITL it could lead to a more nuanced approach, at least in so far as 
engagement with ITL is concerned. 
To examine the above mentioned aspects, this chapter proceeds as follows: in Section II, I 
engage with J.E. Penner’s argument that taxation and expropriation are distinct concepts.517 I 
agree with his argument but suggest that a few exceptions could be added to the distinction.
518 Thereafter, in Section III, I look at the concept of direct expropriation as applied in tax-
related investment disputes and the singular importance of physical dispossession. In Section 
IV, I examine the concept of indirect expropriation. The substantial deprivation test applied 
by the tribunals is examined along with taxation of windfall profits. I argue that states have 
significant policy space to enact tax measures despite their obligations in IIAs. In Section V, I 
look at tax stabilisation clauses, their evolution and suggest that the contemporary tax 
stabilisation clauses ordinarily reduce the policy space of states to adopt tax measures. 
Section VI examines the persuasive value of different reasons given by tribunals to endorse 
taxation as a special category of investment disputes. Section VII discusses the limited 
engagement of investor-state tribunals with ITL in tax-related investment disputes. Section 
VIII concludes. 
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TABLE 3: TAX MEASURES CHALLENGED IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
AWAR
D
TAX MEASURE CHALLENGED
Antoine Goetz v Republic of 
Burundi (1999)
Withdrawal of free zone certificate conferring tax 
and custom exemptions
Archer Daniels v Mexico (2007); 
Corn Products v Mexico (2008); 
Cargill v Mexico (2009)
Imposition of 20% excise tax by Mexico on soft 
drinks that used a sweetener other than cane 
sugar
Bogdan
ov 
(2010)
v Republi
c
of Moldov
a
Environmental Charge
Duke Energy v Peru (2008) Violation of tax stability agreement
El Paso v Argentina (2011) Imposition of withholding tax
Link Trading v 
Moldova (2002)
Change in custom duties
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Mamidoil v Albania (2015) Import taxes on petroleum products
Marvin Feldman v Mexico (2002) Denial of tax rebates to cigarette exporters
Micula v Romania (2013) Withdrawal of tax incentives
Occidental v Ecuador (2004); 
EnCana v Ecuador (2006)
Retrospective denial of VAT refunds
Oostergetel v The Slovak 
Republic (2012)
Bankruptcy proceedings initiated against the claimant 
by tax authorities for non-payment of taxes
Señor Tza Yap Shum v Peru (2011) Imposition of back taxes and fines after a tax audit
Sergei Paushok v Mongolia (2011); 
Burlington v Ecuador (2012); 
O c c i d e n t a l v E c u a d o r 
(Occidental(II)) ((2012); Perenco v 
Ecuador (2014); Murphy v Ecuador 
(2016)
Windfall Profits Tax
Yukos awards (2010-2014) Discriminatory and retrospective tax assessment; 
seizure and auctioning of assets due to non-payment 
of taxes
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II. TAXATION AND EXPROPRIATION – DISTINCT CONCEPTS 
J.E. Penner in his article ‘Misled by Property’ argues that treating taxation and expropriation 
both as ‘taking of property’ is illicit.519 I identify three main arguments made by Penner to 
distinguish taxation and expropriation: first, expropriation is a claim to a particular item of 
property while taxation is a claim for value; second, expropriation can only take place in 
respect of property one has, which is not true of taxation and also expropriation decisions are 
typically made without consideration for the particular owner; third, decisions to tax are, by 
and large, ‘individual taxpayer independent’ – unlike expropriation, taxes never identify a 
particular individual as the person on whom to levy a tax.520 I submit that the distinction, 
though well-argued by Penner, may not be applicable to all cases and in all circumstances. 
To begin with, Penner makes a clear distinction between the property and the value of the 
property. He states that expropriation is a ‘claim to a particular item of property’ because 
that property itself is what the expropriating authority wants.521 The question of value, 
Penner argues, only comes after expropriation and good liberal states typically compensate 
expropriated owners by estimate of market value.522 This is not always the case. For instance, 
if due to sudden rise in gold prices, a gold mine generates extraordinary profits for a foreign 
investor, the state may make claim to the windfall profits by imposing additional taxes.523 In 
this case, the claim by the state is for value and not necessarily the underlying property. If 
the additional taxes imposed are too burdensome, an investor-state tribunal can certainly 
term the taxes as expropriatory. Penner’s argument may hold if the state reacts by 
nationalising the gold mine. In such a scenario, it can be possibly argued that the state’s 
claim is to a specific item of property. But, in such a case the distinction will need to be 
framed as ‘claim to a particular item of property at a particular time.’ This is because the 
state’s interest in the property may diminish considerably if the profits margins drop 
drastically or to a more ‘normal’ level. To put it differently, a strict distinction between the 
property and the value of the property may not be applicable in all cases and at all times. 
The second argument that Penner makes is that expropriation can only take place in respect 
of property one already has while one can be liable for taxes even without owning a property 
or even if one has insufficient assets to meet the claim. This is a valid point, but, Penner then 
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elaborates that expropriation decisions are related to a specific item of property and are 
‘made without consideration for the particular owner.’524 With respect to the latter limb of 
the argument, the dispute between Russia and Yukos offers a credible counter-point.525 The 
dispute between Yukos and Russia essentially involved Russian President, Vladimir Putin and a 
Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky – the main shareholder of Yukos and its Chief 
Executive Officer. During the arbitral proceedings between Yukos and Russia it was alleged 
that the forced sale of Yukos, its bankruptcy and removal from companies register was due to 
the rivalry between Mr. Putin and Mr. Khodorkovsky. The claimants asserted that the 
increasing influence wielded by Mr. Khodorkovsky due the success of Yukos, his financial 
support of opposition parties was politically threatening to Mr. Putin. This, it was argued, was 
the main reason behind targeting Yukos through hefty tax assessments, fines, and arrests of 
Yukos officers among other measures. The tribunal endorsed several of the above mentioned 
arguments and stated that the bankruptcy of Yukos had accomplished the removal of Mr. 
Khodorkovsky from the political scene.526 While the Yukos dispute may be extraordinary and 
rare in its scale and abuse of authority, but it dilutes Penner’s suggestion that expropriatory 
acts are always aimed at the property. In my view, the owner of the property also, at times, 
influences the expropriation decisions. 
The third argument that Penner makes is that decisions to tax are not taken to target specific 
individuals, instead taxes are imposed on various sorts of transactions such as sales, receipt of 
income, import of goods, etc.527 Here again, Penner draws a neat distinction between persons 
and the commercial transactions. I would argue that the distinction cannot always be drawn 
so clearly. It is possible for a state to target a particular investor or class of investors by 
disguising it as tax on the industry. This is possible if a certain sector such as the natural 
resources sector is dominated by a sizeable number of investors who either share same 
political views, ethnicity or are otherwise unfavourably viewed by the state.528 In such 
instances, the distinction between the economic activity and the persons involved in the 
activities collapses. 
 
524 
Ibid. 
525 
See Section III below for a detailed discussion on the Yukos awards. 
526 
See, for instance, Hulley award, supra note 299, at paras 795-804 (the tribunal accepted that 
claimant’s arguments that Russia had conducted a campaign of harassment and intimidation against 
Yukos partly due to political rivalry between Mr. Putin and Mr. Khodorkovsky). 
527 
Penner, supra note 517, at 81. 
528 
See Amy Chua, ‘Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and 
Development’ (1998) 108 Yale L J 1; For a more detailed account see Amy Chua, World on Fire: How 
Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (Anchor 2003). 
 120
Penner makes a strong and valid case for distinguishing taxation from expropriation. My 
limited aim in this Section has been to suggest that the distinction may not be applicable in 
all cases and may need to acknowledge a few exceptions. Further, from the perspective of IIL, 
it needs to be stated that investor-state tribunals have treated taxation and expropriation as 
distinct concepts. Not all instance of taxation have been termed as expropriation. However, it 
is difficult to say if the criteria adopted by tribunals to distinguish taxation and expropriation 
are satisfactory. The recurrent question before investor-state tribunals is - At what point, 
does taxation cease to be a lawful exercise of state authority and becomes expropriation? To 
answer this question would require a coherent and well-reasoned approach to tax-related 
investment disputes. Sections III and IV below, examine the manner in which various tribunals 
have addressed the allegations of expropriation by taxation. 
III. PHYSICAL DISPOSSESSION AS SOLE DETERMINANT OF DIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
Direct expropriation usually involves a transfer of title in the property.529 Instances of direct 
expropriation are generally easy to identify as they involve physical dispossession. In certain 
situations, seizure of properties can occur on grounds of tax evasion and/or non-payment of 
the taxes assessed.530 In situations of continued non-payment of taxes or tax evasion, the 
domestic tax laws of almost every state provide for a procedure of seizure and attachment of 
the property of the taxpayer.531 Such seizure is generally given effect to after a court order 
authorising the same.532 However, the legal procedure for attachment and subsequent auction 
of the properties of the tax assessee may be abused. It is possible that the procedure for 
attachment may be in accordance with the letter of the law but the entire procedure may be 
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a facade to confiscate the property of the claimant.533 In such cases, the entire procedure 
may be termed as expropriation.534 
The misuse of the taxation powers of the state with an intent to expropriate were central to 
the Yukos awards. There are five reported awards that have resulted from the same fact 
situation.535 The claims were brought by different shareholders of Yukos under different IIAs.
536 The arguments of the claimants before all the five tribunals (in so far as they related to 
expropriation) were essentially that: Firstly, it was alleged that Russia had brought massive 
tax claims against Yukos which had no basis in law and that such tax assessment was not a 
bona fide interpretation of the Russian tax law. Secondly, it was claimed that Russia after 
making tax demands prevented Yukos from paying its tax liabilities so that the non-payment 
of the tax claims could be used as a pretext to seize the assets of Yukos and auction them off. 
It was alleged that the actions of Russia constituted either a direct or an indirect 
expropriation. 
In the Hulley award, the claimants argued that the respondent completely and totally 
deprived them of their investments in Yukos which were motivated by a political and 
economic agenda and not any legitimate tax collection purpose. In this regard, the tribunal 
observed that ‘the primary objective of the Russian Federation was not to collect taxes but 
rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its valuable assets.’537 The tribunal also observed 
that there were no grounds for holding Yukos liable for the payment of more than 13 billion 
dollars in VAT. However, despite these categorical observations about the misuse of state 
power by Russia and its mala fide interpretation of tax law, the tribunal did not term these 
actions of Russian tax authorities as expropriatory. It relied on the events that occurred 
subsequent to the tax assessment in order to arrive at a finding of expropriation. The tribunal 
relied on the illegal auction of Yukos’ assets to conclude that the actions of Russia amounted 
to illegal expropriation. 
533 
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The tribunal in its finding on expropriation observed that - Yukos was vulnerable on some 
aspects of its tax optimization scheme as some of its operations were sham-like and designed 
to take advantages low-tax jurisdictions. Yukos, the tribunal observed, could have faced some 
legitimate tax claims had Russia limited itself to bona fide taxation measures. Instead, the 
Russian state apparatus decided to take advantage of that vulnerability by launching a full 
assault on Yukos and its beneficial owners in order to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its 
assets while, at the same time, removing Mr. Khodorkovsky from the political arena.538 While 
the conclusion of the tribunal can hardly be disputed, it is of interest to note that the 
tribunal avoided calling the arbitrary and retrospective tax assessment as expropriatory in 
itself. The tribunal’s deference to Russia’s tax measures is obvious in the award. The tribunal 
was cautious before it finally concluded that it was the cumulative actions of Russia that 
amounted to expropriation i.e. the tax assessments and the auction process. This approach 
finds its echo in all the other Yukos awards. 
In Valores, the tribunal observed that the Russian tax authorities invalidated the tax 
arrangements of Yukos in a cavalier manner and the retrospective tax assessments of Yukos 
were not bona fide.539 The tribunal further observed that the conduct of Russia raised 
significant doubts as to whether it acted in good faith in its attempts to resolve its tax dispute 
with Yukos, and whether its actions were really part of an ordinary process of assessing and 
collecting taxes. However, after such categorical statements, the tribunal finally observed 
that the rejection by Russia of the offers of Yukos to pay the taxes so assessed was ‘disturbing 
to say the least.’540 It was only after the tribunal had taken into account that the auction 
process - which resulted in sale of the assets of Yukos and lacked legal credibility, it finally 
concluded that the Respondent’s measures, seen in ‘their cumulative effect towards Yukos’ 
were an unlawful expropriation under the treaty.541 
The tribunal’s approach in Hulley and Valores awards, with minor variations, is evident in the 
Yukos Universal, Veteran and the RosInvest awards too. For instance, in Yukos Universal, the 
tribunal concluded, very early in its assessment that ‘the primary objective of the Russian 
Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its valuable 
assets.’542 The tribunal added, the sentencing of Messrs. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on the 
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creative legal theory of their theft of Yukos’ oil production, indicated that Russian courts bent 
to the will of Russian executive authorities to bankrupt Yukos, assigned its assets to a state 
controlled company, and incarcerated a man on the verge of becoming a political competitor.
543 However, it was only after the tribunal had elaborated on the sham like nature of 
bankruptcy proceedings against Yukos, it eventually observed that – ‘the Tribunal does not 
accept that the effective expropriation of Yukos was “carried out under due process of law”’ 
and concluded that Russia had breached Article 13 of the ECT by an unlawful expropriation.544 
The observations of the tribunal in the Veteran award were an almost verbatim copy of its 
observations in the Yukos Universal award because both the claims were made under the 
same legal instrument – the ECT and in respect of the same facts.545 
In RosInvest, the tribunal made several observations about the abuse of discretion by tax 
authorities and their lack of bona fide intentions. With respect to the latter, the tribunal 
observed that certain actions of the tax officials did not comply with the letter of the 
domestic tax law and constituted an abuse of the tax collection process. However, it always 
stopped short of terming any single act as expropriation. Eventually, the tribunal concluded 
that the application of Russian tax law, the tax assessment, and the auctions led the tribunal 
to conclude that ‘Respondent's actions towards Yukos cannot be justified by its authority to 
apply and enforce its tax laws.’546 However, this conclusion is arrived at only after the 
tribunal has, at considerable length discussed the arguments of both sides. The need to 
discuss each aspect was justified as ‘relevant for the consideration of the cumulative effect 
of the totality of Respondent's conduct.’547 It is hard to imagine a comparable state action – in 
the field of environmental law or public health where the tribunal may have shown this 
amount of restraint before finally concluding that the laws of the state were in violation of its 
obligations under the IIA. This deferential approach of tribunals is reflected in each of the 
Yukos awards as discussed above. 
The approach of the tribunals in the Yukos awards is perhaps the best example of the 
deference accorded by tribunals before terming a taxation measure as expropriatory. The 
expropriation of the assets of Yukos is one of the most glaring examples of direct 
543  
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expropriation by a host state.548 It was an obvious misuse of state power to dismantle an 
economically profitable company because of political considerations. Each of the several acts 
of the Russian tax authorities – tax assessment of Yukos, the retrospective application of the 
tax laws through questionable interpretations, the subsequent auctions and bankruptcy 
proceedings against Yukos were excessive exercise of state powers. However, none of the 
tribunals termed any of these actions as expropriation in itself. The conclusion by tribunals 
that the actions of Russia constituted expropriation were always made by taking into ‘account 
all the circumstances of the case’ or were ‘based on extensive record on the proceeding.’ 
Russia’s actions in totality were termed as expropriatory and not each individual action – 
though there were sufficient grounds for the same. 
While little fault can be found in tribunals taking into account all the circumstances and facts 
of the case; in tax-related investment disputes such an approach results in setting the 
threshold of expropriation by taxation too high. Further, one may find little fault in setting a 
high threshold of expropriation by taxation, if accompanied by cogent reasons. In none of the 
Yukos awards, the tribunals mention persuasive reasons for deference to taxation measures.549 
There are possible legal reasons for according high deference to taxation measures of a state. 
The nature of tax itself which involves compulsory transfer of money is one reason. Wide 
discretion of states to enact tax laws, even retrospectively is another. A few tribunals have 
also relied on tax carve outs to justify deference to taxation measures.550 But the Yukos 
awards do not rely on any of the above mentioned reasons to convincingly justify a high 
threshold for expropriation by taxation. The Yukos awards are not an outlier, another example 
of showing a great deference for expropriation by taxation is the Burlington award. 
In Burlington, the dispute revolved around the enactment of a windfall tax law (known as 
‘Law 42’) by Ecuador through which it sought to levy additional taxes on the windfall profits 
that the investor had received due to escalation of oil prices in the world market. The tax 
rate was 50% to begin with and was eventually increased to 99% in order to prevent the 
investor from pocketing windfall profits. The investor’s opposition to the tax laws culminated 
in the announcement that it would, within three days, suspend its oil exploration activities in 
548 
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the oil blocks under its control. Ecuador, the respondent state, responded by taking physical 
control of those oil exploration areas after three days. Burlington eventually challenged the 
enactment of the tax laws and the physical takeover by Ecuador. 
The tribunal in its detailed analysis found that the enactment of the tax law was well within 
the rights of the state and that the initial tax rate of 50% and even the subsequent tax rate of 
99% did not amount to expropriation. The tribunal was not convinced that imposing the most 
stringent possible tax rates on a particular income stream constituted expropriation. While 
the facts of the case – particularly the receipt of windfall profits, may arguably justify the 
imposition of a tax rate of 99%; the tribunal showed a very high amount of deference to the 
discretion of a state to enact a tax law. The tribunal concluded that it is not persuaded that 
tax rate at 99% ‘substantially deprived Burlington of the value of its investment. While Law 42 
at 99% diminished Burlington’s profits considerably.’551 The tribunal noted that Burlington’s 
allegations that its investment was rendered worthless and unviable have not been 
substantiated.552 This conclusion in the Burlington award certainly does not mean that in the 
event of an investor receiving windfall profits every host state can legally impose a tax rate 
of 99% - but it is certainly an extraordinary conclusion by the tribunal. 
The Burlington tribunal based its finding of illegal expropriation by relying solely on the 
physical takeover by the respondent state. The tribunal observed that Ecuador took physical 
possession of the oil blocks under the control of Burlington only three days after Burlington 
had announced that it would suspend its oil exploration activities. However, the tribunal 
stated that Ecuador under its domestic law (the Hydrocarbon Law) could declare the 
expiration of its contract with Burlington only when an unlawful suspension lasted for 30 days 
or more. Ecuador did not meet this requirement of waiting for the required period and took 
over the properties on the very day the suspension was supposed to begin. Hence, the 
tribunal concluded ‘that Ecuador’s entry and taking of possession of the Blocks was not 
justified under the police powers doctrine’.553 
There is at least one common element in all the Yukos awards and the Burlington award - 
tribunals have only equated taxation measures of a state to expropriation when the actions of 
the state manifested themselves in the most obvious and undeniable instances of direct 
expropriation. This is usually a physical takeover or a transfer of property of the investor. 
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Thus, the tax assessment of Yukos by the Russian authorities and their highly questionable 
interpretations of tax laws were not termed expropriation. It was only the combination of tax 
assessments and the illegal auction that was termed as expropriation. Similarly, in Burlington, 
even a tax rate of 99% was not considered to be expropriatory until the host state physically 
took over the oil production blocks of the investor. Factors such as tax rates or abusive tax 
administration have played a secondary and, in fact, a minimal role; tribunals have almost 
exclusively relied on the fact of physical dispossession before arriving at a finding of direct 
expropriation thereby underlining a tribunals’ extensive deference to taxation measures at 
least in so far as direct expropriation is concerned. 
IV. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
Indirect expropriation has no single definition and the variety of means by which it can be 
accomplished is a huge if not the only hurdle in encapsulating it in a single definition.554 For 
instance, it has been stated that the absence of an expropriatory decree, but the presence of 
an expropriatory consequence, defines an indirect expropriation.555 There are many other 
views on what constitutes indirect expropriation.556 This Section does not intend to provide an 
exhaustive survey of the concept of indirect expropriation in IIL. The aim is to examine some 
of the arbitral awards in order to shed light on the concept of indirect expropriation with a 
focus on tax-related investment disputes. An analysis of the awards suggests that states have 
a significant policy space to enact their tax laws and impose tax liabilities.557 This position is 
in contrast to non-tax related investment disputes, in respect of which it is usually argued 
that the effect of IIAs and awards is to significantly reduce a state’s policy space.558 
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A. Substantial Deprivation/Effects Test 
A survey of the arbitral awards reveals that several tribunals have adopted the ‘effects test’ 
or the ‘substantial deprivation test’ in order to determine if the taxation measures of the 
state amount to unlawful expropriation or not. However, at the same time, tribunals have 
been wary of concluding that the imposition of taxes was expropriatory unless it is 
indisputably obvious that there is violation of the relevant IIA. Tribunals have, to borrow a 
phrase from criminal law almost stretched it to the point where there is ‘no reasonable 
doubt’ that the states exceeded its regulatory powers of taxation and breached its obligations 
in international law. 
In Burlington, the tribunal observed that the effect of the taxation measure is the touchstone 
to determine the permissibility of the taxation measure.559 It noted, however, that additional 
questions would also need to be answered - role of the state's intent, the discriminatory 
character of the tax and the weight of contractual stabilization clauses.560 A state measure 
designed to deprive the investor of its property or to cause it to "abandon or sell it at a 
distressed price" would support a finding of expropriation; it would reveal state’s intent. 
Additionally, the tribunal observed that under general international law a tax is illegal not 
only if it is confiscatory but also discriminatory. However, the tribunal observed that state’s 
intent and a discriminatory tax play secondary role to the effects test. For instance, to reach 
the level of expropriation, the discriminatory tax must cause substantial deprivation i.e. a 
discriminatory tax cannot per se amount to an expropriation. The secondary role accorded to 
discriminatory taxes is perhaps because discriminatory taxation is relatively easier to prove.
561 For instance, the tribunal in Feldman noted that in most regimes, the tax laws are used as 
instruments of public policy as well as fiscal policy, and certain taxpayers are inevitably 
favoured while others are less disadvantaged.562 The fact that discriminatory taxation is 
559 
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commonplace is perhaps another reason why tribunals do not accord them primary 
importance in determining if the tax is expropriatory. 
In the Occidental award, the tribunal relied on the substantial deprivation test and observed 
that the criterion of ‘substantial deprivation’ test had not been met in the case and dismissed 
the investor’s claim that the denial of VAT refunds by Ecuador amounted to indirect 
expropriation.563 In a similar vein, the tribunal in EnCana concluded that there was no 
expropriation in the case by observing that: 
[T]here is nothing in the record which suggests that the change in VAT laws or 
their interpretation brought the companies to a standstill or rendered the value 
to be derived from their activities so marginal or unprofitable as effectively to 
deprive them of their character as investments.564 
However, unlike the Occidental award, the tribunal in EnCana did not expressly endorse the 
substantial deprivation test.565 
The NAFTA tribunals, like most non-NAFTA tribunals, have also been hesitant to adjudicate 
taxation measures as expropriation unless accompanied by a physical takeover and have 
relied on the effects test to determine if taxation measures of the state amount to indirect 
expropriation. This is reflected in the three NAFTA awards that emerged from the imposition 
of a 20 percent excise tax by Mexico on soft drinks and syrups and the same tax on services 
used to transfer and distribute soft drinks and syrups.566 This tax applied only to those soft 
drinks and syrups that used a sweetener other than cane sugar, such as high fructose corn 
syrup (HFCS). Soft drinks and syrups sweetened exclusively with cane sugar were tax 
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exempt.567 The tax was in effect for 5 years – 1 January 2002 to 1 January 2007. The 
imposition of the tax led to three claims under the NAFTA and the claimants sought damages 
and related relief alleging that the imposition of the tax had a direct impact on the claimants' 
investment in HFCS production and distribution facilities and caused them substantial loss or 
damage in violation of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA. One of the arguments was that the levy 
of tax was an indirect expropriation. 
The tribunal in Corn Products award observed that the claimant’s production facilities had 
suffered a ‘substantial blow’ and affected their market share for a period of two years. But, 
the claimant retained full control of its investment at all times and was able to report to its 
shareholders that the tax would not make a long term difference to its business. The tribunal, 
did not use the precise words, but effectively endorsed the ‘continued profitability’ of the 
venture as a benchmark to determine if the investment had been expropriated. It also 
underlined the continued control over the production facilities by the investor – a fact which 
if absent, in my opinion, would have certainly altered the findings of the tribunal. The 
tribunal added that in view of the facts of the case there was no ‘substantially complete 
deprivation’ of the use and enjoyment of the investment.568 The tribunal further emphasised 
that in the ‘absence of a physical taking or transfer of ownership’ the degree of interference 
should be as to ‘sterilise its business’.569 
In the Cargill award, the tribunal, in a familiar trend, emphasised that the expropriation of 
the property required a radical deprivation of the claimants’ economic use. The tribunal 
concluded that the imposition of the tax did not amount to expropriation by essentially 
relying on the fact that the claimant was still in physical possession of its business facilities, 
no ‘total cessation of business’ had occurred and that the claimant could use its assets for 
other products.570 The tribunal in the Archer Daniels award followed similar reasoning by 
relying on the ‘effects test.’571 It observed that judicial practice indicates that the severity of 
the economic impact is the decisive criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or 
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a measure tantamount to expropriation has taken place.572 In the present case, the tribunal 
observed, the criterion have not been met and hence the levy of the tax did not constitute an 
indirect expropriation. 
Each of the three tribunals effectively relied on the substantial deprivation test applied by 
non-NAFTA tribunals. All the three tribunals also referred to the fact that the investor had not 
been deprived of the physical possession of the enterprise, a factor that played an important 
if not an influential role in the conclusion of the tribunals. As we saw in Section III, the 
continued physical possession by an investor of the enterprise constitutes a vital element in 
tax-related investment disputes, at least in addressing arguments on direct expropriation. 
Physical possession also plays an important if not equally important role in findings on 
indirect expropriation. 
The only outlier seems to be the Tza Yap Shum award where the tribunal arrived at a finding 
of indirect expropriation even when the claimant was not dispossessed of its investment. The 
claimant’s company was a Peruvian company that manufactured, distributed and exported 
fish-based food products to Asian markets. The Peruvian tax authority commenced an audit of 
the company and alleged that the claimant had underreported sales volumes and imposed 
taxes and fines of around 10 million Peruvian Nuevos Soles. According to Peruvian tax 
authorities, these were ‘exceptional circumstances’ and thus in order to secure the tax 
payments it ordered the banks to withhold the funds of the claimant.573 The claimant alleged 
that the actions of the Peruvian tax authority constituted indirect expropriation. The 
respondent in turn argued that the claimant’s business operations had not come at a 
standstill, it had not gone bankrupt and was still continuing its exports. 
The tribunal looked at the effect and the severity of measures to conclude that the measures 
of the respondent state constituted expropriation.574 With regard to the former, the tribunal 
observed that by freezing the claimant’s bank accounts the respondent had cut off the 
conduit through which the claimant could secure letters of credit or pay its debt. The 
measures the tribunal observed had a severe effect on the claimant’s business and created a 
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‘direct, close or permanent’ effect.575 The tribunal thus concluded that measures of the 
respondent constituted indirect expropriation without compensation.576 
B. Wide Leeway in Taxing Windfall Profits 
An investor earning excessive profits has been acknowledged as a valid and rational reason for 
a state to change its taxation policies.577 But an attempt to tax windfall gains may result in 
the taxation measure being termed as confiscatory and can also be challenged for breaching 
the tax stabilisation clause. In such a situation, one factor that tribunals have looked at is the 
continued profitability of the economic activity that the investor is engaged in. If the investor 
is able to generate profits even after the imposition of the windfall taxes – the tribunals have 
been reluctant to term the tax as expropriatory. 
In the Sergei Paushok award, one of the claims related to Mongolia’s enactment of the 
windfall profit tax law.578 The tax law was enacted in response to the dramatic increase in the 
price of gold on the world market – the price had almost doubled in 2006 from the price that 
existed in 1997. Claimant argued that the windfall profit tax put it in a position where it 
would have to sell its gold at a loss and hence the tax was extraordinary, punitive in amount, 
arbitrary and discriminatory. The negative effects of the tax and the connected events led to 
the claim and formed the crux of the dispute between the investor and Mongolia. The 
tribunal, in its conclusion on allegations of expropriation noted that the windfall profit tax 
‘by itself cannot be considered an expropriatory measure.’579 The various reasons for 
tribunals’ conclusion cannot be neatly compartmentalised and it is difficult to state with 
certainty which reason was the most influential. 
Tribunal’s first reason was that subsequent to the levy of the tax, the claimants neither lost 
ownership nor control over the operations. As described in Section III above, unless a physical 
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dispossession of the investor takes place, tribunals have been very reluctant to term any 
taxation measure as expropriatory. The tribunal then relied on a comparison of the claimant 
with other mine operators. The tribunal observed that while the claimants did not have the 
protection of a stability agreement, ‘but other mines not benefitting from a stability 
agreement still managed to continue their operations in spite of the application of the WPT 
[windfall profit tax].’580 The tribunal acknowledged that the burden of the tax was ‘heavy’ on 
the claimant – but was it not convinced that the tax equated to ‘substantial deprivation’.581 
The last reason that the tribunal relied on was the extent of the loss the claimant suffered. 
The tribunal relied on the ‘long history of strong annual profits’ of the claimant, the 
presumption that the claimants would have ended the year of 2007 with a ‘loss of slightly less 
than 1 million US dollars’ and stated that ‘a loss of that size for one year is not a matter 
leading to the destruction of an ongoing enterprise’.582 In the latter two reasons, the thrust of 
the tribunal was on the profit making ability of the claimant despite the levy of the windfall 
profit tax – this can be cumulatively referred to as the ‘continued profitability’ test. In 
essence, the tribunal concluded that - as long as the investor is able to keep its enterprise 
afloat, either by taking steps to reduce the impact of the tax or because of past profits, the 
taxation measure shall not be considered expropriatory.583 
In the Burlington award, as described in Section III above, the tribunal had to adjudicate on 
Ecuador’s ‘Law 42’ under which the windfall profit tax was imposed. The law, to begin with, 
levied a tax rate of 50% and then subsequently increased it to 99%. The tribunal relied on the 
‘effects test’ in order to determine if the taxes were expropriatory or not. The Burlington 
tribunal like the Sergei Paushok tribunal, also relied on the ‘continued profitability’ test in 
order to determine if the taxes were a bona fide exercise of the regulatory power of the state 
or an unlawful expropriation. 
To begin with, when examining the law that imposed a tax rate of 50%, the tribunal observed 
that despite the enactment of Law 42, the claimant was planning to make additional 
investments of 100 million US dollars and bidders were willing to acquire its interests in the 
oil blocks. Also, the fact that the financial statements of Burlington ‘do not show a loss but a 
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“positive figure”’, showed that the Law 42 at 50% did not substantially deprive Burlington of 
the value of its investment and therefore was not tantamount to expropriation.584 In a similar 
vein, while examining the validity of Law 42 at 99%, the tribunal observed that while the law 
did diminish Burlington’s profits considerably, Burlington’s investment was not rendered 
worthless and unviable for the ‘investment preserved its capacity to generate a commercial 
return.’585 The tribunal, apart from its reliance on the ‘substantial deprivation’ test or the 
‘effects test’, considered the ability of the investor to generate profits or earn a commercial 
return as an important factor in determining that the windfall profits tax in itself did not 
amount to unlawful expropriation. This approach was similar to the approach adopted by the 
Sergei Paushok tribunal.586 
The findings of the tribunals in the Sergei Paushok and Burlington awards suggests that there 
is no upper limit of tax rates beyond which tax becomes expropriatory. Tax rates are only one 
factor - the ability of an investor to generate profits even after imposition of high tax rates, 
past profits, continued physical possession - all cumulatively guide tribunal’s conclusion. 
Which factor is the most influential is usually determined by the facts of the case, the nature 
of taxation measure in question and the nature of arguments presented before the tribunal. 
Though like in the case of direct expropriation, tribunals accord deference to tax measures 
even in relation to indirect expropriation. The Perenco award is one such instance where the 
high deference is visible. 
In the Perenco award, where again Ecuador’s Law 42 that imposed a windfall profit tax was in 
question, even physical takeover was not termed expropriation; the influencing factor was 
the respondent state thereafter terminating the claimants’ contract.587 The tribunal in 
Perenco observed that when the claimants announced their decision to suspend operations in 
the oil blocks, Ecuador could with good and valid reasons intervene to operate the blocks and 
 
584 
Burlington award, supra note 551, at para 431. 
585 
Ibid, at para 456; Also see Dissenting Opinion Francisco Orrego Vicuña, at para 27 (stating that a 50% 
tax was substantial and unheard of, while a 99% tax was confiscatory). 
586 
The ability of the enterprise to make profits has also been stressed by other tribunals, though not in 
relation to the windfall profits taxes. In EnCana award, the tribunal observed that ‘although the 
EnCana subsidiaries suffered financially from the denial of VAT and the recovery of VAT refunds wrongly 
made, they were nonetheless able to continue to function profitably and to engage in the normal range 
of activities, extracting and exporting oil (the price of which increased during the period under 
consideration). There is nothing in the record which suggests that the change in VAT laws or their 
interpretation brought the companies to a standstill or rendered the value to be derived from their 
activities so marginal or unprofitable as effectively to deprive them of their character as investments.’ 
See EnCana award, supra note 211, at para 174. 
587 
Perenco Ecuador Ltd v The Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6 (Decision on Remaining 
Issues of Jurisdiction and on Liability, 12 September 2014). 
 134
maintain their productivity. The tribunal added that since the claimants had voluntarily 
suspended their right of management and control of the oil blocks temporarily, Ecuador could 
lawfully intervene to operate the oil blocks.588 The tribunal’s finding on expropriation was 
based on the respondent’s decision to initiate caducidad proceedings with an aim to end the 
claimant’s contract. The decision to end the contract was termed expropriation because: 
first, Ecuador had indicated its intention to not terminate the claimant’s contract in the 
preliminary proceedings of arbitration, but changed its position thereafter; second, the 
tribunal observed that Ecuador’s discretion to end the contract should have been postponed 
till the end of arbitration; third, since Ecuador had taken over the oil blocks, it was 
‘unnecessary’ to end the contract.589 
C. Concluding Remarks 
In view of the discussion in Sections III and IV above, a few concluding remarks are necessary. 
To begin with, it is fair to say that the deference accorded by tribunals to a state’s taxation 
measures suggests that states have a significant policy space to enact their tax measures 
without violating their obligations under IIAs. Second, tribunals have accepted that investors 
making excessive profits is a legitimate policy objective and a state can change its tax laws to 
impose additional tax liability on the huge profits being earned by the investor. However, the 
tribunals have focused more on the effects of the tax measures as seen in the Burlington, 
Yukos, and Perenco awards, and less on the proportionality of the taxation measures. Finally, 
one also sees a lack of any meaningful reference to and engagement with ITL in the arbitral 
awards and whether the principles of law in ITL meaningfully constrain a state’s ability to 
enact its tax laws.590 
V. TAX STABILISATION CLAUSES 
Another unique facet of tax-related investment disputes is connected to tax stabilisation 
clauses. Such clauses are part of legal stability agreements and frequently signed between 
the investor and a host state. A tax imposed in violation of a stabilisation clause would 
amount to breach of contract and can be the subject of challenge. At the same time, a mere 
breach of contract does not amount to expropriation and in order to constitute expropriation 
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it must amount to a substantial deprivation of investment.591 Tax stabilisation clauses have 
changed a lot during the past few decades – their nomenclature, life-spans and even their 
nature. From the initial ‘freezing contracts’ they have evolved into ‘contracts that stipulate 
re-negotiation in case of adverse changes in the legal regime’ of the host state. The essential 
difference between the two is that – while the former provided that the laws applicable at 
the time of entering into contract shall apply to the investor over the entire duration of the 
project, the latter provide that if the amendment to the laws has an adverse economic effect 
on the investor – the state and the investor can re-negotiate to amend the contract. 
A. First Generation Stabilisation Clauses 
The two most prominent awards that emerged from what may be termed as ‘first generation 
clauses’ were the Aminoil award and the Revere Copper award.592 In Aminoil, the dispute 
centred around the concession agreement that had a duration of 60 years. Under the 
agreement, Aminoil was given the rights for exploration and exploitation of petroleum and 
natural gas and in return it was obligated to pay two shillings and six pence for every barrel of 
oil. In the subsequent years, not only did Kuwait became an independent state but the price 
of oil in the world market also increased substantially. The concession agreement was 
amended a couple of times when the oil prices increased substantially – the avowed objective 
of amendment was to prevent the oil company from receiving undue benefits due to windfall 
profits. However, subsequent attempts to renegotiate the contract failed and the state took 
over the production of oil. The actions of the state were challenged as amounting to breach 
of the agreement, but the tribunal dismissed the claim. The tribunal observed that Aminoil 
had tacitly accepted the initial changes in the contract and it neither entered objections nor 
reservations when the first changes were made. This brought about a ‘metamorphosis in the 
whole character of the Concession.’593 The tribunal stressed that ‘[I]t is not a case of a 
change involving a departure from a contract, but of a change in the nature of the contract 
itself, brought by time, and the acquiescence or conduct of Parties.’594 The conclusion of the 
tribunal was warranted in view of the long period contemplated in the contract and the fact 
that the contract was entered into when Kuwait was not an independent state. 
 
591 
See generally Thomas Wälde, George Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation’ (1996) 31 Texas Int’l L J 215. 
592 
Aminoil v Kuwait (1982) 21 ILM 976; Revere Copper and Brass Inc v Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) (1978) 56 ILR 258. 
593 
Aminoil award, supra note 592, at para 97. 
594 
Ibid, at para 101. 
 136
In Revere Copper, the dispute arose from a concession agreement between Jamaica and a 
subsidiary of Revere Copper Company - RJA. The duration of the agreement was 25 years and 
it provided that the taxes on the company would remain the same for the duration of the 
contract. However, the government later claimed more royalties by arguing that the 
circumstances had changed. But the company closed its operations due to the difficulty in 
continuing its operations. The tribunal noted that the sole question before it was whether the 
actions of the government prevented RJA from exercising effective control over the use or 
disposition of a substantial portion of its property or from operating its property.595 The 
tribunal concluded that: 
In our view the effects of the Jamaican government’s actions in repudiating its 
long term commitments to RJA have substantially the same impact on effective 
control over use and operation as if the properties were themselves conceded 
by a concession contract that was repudiated.596 
The tribunal added that here ‘effective control not only of the contract but of the entire 
operation has been lost, due directly to the action of the government.’597 The observations of 
the tribunal have been rightly criticised for formulating too wide a rule and for supporting a 
proposition that the stabilisation clause immunises the investor from any changes in the 
regulatory regimes of the host state.598 Rosalyn Higgins commented on the award and stated 
that it ‘comes very close to saying that all international contracts for the exploitation of 
resources are inherently immutable.’599 
The above mentioned criticisms are valid but need to be read in the context of the nature of 
first generation stabilisation clauses. Freezing laws for (unrealistically) long time periods was 
a typical feature of the first generation stabilisation clauses. Any minor changes in law, which 
were invariable during a long period of time, led to disputes. The frequency of disputes was 
further intensified if there was an unexpected change in circumstances such as windfall 
profits or a general change in market conditions. The stabilisation clauses have changed in 
nature and so have the disputes that revolve around them. 
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B. Second Generation Stabilisation Clauses 
One of the recent disputes that involved ‘second generation tax stabilisation clauses’ was the 
Duke Energy award. One of the issues that the tribunal was confronted with was - what 
constitutes tax stabilisation under legal stability agreements? The tribunal observed that laws 
often invite different interpretations and in order to preserve the proper balance between 
the parties, it must be shown that - absent a demonstrable change of law or a change to a 
stable prior interpretation or application, the application of the law was patently 
unreasonable or arbitrary.600 
The tribunal held that tax stabilisation guarantees that: (a) laws and regulations that form 
part of the tax regime at the time the agreement is executed will not be amended or 
modified to the detriment of the investor; (b) a stable interpretation or application that is in 
place at the time of the agreement will not be changed to the detriment of the investor; (c) 
even in the absence of (a) and (b), stabilised laws will not be interpreted or applied in a 
patently unreasonable or arbitrary manner.601 Further, the tribunal clarified that: 
tax stabilization does not mean that the laws shall only be interpreted or 
applied based on the meaning that most favours the beneficiary, or the 
meaning that its legal advisors suggest would be the most appropriate. Tax 
stabilization does not provide a guarantee against the risk that the Government 
or the courts will interpret the law in a manner that is unfavourable to the 
investor, or that differs from the opinion of the investor’s legal advisors. An 
interpretation adverse to the investor cannot per se be considered a 
modification or violation of legal stability unless it is so unreasonable that, in 
practice, it violates the very stability that was guaranteed.602 (emphasis added) 
The tribunal has very carefully demarcated the scope of protection provided by the tax 
stabilisation clauses. It clearly did not approve of the wide formulation in the Revere Copper 
award. At the same time, it stated that any unreasonable action by the host state shall be 
considered as breach of the tax stabilisation clause. However, it is not clear how this 
threshold of ‘unreasonableness’ in contractual disputes is different from the test of 
‘substantial deprivation’ applied in instances of treaty violations. Is it merely a distinction 
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without a difference? It is unclear. However, second generation tax stabilisation clauses do 
provide one essential element to the investor that is not otherwise available – an opportunity 
to re-negotiate the terms of the agreement in case of adverse changes to the tax law. This 
issue was examined in the Burlington award. 
In Burlington, one of the issues before the tribunal related to the tax clauses contained in the 
contracts between the investor and the host state. The two tax clauses that were in dispute 
essentially provided that: in the event of a modification to the tax system or the creation or 
elimination of new taxes not foreseen in the contract, if such taxes have an impact on the 
economics of the contract, a correction factor will be included in the production sharing of oil 
(between the investor and the state) in order to absorb the impact of the increase or 
decrease in the tax.603 Burlington argued that the clauses were tax stabilisation clauses while 
Ecuador argued that they were merely renegotiation clauses.604 The position of Ecuador was 
that the application of correction factor was not mandatory. The tribunal concluded that the 
language of the ‘tax modification clause’ was mandatory and the mere fact that the clause 
required that the parties must jointly calculate the readjustment does not make the 
application of the correction factor optional. The requirement of jointly calculating the 
correction factor was ‘to prevent a situation where a party unilaterally imposes its 
computation of the share of oil production.’605 
The Burlington tribunal coined the term ‘tax modification clause’ to describe second 
generation stabilisation clauses. The clauses in dispute in Duke Energy and Burlington are 
prominent examples of the manner in which tax stabilisation clauses have evolved over the 
past few decades. They differ in several ways from the clauses that were challenged in the 
Aminoil and in the Revere Copper awards: first, they do not ordinarily prescribe that the tax 
laws shall stay ‘unaltered’ or ‘frozen’ for a period of decades; second, the change in tax law 
has to be unreasonable in order to constitute a breach of contract; third, they contain a 
provision that in case of any change in the tax laws that impact the economics of the contract 
the parties shall jointly negotiate and absorb the impact of the change in the tax laws. 
Additionally, one of the most interesting aspects of the tax modification clauses, especially in 
the Burlington award, was that they provide that the parties shall negotiate to absorb the 
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‘impact of the increase or decrease in the tax.’606 This ensures that the stabilisation clauses 
are not just beneficial to the investors but that the host state can also benefit if it reduces 
the tax burden of the investor. The evolution of the tax stabilisation clauses shows that they 
have matured from being merely tools to protect investors from adverse actions of the host 
state to being a mutually beneficial tool. The jurisprudence has evolved accordingly. From 
postulating a wide rule in the Revere Copper award to delineating the scope of protection 
provided by a tax stabilisation clause in the Duke Energy award. 
At the same time, the above discussed awards do not provide a clear indication of the extent 
to which a tax stabilisation clause protects an investor. As I mentioned above, it is unclear 
how the standard of unreasonableness in the context of tax stabilisation clauses is different 
from the substantial deprivation test. In my view, a tax stabilisation clause is likely to provide 
greater protection to an investor in case of any volatility in the prices. For example, the 
tribunals in Yukos awards described the tax assessments by Russia as arbitrary; the tax 
assessments would have been termed as violation of tax stabilisation clause if one applies the 
standards laid down in the Duke Energy award. Further, in the Sergei Paushok award, one of 
the facts that the tribunal relied on was that the investor did not sign a stability agreement 
unlike other investors in the same sector and thus the argument of expropriation by tax was 
not accepted.607 But more clarity from tribunals is certainly needed. 
VI. REASONS FOR THE UNIQUENESS OF TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
Amongst different reasons for treating taxation as a unique category in investor-state 
arbitration, the nature of tax – a measure which makes a claim on the monies of the investor 
and necessarily reduces the investor’s profit and revenue – is the foremost reason. The 
compulsory payment of a part of income is what demarcates taxation from any other 
regulatory measure. Tax carve outs and the provision of tax veto also contribute in earmarking 
tax-related investment disputes as a separate category;608 even though the latter two are 
unlikely to influence the merits of an arbitral award. 
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As discussed in the Sections III and IV, tribunals have endorsed the notion that states have 
wide latitude in the enactment and enforcement of taxation laws.609 However, tribunals do 
not have a unanimous opinion on this aspect. Also, there is no clarity if the special nature of 
tax is due to the relatively higher threshold set for a taxation measure to be expropriatory or 
is it reverse – taxation, per se, constitutes a special category in investment disputes and thus 
tribunals have set exacting standards for expropriation claims to succeed. Tribunals have 
referred to a diverse set of reasons to justify the treatment of taxation as a separate 
category. In the paragraphs that follow I examine the tribunals which have endorsed taxation 
as a separate category of disputes – and the reasons advanced for the same. 
In Feldman, the tribunal endorsed the US position that ‘tax law and policy changes are 
intended to be given relatively broad leeway under NAFTA, even if their effect is to make 
impractical for certain business activities to continue.’610 The tribunal indicated the need to 
provide greater leeway to states in taxation matters at several places in the award. At one 
place in the award the tribunal stated that it is undeniable that the claimant has been 
treated unreasonably and had great difficulties in dealing with the officials, but 
unfortunately, ‘tax authorities in most countries do not always act in a consistent and 
predictable way.’611 Additionally, the tribunal placed the onus on the claimant to consult a 
legal counsel ‘given that he was dealing with tax laws and tax authorities, which are subject 
to extensive formalities in Mexico and in most other countries of the world.’612 The tribunal 
did not, however, expressly address or endorse the view that taxation forms a special 
category of expropriation. 
The most express endorsement of taxation as a special category was in EnCana. In EnCana, 
the tribunal before dismissing the claim of indirect expropriation by the claimants, remarked 
that in the absence of a specific commitment from the host state, the foreign investor neither 
has the right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change to its 
disadvantage during the period of the investment.613 Concluding on the indirect expropriation 
claims, the tribunal observed: 
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From the perspective of expropriation, taxation is in a special category. In 
principle a tax law creates a new legal liability on a class of persons to pay 
money to the State in respect of some defined class of transactions, the money 
to be used for public purposes. In itself such a law is not taking of property; if 
it were, a universal State prerogative would be denied by a guarantee against 
expropriation, which cannot be the case. Only if a tax law is extraordinary, 
punitive in amount or arbitrary in its incidence would issues of indirect 
expropriation be raised.614 (emphasis added) 
The tribunal also referred to the reason for treating taxation as a special category, albeit 
briefly. The tribunal emphasised on nature of taxation and observed that ‘all taxation reduces 
the economic benefits an enterprise would otherwise derive from its investment’ and thus 
only in an extreme case shall a generally applicable tax be judged as equivalent in effect to 
an expropriation.615 
In El Paso, the tribunal relied on the tax carve out to justify special nature of taxation. It 
observed: 
Every year, governments around the world propose the adoption of tax 
measures which constitute either new initiatives or amendments to the existing 
fiscal legislation. There is a presumption of validity in favour of legislative 
measures adopted by a State, and it is up to those who challenge such 
measures to demonstrate their invalidity. This idea has been embodied in 
Article XII of the BIT, the effect of which is to only limit slightly the State’s 
power to levy taxes.616 (emphasis added) 
The tribunal further added that the tax carve out grants an important margin of freedom to 
the host State in relation to its fiscal policy towards foreign investors and only creates a 
‘best-effort obligation’ for the state.617 
In my view, the tribunal in the El Paso award could have also referred to the existence of tax 
treaties. As described in Chapter 3, tax treaties are the proximate cause for inclusion of tax 
carve outs in IIAs. Tax carve outs, in turn, not only limit the jurisdiction of investor-state 
tribunals they also grant states a wide margin to enact and implement tax measures. The El 
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Paso tribunal recognises the latter as reflected in its observation that tax carve outs only 
create a best-effort obligation on states. However, this does not adequately articulate the 
uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes and the role of tax treaties in contributing to 
the uniqueness. In my view, the appropriate order of analysis is as follows: 
FIGURE 1: Tax Treaties, Tax Carve Outs and Uniqueness of Tax-Related Investment Disputes 
Tax treaties ----> Tax Carve Outs ------ 
Limited Jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals 
Wide discretion for a state’s tax measures 
The meaning and implication of the phrase ‘best-effort obligation’ employed by the El Paso 
tribunal is unclear. If the aim is to highlight the uniqueness of tax-related investment 
disputes, it could in my view, be better articulated by using the above mentioned approach. 
In endorsing the special category of taxation, the tribunals in the Yukos awards were less 
emphatic than the Feldman, EnCana and El Paso tribunals. The tribunal in the Valores award 
observed that ‘the notion that states have a considerable margin of discretion in enacting and 
enforcing tax laws should not lead to any confused idea that they have a discretion as to 
whether or not to comply with an international treaty.’618 The tribunal made this observation 
to underscore the point that the mere use of the label ‘taxation’ does not shield the host 
state from expropriation claims. If it were so, the investment protection through 
international law would become an illusion and state could avoid all responsibility by dressing 
up all its measures as taxation.619 The tribunal acknowledged that taxation affords a greater 
discretion to the states – but a state cannot breach its obligations under international law 
merely by using the term ‘taxation.’620 
In a similar vein, the tribunal in RosInvest observed that ‘States have a wide latitude in 
imposing and enforcing taxation laws even if resulting in substantial deprivation without 
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compensation.’621 In Tza Yap Shum award, the tribunal noted that as a general rule a state is 
not responsible for a loss of value or other disadvantages resulting from the imposition in 
good faith of general taxes and regulations. Even though the tribunal recognised the wide 
discretion that the states enjoy in taxation matters, it also expressly stated the limitations 
that this discretion provided.622 However, no reasons were mentioned as to why states enjoy 
wide discretion in adopting tax measures. 
Additionally, in the Sergei Paushok award, the tribunal made a few observations that hinted 
at the need to view taxation measures of a state through a different lens. While discussing 
the burden of the windfall profit tax imposed by the government of Mongolia, the tribunal 
observed that just because Mongolia also paid a heavy price following the adoption of the 
windfall profit tax does not mean the tax was arbitrary and unreasonable. The tribunal 
observed it was not willing to take that step ‘especially when it comes to dealing with fiscal 
legislation.’623 At a different place in the same award, the tribunal observed that just because 
Mongolia adopted a tax regime which was different from other states and may not be wise 
economic policy does not mean that it constitutes a breach of a BIT ‘particularly in the area 
of taxation, in respect of which States jealously guard their sovereign powers.’624 The 
tribunal’s intent was to emphasise, though in a limited manner, that taxation constituted a 
special category and the rationale for that is partially derived from the sovereignty concerns 
of the states.625 
However, not all tribunals have endorsed taxation as a special category. For instance, in the 
Burlington award, the claimant made a specific argument made that taxation is a special 
category in investment disputes. The respondent state also made an elaborate counter 
argument. However, the tribunal, in its findings, side-stepped the issue and avoided making 
any observation on the issue. In the award, the tribunal makes several important observations 
on various issues relating to tax-related investment disputes, but disappointingly considered 
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the issue of taxation constituting a special category as one to be avoided. The omission is 
particularly disappointing since the claimant specifically made an argument to that effect.626 
The above mentioned awards suggest that various tribunals have articulated that tax-related 
investment disputes are in a separate category by using different rationales. However, despite 
the diversity of views or perhaps because of it, several questions remain unanswered. If 
taxation constitutes a special category for expropriation purposes, is a higher standard of 
expropriation the only (and necessary) consequence of recognising a separate category? 
In my view, the EnCana award suggests the correct rationale for treating expropriation by 
taxation as a special category. The tribunal acknowledged that every tax due to its nature 
reduces the economic benefit of the investment and further suggested that the states enjoy a 
wide margin in so far as the tax is not ‘extraordinary, punitive in amount or arbitrary in its 
incidence.’ Thus, nature of tax contributes in making tax-related investment disputes as 
unique and an important implication of the same is a high threshold for expropriation by 
taxation. 
The tribunal in El Paso referred to tax carve outs to justify that states enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in matters of taxation. However, the tribunal failed to convincingly elaborate on 
the connection between tax treaties, tax carve outs and the uniqueness of tax-related 
investment disputes. I discussed the rationale for tax carve outs in Chapter 3 above where I 
elaborated that taxation is carved out from IIAs because states perceive that taxation matters 
are better addressed under tax treaties.627 The reference to the existence of tax treaties 
could be used by future tribunals to highlight the uniqueness of tax-related investment 
disputes, and to give a wide margin of appreciation to the states. 
Further, as mentioned above, the tribunal in the Sergei Paushok award referred to sovereignty 
to distinguish tax from other measures. Sovereignty, per se, is not a convincing legal reason to 
conclude that taxation deserves a wider margin of appreciation. In my view, an alternate 
approach could be to refer to the police powers doctrine in tax-related investment disputes.
628 Doctrine of police power excludes state liability for bona fide and non 
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discriminatory regulation.629 Gebhard Bücheler observes that under the ‘mitigated police 
powers’ doctrine – the tribunal can consider both the effect of a state measure and the 
purpose for which it was adopted.630 This is unlike the strict application of ‘police powers’ 
doctrine which focuses only on the purpose of the state measure.631 A mitigated police powers 
doctrine would allow a process of balancing the public interest and property rights of the 
investor. Using the police powers doctrine in their analysis may allow the tribunals to ground 
their awards in a more convincing legal reason instead of vague assertions of sovereignty 
considerations of the states. 
Apart from the Burlington award, Feldman award is the closest that any tribunal has come in 
referring the police powers doctrine in tax-related investment disputes. In the Feldman 
award, the tribunal observed that governments should be free to act in public interest by new 
and modified tax regimes.632 The tribunal continued that reasonable governmental regulation 
that involves increase or decrease of tariffs cannot be achieved if every adversely affected 
business is allowed to seek compensation.633 Almost on an opposite spectrum, the tribunal in 
the Hydro award suspended criminal proceedings against the claimant to protect procedural 
integrity of arbitration - directions which can be interpreted as interfering with the police 
powers of a state.634 However, interference with police powers is a rare occurrence and needs 
to meet a high threshold. 
Finally, in future disputes, I would suggest that the tribunals should also indicate if the 
opinions of the competent authorities under the provision of tax veto constitute decisions of 
experts or specialised decision makers. The competent authorities that exercise tax veto are 
typically officials of taxation departments of the relevant states. Thus, if the opinion of tax 
authorities is considered as expert opinions, the tribunals will also need to state the extent of 
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restraint that needs to be shown in reviewing their decisions.635 The opinion of tax authorities 
should be considered expert opinion and shown deference by tribunals unless their 
interpretation of tax laws is mala fide or without adequate reasoning. 
VII. INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS AND THEIR LIMITED ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL 
TAX LAW 
Arbitral awards on tax-related investment disputes have one common and recurring 
shortcoming- their limited engagement with ITL. The limited jurisdiction of most tribunals in 
tax-related investment disputes combined with the nature of disputes has rarely presented 
the tribunals with an opportunity to meaningfully engage with ITL. However, some tribunals 
have addressed certain taxation issues, the prominent ones being - customary norms of 
taxation and the incorporation of shell companies by investors in low tax regions to reduce 
their tax liabilities. On both aspects, the analysis of the tribunals has been unsatisfactory. 
The first troublesome aspect of the interface of international tax and investor-state tribunals 
arises in the context of customary law limitations on taxation. Some tribunals refer to 
customary norms limiting a state’s power to tax. But, as I argued in Chapter 1 above, there 
are no customary norms in ITL, only general principles of law. Tribunals do not adequately 
probe the existence of customary norms in ITL; the superficial treatment of CIL is perhaps one 
of the most glaring omissions by the tribunals adjudicating tax-related investment disputes. It 
is contended, that such an approach belies a correct understanding of ITL as a sub-discipline 
of general international law. 
In Sergei Paushok, the tribunal dismissed the argument of the claimant that the windfall 
profit tax was contrary to international standards. The tribunal observed that the claimants 
‘have not established the existence of such standards.’636 In my view, a better approach 
would have been to rely on general principles of law in ITL. In a similar vein, the tribunal in 
Feldman observed that states are free to adapt new or modified tax regimes, the grant or 
withdraw government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels, and the like. The 
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tribunal stated that business cannot seek compensation from reasonable governmental 
regulation of this type and ‘it is safe to say that customary international law recognizes 
this.’637 The tribunal’s erroneous observation relied on the US Restatement; the latter stated 
that it was the police power of the state to change laws - it did not state that there were 
customary norms in ITL. 
In Burlington the claimant challenged Ecuador’s legislation which increased its tax liability. It 
was argued that it amounted to a measure ‘tantamount to expropriation’. The tribunal 
observed that the concept of confiscatory taxation corresponds to expropriatory taxation. It 
observed ‘the most important factor to distinguish permissible from confiscatory taxation is 
the effect of the tax. The effects required for a tax to be deemed confiscatory do not appear 
to be different from those required to assess the existence of an indirect expropriation. In 
other words, confiscatory taxation constitutes an expropriation without compensation and is 
unlawful.’638 In its analysis of the standard for expropriatory taxation, the tribunal relied on 
the CIL on taxation. The tribunal noted that there are two limitations to a state’s power to 
tax under CIL – it should not be discriminatory and it should not be confiscatory.639 In my view, 
these two limitations are not based in customary law. For example, it is possible to 
understand non-discriminatory taxation as a general principle of law due to its incorporation 
in almost every tax treaty, but it would be premature to view it as a customary norm. 
The tribunals in Burlington and Feldman suggested that customary law limits a state’s power 
to tax, but did not rely on any authoritative source. There was, for instance, no mention of 
the fact if customary limitations on state power to tax are incorporated in any of the tax 
treaties, tax information exchange agreements or even in any domestic tax laws of the states. 
Until now, neither the issue of international tax avoidance nor customary norms in ITL have 
decisively influenced the decision of any tribunal, but partial and incorrect references to ITL 
are problematic. 
Further, the allegations of expropriation at times intersect with the disputes generally 
considered within the purview of tax treaties - disputes relating to international double 
taxation, under taxation or tax evasion. In the Yukos Universal and Hulley awards, tribunals 
referred to the tax avoidance techniques adopted by Yukos such as the incorporation of shell 
companies in low tax regions without a contemporaneous economic activity in those regions. 
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The tribunal accepted that the Russian federal legislation and the legislation of the low-tax 
jurisdictions did not mandate that trading companies actually conduct their trading 
operations in the territory of the low-tax jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the tribunal observed, 
‘there are indications in the record that Yukos itself had doubts, or at least apprehensions, 
about the legality of aspects of its modus operandi. There is also the issue of the questionable 
use by Claimants of the Cyprus-Russia DTA.’640 Even though the conduct of the claimant in this 
case did not prevent the tribunal from deciding in its favour, from the perspective of 
international tax, these observations have several shortcomings. Claimants’ doubts about the 
use of low tax regions for reducing their tax liabilities and its permissibility under the tax 
treaty were not unique, such doubts are widespread.641 MNEs across the globe frequently use 
these techniques and have to consistently defend the legality of their techniques.642 
In view of such uncertainty in tax laws it is appropriate to look at the observations in the 
Yukos Universal award on the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine and ‘contributory fault’. The tribunal 
held that it is not persuaded that there exists a general principle of law recognized by 
civilized nations under Art 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute that would bar an investor from making 
a claim because it has ‘unclean hands.’643 In the context of tax-related investment disputes, 
‘unclean hands’ would generally translate to tax evasion by the investor. The Yukos Universal 
award, rejected the unclean hands doctrine but relied on two other concepts to address the 
tax evasion by the investor – making and performing an investment and contributory fault. 
With respect to the former, the tribunal observed that the allegations of tax evasion against 
the claimant were not related to the making of the investment but largely concerned post- 
investment illegalities. Thus, the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claims. With respect to 
the latter, the tribunal attributed ‘contributory fault’ to Yukos – that through its own wilful 
and negligent acts it contributed to its own destruction.644 Based on its findings, the tribunal 
concluded that the faults of Yukos were much lesser in comparison to those perpetrated by 
the host state. 
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The observations of the Yukos Universal tribunal leave a few questions unanswered. It is 
unclear if tax evasion is viewed part of transnational public policy or is it merely an issue to 
be viewed on a temporal dividing line - to characterise the issue as one of jurisdiction or 
merits. It is also possible to argue that an investor’s obligation to pay tax in the host state is a 
recognised principle of law in ITL. Additionally, it remains unclear how contributory fault is 
assessed and ascribed. The Niko tribunal has observed that there has to be a relation of 
reciprocity between the relief sought by the claimant in the arbitration and the claimant’s 
acts in the past which the respondent state may characterise as involving unclean hands.645 
The tribunal in Yukos Universal did not examine this aspect adequately. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Tribunals, in tax-related investment disputes, have usually not found that the measures of the 
host state constitute expropriation unless there is a direct, obvious and an undeniable 
curtailment of the investor’s rights. In the Burlington and the Yukos awards, the tribunals only 
held the actions of the host state to be expropriatory when the host state interfered  with the 
physical possession of the investor’s assets. This deferential approach to ‘expropriation by 
taxation’ is because tax-related investment disputes constitute a unique category. The 
tribunals in awards such as the EnCana award have expressly endorsed this position. Other 
tribunals, for instance, in the Yukos awards have adopted a deferential approach and have 
given a wide leeway to the states in taxation measures; but they have not expressly 
articulated the unique nature of tax-related investment disputes. 
Apart from the physical dispossession or interference with property rights of an investor, 
tribunals have relied on the substantial deprivation and the continued profitability test in tax- 
related investment disputes. There is no upper limit of tax rates beyond which taxation 
becomes expropriatory – a tax rate of 99% in Burlington award was not held to be 
expropriatory until it was accompanied by a physical takeover by the host state. Thus, the 
ability of the investor to generate profits even after the imposition of a strenuous tax and the 
continued physical possession are important factors that tribunals consider in arguments 
relating to expropriation in tax-related investment disputes. I’ve argued that that the arbitral 
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awards in tax-related investment disputes reveal that tribunals have offered a wide margin of 
appreciation to the states in taxation matters. 
The rationale and justification for wide margin to states, however, differs. Some tribunals 
have referred to tax carve outs, others have mentioned the sovereignty considerations in 
taxation matters still others underscored the involuntary transfer of money. The latter, I 
argue, is the most pertinent and important factor that distinguishes taxation from other 
measures such as public health measures. Future arbitral tribunals dealing with tax-related 
investment disputes should recognize a separate category of ‘expropriation by taxation’. 
Equally, I highlight that tribunals should refer to the regulation of tax by tax treaties which 
has also contributed to the unique nature of tax-related investment disputes. 
Another aspect that I highlight is the under appreciation of ITL by investor-state arbitral 
tribunals. Thus far, reference to customary norms in ITL and tax evasion by MNEs is rare. I 
suggest that some of the principles in tax treaties constitute general principles of law and not 
customary norms. These principles should, in turn, inform how ITL enables a state to impose 
taxes. However, one sees that tribunals tend to treat IIL as self-sufficient even when they 
examine the arguments of the parties on tax evasion and the application of tax laws. I suggest 
that investor-state tribunals need to take into account the general principles of ITL. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 3, taxation measures of a state are generally required to meet only a 
limited set of substantive obligations. The prominent ones are – expropriation, FET standard 
and the non-discrimination standard. Chapter 4 examined expropriation, in this chapter I shall 
focus on the FET standard.646 
The FET standard has become the most important standard in investor-state arbitration.647 Its 
content is, however, indeterminate and contingent on the decentralised working of the IIL 
regime.648 Unsurprisingly, the form and content of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ has 
attracted different opinions.649 Most commentators have argued that the FET standard has an 
autonomous content.650 A few others have, however, argued that the FET standard should be 
understood in reference to the international minimum standard.651 The purpose of this 
chapter is not to engage with the different opinions about the content and nature of the FET 
standard. Instead, this chapter aims to examine the FET standard in the specific context of 
tax-related investment disputes. 
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Legal concepts such as fair and equitable treatment attract academic attention from various 
perspectives. For instance, some focus on broad theoretical arguments and examine the 
position of fair and equitable treatment in IIL and general international law.652 The aim in this 
chapter is to attempt a more specific analysis. This chapter seeks to understand how the 
concept of fair and equitable treatment is applied during the adjudication of tax-related 
investment disputes. Examining the concept of fair and equitable treatment in the context of 
tax-related investment disputes reveals in granular detail how this substantive obligation 
works in practice. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section II of the chapter discusses the relation between 
taxation and the FET standard. It discusses the approach of the tribunals to tax-related 
investment disputes and how the FET standard is applied to certain actions of the states such 
as amendment of taxation laws, abusive tax administration and discriminatory taxation. 
Section III looks at the interaction between the FET standard and ITL. I highlight the limited 
and unsatisfactory engagement of tribunals with ITL. Section IV elaborates that in so far as 
the FET standard is concerned it is unclear if tribunals view tax as a separate category. 
Section V concludes. 
II. TAXATION AND THE FET STANDARD 
A. Stability of Tax Laws 
This Section proceeds on the assumption that legitimate expectations are an element of the 
FET standard.653 It relies on the work of Jonathan Bonnitcha who has shown that the tribunals 
have adopted four approaches towards legitimate expectations: the legal rights approach, the 
representations approach, the stability approach and the business plan approach.654 In tax- 
related investment disputes, one observes that the tribunals have frequently adopted either 
the legal rights approach or the representations approach. The first requires that the 
expectations of the investor must rest on specific rights acquired under domestic law while 
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the second requires that expectations must rest on specific unilateral representations of 
government officials.655 
The expectations of the investor may not only derive from the laws of the host state but also 
from contractual undertakings - drafted specifically to attract foreign investment. In the 
latter case, as a result of the conduct of the host state, the expectation of the foreign 
investor may ‘rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in the light of the 
circumstances.’656 Tribunals have upheld that ‘specific commitments’ limit the right of the 
host state to adapt the legal framework to changing circumstances.657 The finding of breach 
of legitimate expectations thus at times involves distinguishing a contractual commitment 
from an expectation that emerges from the general regulatory framework of the host state.658 
1. Legitimate Expectations and Windfall Profit Tax 
The question of legitimate expectations in the context of tax was examined by the tribunal in 
Sergei Paushok. The tribunal rejected the claim of the investors that they had legitimate 
expectations; the basis for rejection was that the investors did not sign a stability agreement 
with the host state.659 In this dispute, the claimant challenged the imposition of the windfall 
profit tax on its gold mining business by the respondent state – Mongolia. The tax, it was 
claimed, violated their legitimate expectations. The tribunal rejected the argument and 
observed: 
[F]oreign investors are acutely aware that significant modification of taxation 
levels represents a serious risk, especially when investing in a country at an 
early stage of economic and institutional development. In many instances, they 
will obtain the appropriate guarantees in that regard in the form of, for 
example, stability agreements which limit or prohibit the possibility of tax 
increases.660 
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The tribunal concluded that other companies had secured such agreements and the claimant 
in the absence of such an agreement had not succeeded in establishing that they had 
legitimate expectations against exposure to significant tax increases in the future. The 
tribunal in Sergei Paushok linked the windfall profits and legitimate expectations with 
‘economic and institutional development stage’ of a state. In my view, taxation of sudden or 
unexpected profits cannot be justified on the ground that the state is at an early stage of 
economic development. Windfall profit taxes need to be justified on principles of equitable 
sharing of profits – for instance, the fact that the profits are derived from a state’s resources. 
The sharing of profits should be without any reference to the stage of development of the 
particular state. 
In Total v Argentina, the tribunal had to distinguish between the legitimate expectations 
derived from general regulatory framework and those derived from specific unilateral 
commitments.661 I shall discuss two arguments made by Total to elaborate on the 
aforementioned distinction. First, Total claimed that Argentina’s unilateral modification of 
the legislation and regulations entailed a breach of the legitimate expectations of Total. 
Argentina argued that it had not breached any promise or guarantee made to Total because 
neither did it enter into any contract with it nor did it ‘induce’ Total to invest in Argentina.662 
Total’s second argument was in relation to the export taxes.663 Export taxes on crude oil were 
imposed by Argentina in order to increase government revenues and address the emergency in 
its banking and financial sector. Total argued that taxes were confiscatory and complained 
that the indirect effect of the export taxes was on the domestic price of oil. Total contended 
that the export taxes had the effect of reducing its domestic price and interfered with its 
right to sell crude oil at a freely negotiated price. 
With respect to the first argument, the tribunal stated that the principle of legitimate 
expectations needs to be addressed with reference to the ‘stability’ of the legal framework of 
the host state.664 In elaborating on the subject of stability, the tribunal observed that ‘the 
form and specific content of the undertaking of stability invoked are crucial.’665 It observed 
that more specific the commitment of the state, the more credible the investor’s claim of 
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reliance on it. The tribunal did not find any specific commitments made by Argentina and 
correctly rejected Total’s argument. Elaborating further, the tribunal held that if the licence 
provisions of Total are regulated by a defined legal regime it ‘cannot be regarded as a source 
of contractual legal obligations of a specific character assumed directly by Argentina towards 
Total.’666 
Addressing the second argument, the tribunal observed that Argentina never restricted the 
right of Total from selling crude oil and further such right was subject to the right of the 
executive to fix the domestic price of crude oil.667 The tribunal stated that the increase in 
export taxes in 2007 were intended to recoup resources from the extra profits of exporters 
due to the extraordinary increase in international oil prices. It then rejected Total’s 
argument that the taxes confiscatory and the purpose of taxes was to manipulate the market. 
The taxes, the tribunal observed, were part of general fiscal legislation and Total cannot 
invoke any promise from Argentina to be exempt from general fiscal legislation; these taxes 
were part of general fiscal stability.668 The tribunal then added that windfall profit taxes 
were ‘common’ and had been introduced in many oil producing states. Hence, the tribunal 
concluded, the export taxes enacted by Argentina were not in violation of Total’s legitimate 
and reasonable expectations.669 Tribunal’s reference to the regularity of windfall profit taxes 
was unusual. In tribunal’s understanding, the fact that other states had imposed windfall 
profits tax too was important to determine if there was a breach of legitimate expectations. 
However, the exact meaning of the word ‘common’ used by the tribunal is uncertain. For 
instance, it is unclear how many states should have imposed a windfall profit tax for it to be 
considered ‘common’. 
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In Occidental (II), the tribunal held that Ecuador’s Law 42 that imposed windfall profit tax 
flouted the legitimate expectations of the investor and thus breached the FET standard.670 
The tribunal examined the participation contract between Occidental and Ecuador which 
provided that both the claimant and the respondent would receive a share in the production 
of crude oil which would be exclusively dependent on production volume. However, after the 
rise in oil prices, in April 2006, Ecuador amended the participation contract which made its 
participation in oil revenues dependent on oil prices. This was an amendment to the original 
contract where participation of the parties was without any reference to the price of oil. 
The findings of the tribunal were influenced by three factors: first, Ecuador’s legislative 
amendment to the contract struck at the heart of the rights acquired by Occidental and its 
acceptance of the risk of losses in a low price scenario; second, the curtailment of 
Occidental’s right to freely dispose of the oil by amendment to the participation contract; 
third, Ecuador had made explicit representations during the negotiations of the contract 
which were later crystallised in the contract itself – and thus, Occidental was ‘justified in 
expecting that this contractual framework would be respected and certainly not modified 
unilaterally by the Respondent.’671 The findings of the tribunal were accurate and succinct. 
However, the tribunal in Occidental (II) did not elaborate whether the obligation to re- 
negotiate the contract was mandatory or optional.672 In the latter scenario, a unilateral 
modification of a sharing contract cannot always amount to breach of legitimate expectations 
of the investor. 
While I do not disagree with the findings of the tribunals in Sergei Paushok, Total, and 
Occidental (II), I’ve certain reservations about the reasoning adopted by the tribunals with 
respect to the FET standard, legitimate expectations and windfall profits tax. I doubt if the 
question of windfall profits and FET standard should be decided under the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations. The very nature of windfall profits is that they are unexpected and 
cannot be foreseen.673 Even if the contractual arrangement between an investor and host 
state stipulates that a state can impose windfall profits tax - the nature, duration and extent 
of windfall profits can never be contemplated or agreed beforehand. I submit that windfall 
profit taxes do not fall under any of the four approaches identified by Jonathan Bonnitcha. An 
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unexpected change in market conditions and rise in prices creates a specific context of its 
own – a separate category. 
The question of whether the windfall profits tax breaches the FET standard should in my view 
be decided in the backdrop of the market factors that cause such profits. For instance, a 
cyclical increase in the prices of the commodity may warrant a less harsh windfall profit tax 
while if the change in prices is unprecedented the windfall profit tax could have a higher 
threshold without breaching the FET standard. The tribunal’s obligation should be to assess if 
the imposition of taxes by the state was proportional to the windfall profits. However, the 
reference in Total to the tax being ‘common’ while in Sergei Paushok the reference to the 
‘stage of development’ of the state suggests that the parameters to assess the breach of the 
FET standard are not certain. In this context, it is important to refer to the observations of 
the tribunal in the Murphy award.674 
The award also involved the Law 42 enacted by Ecuador under which a windfall profit tax was 
imposed. The tribunal addressed the question if the tax had breached the legitimate 
expectations on the investor. The tribunal observed that the initial tax rate of 50% did not 
disturb investor’s legitimate expectations since it would be unreasonable to expect that the 
contracts terms would remain unchanged if the oil prices rise significantly.675 However, the 
tax rate of 99%, in tribunal’s view violated the investor’s legitimate expectations since - it 
fundamentally changed the nature of the contract, involved coercive conduct of respondent 
in re-negotiating and the respondent also created a hostile and coercive investment 
environment.676 
In the Murphy award, the tribunal relied on the fact that the imposition of the windfall profit 
tax changed the very nature of the contract between the claimant and the respondent in the 
backdrop of a changing business environment in Ecuador. To conclude, I would like to say that 
unless in tribunal’s opinion, the windfall profit tax fundamentally alters the relation between 
the investor and the host state, it should not ordinarily be addressed in reference to 
legitimate expectations.677 
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2. Changes in Tax Law and Violation of the FET Standard 
The tribunal in Occidental handled the claim of fair and equitable treatment unconvincingly. 
The claimant, Occidental, argued that the revocation by Ecuador of its previous decisions678 
was a frustration of its legitimate expectations and thus a breach of the obligation of Ecuador 
to accord fair and equitable treatment. The tribunal did not address the concept of 
‘legitimate expectations’ and its relation with fair and equitable treatment. The tribunal 
based its findings on the ‘stability’ of the legal and business framework which it considered to 
be an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.679 The tribunal observed that ‘the 
framework under which the investment was made and operates has been changed in an 
important manner.’680 It further observed that the ‘tax law was changed without providing any 
clarity about its meaning and extent and the practice and regulations were also inconsistent 
with such changes.’681 However, in analysing the stability of the business framework the 
tribunal conflated the two concepts of transparency and stability. The tribunal failed to 
clearly enunciate the lack of stability combined with the absence of transparency establishes 
that the respondent failed to ensure treatment in accordance with the FET standard. Instead, 
in tribunal’s analysis non-transparency was subsumed within the concept of stability itself 
rather than constituting a separate parameter to determine the breach of the FET standard.
682 While the issues of non-transparency and stability may overlap, the tribunal failed to 
convincingly articulate these concepts.683 
On the other hand, the tribunal in the PSEG award was more nuanced for it expressly 
mentioned the non-transparent negotiations conducted by the host state.684 The tribunal 
noted that the ‘fair and equitable treatment was seriously breached by what has been 
described above as “roller-coaster” effect of the continuing legislative changes. This is 
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particularly the case of the requirements relating, in law or practice, to the continuous 
change in the conditions governing the corporate status of the Project … This was also the 
case, to a more limited extent, of the changes in tax legislation.’685 The tribunal commented 
on the inept handling of the negotiations by the administration and observed ‘that key points 
of disagreement went unanswered and were not disclosed in a timely manner, that silence 
was kept when there was evidence of such persisting and aggravating disagreement, that 
important communications were never looked at, and there was a systematic attitude not to 
address the need to put an end to negotiations that were leading nowhere...’.686 This 
separation of the reasons – lack of transparency in negotiations and the constant changes in 
the PSEG award was more convincing in comparison to the Occidental award. 
However, the tribunal in the PSEG award was examining the negotiations between the foreign 
investor and the host state. The tribunal in the PSEG award commented on the frequent 
changes in the laws and attitudes of the host state during its negotiations with the investor. It 
affected the investors’ assessment of its future tax liabilities. The tribunal observed: 
While in complex negotiations, such as those involved in this case, many 
changes will occur beyond the control of the government, as was particularly 
the case with the increased costs, the issue is that the longer term outlook 
must not be altered in such a way that will end up begin no outlook at all. In 
this case, it was not only the law that kept changing but notably the attitudes 
and policies of the administration.687 
The state was held to be in violation of the FET standard. The tribunal held that even if the 
conduct of the state was in good faith, it was still an evident breach of the FET standard.688 
Another example of a change in the attitude of the host state is the withdrawal of tax 
concessions or tax holidays – with retrospective effect. In the Total award, one of Total’s 
complaints was that in the year 2006, Argentina retroactively eliminated the exemption from 
customs duties that it was guaranteed with respect to investments made in Tierra del Fuego. 
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In addressing the argument of the retroactive revocation the tribunal relied on statements 
made by Argentina’s administrative authorities in 2002 and 2004. The tribunal said that in 
response to Total’s specific requests, the competent authorities of Argentina had confirmed 
the non-applicability of the taxes for almost four years. This, the tribunal observed, ‘makes 
the change of position of Argentina’s authorities in 2006 a breach of a specific promise made 
to Total and, therefore, a breach of the fair and equitable treatment clause in BIT.’689 The 
tribunal did not specifically elaborate on the retrospective aspect of elimination of tax 
benefits but instead only focused on the fact that Argentina through its officials had made a 
specific commitment.690 
Similarly, in the Micula award, the claimants challenged the withdrawal of tax incentives by 
the respondent.691 Under an Ordinance in 1998, Romania had extended tax incentives for 
investments in its disadvantageous regions. The claimant argued that it made investments by 
relying on the promise of tax incentives and that Romania’s premature withdrawal of the tax 
incentives violated the FET standard under the IIA.692 The tribunal observed that in order to 
prove the breach of the FET standard it is not sufficient to prove that Romania made a 
promise and the claimant relied on it; the claimant also needs to prove that its reliance on 
the promise was reasonable. 
The tribunal observed that even though the Competition Council in 2000 had declared that 
the tax incentives as were incompatible with the European Agreement, Romania failed to 
enforce the Council’s decision.693 Romania did not remove the tax incentives. In view of the 
continuation of the tax incentives despite the Council’s decision, the investor’s were 
reasonable in expecting that the tax incentives were legal and would continue for ten years.
694 
Retrospective denial of benefits can occur by enacting a new law or by a change in the 
interpretation of the existing law. However, retrospective denial needs to be distinguished 
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from grant of rights that are subject to further review. This can be illustrated in reference to 
the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada. For instance, Eli Lilly has challenged the 
invalidation of its two patents – for the drugs Straterra and Zyprexa – that were held to be 
invalid in separate judgments of Federal Courts of Canada.695 Eli Lilly’s core grievance is 
against the application of the ‘promise’ doctrine by which the Canadian judiciary invalidated 
previously granted patents.696 Here, it needs to be emphasised that the situation involves a 
challenge to the validity of patent laws as interpreted in the domestic courts of Canada. The 
courts invalidated patents that were previously granted by the Patent Office and it resulted in 
denial of rights but the court decisions were part of an established legal process. The 
patentee could also foresee the possibility of invalidation of patent, if, for example, there 
was no invention. Thus, the court’s decision was not a retrospective decision to deny the 
patents. 
3. Abusive Administration of Tax Laws 
Administrative failures can also amount to breach of the FET standard.697 A dishonest 
application of law may involve a hostile attitude of the authorities towards investor(s), 
questionable interpretations of the laws and all this may occur without any change in the 
letter of the law.698 Applying existing laws in a hostile manner may in fact leave the investor 
in a worse off position compared to amendment(s) in laws that impose onerous conditions on 
the investor.699 The Yukos awards are perfect examples where the host state did not bring any 
change in the letter of the law but the implementation and interpretation of the law was 
changed to the detriment of the economic activities of the investor organised through various 
corporate entities.700 The tax authorities (re) assessed the earnings of the investor and 
claimed additional taxes by relying on questionable interpretation of tax laws and 
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retrospectively imposed additional tax burdens worth billions of dollars. These actions 
completely nullified the benefits that the tax law conferred on the investors and violated 
general legal principles of stability, consistency and prospective application.701 It ultimately 
led to complete deprivation of the property of the investors. 
In the RosInvest Co award, one of the arguments made by the investor related to 
discriminatory treatment by the Russian tax authorities. The tribunal held that there was no 
discrimination between the nationals and foreigners and the focus of the Russia’s measures 
was on Yukos irrespective of its domestic and foreign shareholders. However, with regard to 
the discrimination against Yukos as compared to other companies, the tribunal noted: 
In this respect, the Tribunal can refer to its above considerations which 
concluded that, indeed, in the application of the tax law, in the tax 
assessments and in the conduct of the YNG auction, Yukos was treated by 
Respondent quite different to the treatment accorded to its competitors and 
other comparable tax payers and no convincing reasons have been shown by 
Respondent for this differentiation.702 
The tribunal, though, did not conclude that this constituted a violation of the FET standard 
but said that that ‘there remain doubts whether they can be seen as a fair and equitable 
treatment.703 It needs to be pointed out that the tribunal’s hesitation to find a violation of 
the FET standard was not because of doctrinal reasons but because the approach the tribunal 
adopted in adjudicating the dispute.704 The tribunal listed various arguments topically and 
made its observations to conclude each section. The tribunal divided and sub-divided the 
various arguments of the parties and examined the facts of the case chronologically with a 
focus on answering only question – whether the cumulative effect of the totality of the 
Russia’s conduct was a breach of the BIT? Thus, the tribunal thought it unnecessary to make a 
separate determination on the FET standard. In my opinion, if the tribunal had adopted a 
different approach or if it was a non-tax related investment dispute, the tribunal would have 
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arrived at an unambiguous conclusion that the conduct of the Russian authorities was a 
violation of the FET standard.705 
B. Inconsistency between State Organs 
The issue of inconsistency addresses the contradictory approaches that the different organs of 
the state may adopt towards the same investor on the same issue.706 The inconsistency may 
result from a lack of co-ordination, miscommunication or even a tussle between the different 
branches of the government such as the executive and the judiciary. The courts may, in a 
certain dispute, interpret the tax laws in a manner that may be considered as departure from 
the earlier settled position of law. In such a situation, the investor may seek to renegotiate its 
contract with the host state or in its absence claim a violation of the FET standard. The 
EnCana dispute was a result of Ecuador’s change in its tax policy. The claim was brought 
under the Canada-Ecuador BIT. The tribunal observed that ‘it could well be’ a breach of fair 
and equitable treatment if a state entity enters into an investment agreement on a certain 
basis and then denies the other party the right to renegotiate the agreement in the event 
that the basis for it has been changed as a result of decisions of other state organs.707 The 
tribunal noted that under the FET standard, ‘the State must act with reasonable consistency 
and without arbitrariness in its treatment of investments. One arm of the state cannot finally 
affirm what another arm denies to the detriment of the investor.’708 In other words, the 
different branches of the government – legislature, executive and judiciary cannot adopt 
conflicting views about the same issue. For instance, if a foreign investor incorporates its 
parent company in a tax haven and its subsidiary in the host state; in such a case, the 
inconsistency will arise if the executive (tax administration) claims it is an illegal practice 
while the judiciary interprets it to be a perfectly legal tax avoidance strategy. However, this 
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is different from an investor’s obligation to comply with different laws and regulations of the 
host state simultaneously.709 
The question of inconsistent views among the different branches of the government was 
addressed by the tribunal in the PSEG award.710 At a certain stage in the negotiations with 
Turkey, PSEG proposed that the corporate structure should be a Turkish Branch Office of a 
Dutch company that would be specifically incorporated in order to channel the investment. 
However, the Turkish government required that the project company be a limited liability 
company incorporated in Turkey. The tribunal observed that foreign branch corporate 
structure and the implementation contract was recognised under the law and by Danıştay 
(administrative court of Turkey) but was ignored by the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources. The court observed that such inconsistent administrative acts ‘might be unlawful 
under Turkish law, but in light of the provisions of the Treaty they are also in breach of the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.’711 
C. Concluding Remarks 
Tax laws are one of the most important instruments used by a state to attract foreign 
investment and investors. States may suspend the application of tax laws in certain sectors to 
encourage foreign investment; they may reduce tax rates for a certain category of economic 
activities or offer subsidies.712 However, once an investor commits to a long term investment, 
a state may rescind its tax incentives or subsidies – and it is ordinarily well within the 
regulatory power of a state to do so.713 In such instances, the actions of the state will need to 
meet the standards of treatment prescribed in the IIAs, such as the FET standard.714 
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The above discussion reveals that there is no precise manner to identify when the tax 
measures of a state violate the state’s obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. The 
approaches of the tribunals differ and the facts of the case are usually determinative in 
identifying if a particular tax measure is in violation of the FET standard. There is no uniform 
and consistent approach. The tax measures are also of varied kinds – windfall profit tax, 
abuse of tax administration among others. Tribunals tend to rely on the nature of the state 
action to determine violation of the FET standard. Also, unlike arguments relating to 
expropriation by taxation, there is ambiguity if taxation constitutes a unique and separate 
category is so far as the fair and equitable treatment standard is concerned.715 
III. THE FET STANDARD AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
The interaction of FET with international law and specifically CIL has been the subject of 
various investor-state tribunal awards.716 However, the awards where the issues of FET 
standard and ITL intersect simultaneously are only a handful. Nonetheless, it is important to 
make a few observations in order to gain a glimpse of the evolving relationship and throw a 
light on the approach of the tribunals on this aspect. This Section highlights the approach of 
the tribunals towards ITL when addressing arguments on the FET standard. I emphasise on two 
aspects: the lack of any reference to general principles of law in ITL; and, examine the 
relevance of tax practices of an investor such as the allegations of tax evasion. States have 
either claimed that their tax measures seek to prevent tax evasion in order to escape liability 
or states argue that due to the investor’s illegal conduct such as tax evasion, the tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction. I examine the observations of the tribunals, identify a few shortcomings 
and suggest recognising tax evasion as a legitimate public purpose for tax measures. 
A. No Reference to General Principles of International Tax Law 
The tribunal, in Occidental had the opportunity to address the applicability of fair and 
equitable treatment to taxation measures.717 The tribunal commented on the vagueness and 
lack of clarity in the tax laws of the respondent and concluded that by failing to maintain a 
stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources 
(an essential element of fair and equitable treatment), the respondent breached its 
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obligation to provide a fair and equitable treatment under Article II (3)(a) of the BIT. The 
tribunal also addressed the issue of whether the fair and equitable treatment mandated by 
the IIA was a more demanding standard than that prescribed by CIL. The tribunal noted that 
the BIT in question did not provide a standard that was different from that required under 
international law and clarified that the case only involved the question whether the legal 
framework met the requirements of stability and predictability under international law.718 In 
this case, it held, the respondent’s treatment of investment fell below those standards. The 
tribunal, though had an opportunity, did not elaborate on the nature of the FET standard and 
its relevance to tax-related investment disputes. There was no mention of the nature of tax 
laws and whether the FET standard should meet a higher threshold because of the nature of 
taxation. Also, any mention of ITL and its relevance was completely absent. 
The tribunal in the Cargill award made a similar error. The tribunal examined, at length, the 
differing opinions of the claimant and the respondent about the content of the FET standard. 
The awards of various tribunals were cited and discussed at length in order to explain the 
debate on the content of the FET standard.719 However, even though one of the claimant’s 
challenges essentially centred on an allegedly discriminatory tax, there was a surprising lack 
of any discussion about ITL or customary norms. Neither was there any reference to the 
general principles of law in ITL and their importance or relevance in a tax-related investment 
dispute.720 The tribunal gave the impression that it considered IIL as self-sufficient and 
adequate to adjudicate taxation matters.721 
Another missed opportunity to delve into the relation of taxation, FET and international 
minimum standard was the Sergei Paushok award. In this case, the claimant argued that the 
windfall profit tax was contrary to CIL and in particular inconsistent with the international 
minimum standard.722 The tribunal observed that the claimant has not argued that the 
standard would be broader than contained in the BIT; and since the tribunal has already 
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concluded that the tax does not breach the BIT, it goes by itself that the tax is not contrary to 
the international minimum standard.723 
The reason this award is a missed opportunity to explore the relation of taxes and general 
international law is the narrow interpretation of the term CIL. The claimant argued that the 
windfall profit was not in accordance with CIL and the tribunal equated it to international 
minimum standard. The international minimum standard though constitutes part of CIL 
certainly does not comprise the entire universe of customary norms.724 Some commentators 
have used CIL and international minimum standards interchangeably in the context of FET 
standard.725 It was an error on the part of the tribunal to presume that in a tax-related 
investment dispute the reference to CIL was only restricted to IIL (and in turn only to the 
international minimum standard) and did not extend to ITL. 
The tribunal in Sergei Paushok award also referred to ‘international standards’. However, the 
tribunal failed to define the term international standards and neither could it convincingly 
explain the term, its relevance and significance in tax-related investment disputes. In this 
dispute, one of the arguments of the investor was that the windfall profit tax imposed by 
Mongolia was contrary to international standards. In rejecting the argument, the tribunal 
observed that the claimant had failed to establish the existence of such standards. The 
tribunal observed that the fact that a particular country at a particular time has the highest 
taxation level affecting a certain industry does not automatically mean that there has been a 
breach of the BIT. The international standards referred to in the award were not dwelled upon 
in any length. The term ‘international standards’ is clearly an indeterminate term and can 
possibly include international practices or customary norms or both. The tribunal did not 
mention it specifically, but its reference to the taxation levels in other states suggested that 
tax rates in other states are part of ‘international standards’. It is uncertain if it is an 
inclusive or exhaustive interpretation of the term international standards. 
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The tax rates of other states were also referred to in the Total award. One of the reasons for 
tribunal’s conclusion that Argentina’s imposition of taxes did not violate the legitimate 
expectations of the investor was that the windfall profit taxes were common and had been 
introduced in many oil producing states. The references in the Sergei Paushok award and in 
the Total awards though are short of any reference to ITL or general principles of law in ITL; 
they can at best be described as an unconvincing acknowledgement of an undefined concept - 
international tax practices. 
In sum, we see that in relation to the FET standard, tribunals have not relied on or referred 
to the general principles of law in ITL. Instead, the tribunals have referred to: (i) 
international standards or tax rates of other states; (ii) reference to CIL is essentially 
reference to international minimum standard and tribunals have not examined the relevance 
of general principles of law in ITL or even the possibility of evolution of customary norms in 
ITL. 
B. The Relevance of Tax Practices of an Investor 
It has been observed that the conduct of the investor in relation to any undertaking of 
stability is also ‘subjectively’ relevant.726 Tribunals have highlighted that BITs ‘are not 
insurance policies against bad business judgments’ and that the investor has its own duty to 
investigate the host State’s applicable law.727 The issue of the conduct of the investor assumes 
an added importance in tax-related investment disputes. The domestic tax laws of the host 
state and the international tax treaty network together determine the appropriate and legally 
permissible corporate structure that can be used to channelize investment in the host state.
728 The tax liability of the investment activity can be significantly reduced by the choice of 
the right combination of the corporate structure and the tax treaty network.729 For instance, 
if a tax treaty exists between the host state and a low tax jurisdiction, then incorporating a 
parent company in a low tax jurisdiction and its subsidiary in the host state allows minimising 
tax liability in the host state (which usually has higher statutory tax 
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rates).730 The question of the corporate structure became an important issue in the 
negotiations between the claimant and the respondent state in the PSEG award. 
PSEG was interested in building a thermal power plant in Turkey. Amongst other issues that 
were discussed between PSEG and Turkey, there were legal difficulties relating to the 
corporate structure of the investment. The choice of a corporate structure was important as 
it would have affected the tax liability of the investor which in turn would have significantly 
influenced the tariff for the sale of electricity – the purpose for which the plant was 
proposed. The discussion about the corporate structure and the tax burden on the project 
took place during three time periods: negotiations concerning the implementation contract in 
1996, the consideration of a change of structure in 1998 and the disclosure about the effects 
of tax changes in 1999.731 The parties, according to the tribunal, had ‘very different 
recollections about what was or was not agreed during these meetings.’732 Nonetheless, the 
tribunal acknowledged that by 1999 the ‘tax issue had become relevant in the context of the 
dispute.’733 
At the early stage of negotiations, Turkey argued, a Turkish capital company was considered 
as the appropriate capital structure for the project but this was later changed to a branch 
office of a Dutch incorporated company at the insistence of PSEG. Turkey argued that PSEG 
wanted to obtain a tax windfall as a result of the lower tax burden that would accompany the 
latter corporate structure. However, the claimants, PSEG, argued that when the first 
feasibility study was submitted in 1995 the law of Turkey required that the project companies 
be formed as joint stock companies. This law was amended in 1996 and companies were 
allowed to be structured as branch offices. This change in law, the claimants argued, were to 
promote foreign investments in Turkey and the amendment in the law was the only reason for 
change of corporate structure and not to obtain any undisclosed windfall gains. The tribunal 
found merit in the arguments of the claimant and noted that – ‘Tribunal has no difficulty in 
concluding that the change from a Turkish joint-stock company to a branch office of a foreign 
company was both authorized by the law as amended and duly agreed to and approved by the 
Respondent. Indeed, there were tax advantages and such was the intent of the law, which 
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was conceived as an incentive to attract foreign investment capital.’734 The tribunal 
concluded that the respondent cannot argue that such advantages were unknown to its own 
ministries or to the Turkish government in general. 
The second time when corporate structure became relevant was in 1998. The respondent 
argued that since the claimant submitted a revised plan which increased the size of the 
project, the claimant was requested to structure the project company as a Turkish capital 
company – the corporate structure that was in use for other projects in Turkey. The claimants 
did not object to the change as long as they were compensated for the additional ‘costs’ by 
an adjustment in the tariff. The issue that the tribunal was required to address was of 
compensation and whether the parties agreed to it. The tribunal observed that as ‘it has not 
been established that the change was required by law, it is also possible to conclude that the 
requirement for such change was more a matter for preference for MENR [Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources] than a legal obligation.’735 The tribunal concluded that ‘it was 
reasonable for the Claimants to proceed to further stages of negotiations on the assumption 
that in accepting the corporate form of a limited liability company, the revised tariff would 
reflect this particular choice of form and its associated costs.’736 
The third time the issue of corporate structure became relevant was in late 1999. In early 
1999, additional tax changes were made which had the effect of offsetting the tax 
consequences that a limited liability company structure would have incurred as a result of the 
project. The claimants asserted that they became aware of the change only in October 1999 
and they were prepared to accept Turkey’s position i.e. the commercial terms approved in 
1998. The argument of the claimant was that the respondent state once again changed its 
position and demanded a new study. Turkey, on the other hand, claimed that the changes in 
the law were introduced in January 1999 and yet in October 1999 the claimant proposed a 
tariff that included compensation for the effects of the limited liability corporate structure. 
The tribunal said that ‘it can now positively conclude’ that the many successive changes in 
the law relating to corporate structure led to many disagreements and eventual collapse of 
negotiations.737 
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The tribunal stated that there was no evidence of bad faith or a conspiracy to take away 
legitimately acquired rights.738 Nonetheless, the tribunal said: 
the fair and equitable treatment standard has been breached, and that this 
breach is serious enough as to attract liability. Short of bad faith, there is in 
the present case first an evident negligence on the part of the administration 
in the handling of the negotiations with the Claimants. The fact that key points 
of disagreement went unanswered and were not disclosed in a timely manner, 
that silence was kept when there was evidence of such persisting and 
aggravating disagreement, that important communications were never looked 
at, and there was a systematic attitude not to address the need to put an end 
to negotiations that were leading nowhere, are all manifestations of serious 
administrative negligence and inconsistency.739 
After taking into account all the facts of the case, the tribunal concluded that Turkey had 
violated the FET standard and in its findings relied on three important factors: negligence in 
handling of negotiations, abuse of authority (particularly in the case of foreign branch 
corporate structure) and the continuing legislative changes.740 
The tribunal’s finding of breach of the FET standard in the absence of bad faith on the host 
state’s part is unusual, especially if compared to the deference shown by other tribunals 
towards state actions in tax-related investment disputes. But, the PSEG award can be 
distinguished from other disputes. The findings of the tribunal were related to the host state 
constantly changing its position on the legal requirements of the appropriate corporate 
structure and not with the actual application or administration of the tax law itself. 
The Yukos awards were another instance when the tax practices of the investor were 
contested by the respondent state while the claimant defended them as perfectly legal. 
Several arguments were made by the respondent state, Russia, in the Hulley Enterprises 
award to discredit the investor. Russia relied on the concept of ‘unclean hands’, ‘illegal and 
bad faith conduct’ by the claimants and also alleged that the investors ran a ‘criminal 
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enterprise.’741 These factors, it argued, pointed to the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction and the 
inadmissibility of the claims by the investor and also justified denying the investor the 
protection of substantive protections under the ECT (under which the claim was filed). The 
tribunal rejected all the arguments made by Russia. The tribunal observed that it is not 
persuaded by Russia’s claim that the claimant must approach the tribunal with ‘clean hands’. 
Russia, it observed, had neither been able to prove that the doctrine of clean hands was a 
‘general principle of law recognised by civilized nations’ nor had Russia cited any majority 
decision in which the principle was applied and operated to bar a claim.742 
In the RosInvest Co award, Russia, inter alia, relied on two concepts – bad faith doctrine and 
the proportionality principle.743 In arguing the former, Russia claimed that by incorporating 
corporations in the low tax regions of Mordovia, Yukos claimed tax benefits in bad faith; and 
under Russian tax jurisprudence, taxpayers who acted in bad faith were not entitled to the 
same protection as those who acted in good faith. The proportionality principle, it was 
argued, was closely related as to the bad faith doctrine and required that in order for a 
taxpayer to claim the benefit of the relevant low tax legislation, investments should be made 
in the territory in proportion to the amount of tax savings claimed by the taxpayer. In addition 
to this, Russia also claimed that Yukos had tried to conceal its tax practices in the low tax 
regions. The tribunal rejected all three arguments of Russia. 
With regard to the issue of transparency, the tribunal observed that it is undisputed that 
Yukos disclosed all its billions of tax savings in its financial statements in its annual reports.744 
The argument of Yukos concealing its tax practices was declared as unpersuasive given the 
fact that Yukos was one of the largest and most important companies in Russia and frequently 
discussed in the media. The proportionality principle, the tribunal held was not included in 
any provision of the law of the low tax region of Mordovia or in any investment agreement 
concluded by Yukos.745 The tribunal termed it as vague and remarked that the principle was 
never applied before to any competitor of Yukos in a comparable situation. On the bad faith 
doctrine, the tribunal made similar observations and concluded that its application to ‘Yukos 
in comparison to other competitors, was to a great extent a novel application of the law, 
rather vague in content and limits, and expansively used against Yukos in a way not shown to 
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have been used before or against other comparable tax payers.’746 The tribunal did not term 
the action of Russian authorities in violation of the FET standard but termed the application 
of the Russian tax law as discriminatory and not a bona fide treatment. 
The distinctive nature of the above mentioned arguments was the detailed discussion of the 
international tax practices of corporations – perhaps for the first time by an investor-state 
tribunal.747 The discussion about corporate nationality, at least in IIL literature, rarely 
discusses the tax aspect.748 The investor never seriously contended that the trading shell 
companies in the low tax regions had a genuine economic substance or that its investment in 
the economies of low tax regions had been significant in comparison to the tax benefits. It 
merely contended that the companies were not required to have substance under the 
relevant domestic laws. This is an extremely contentious territory in international tax 
literature.749 While some commentators would argue that an economic substance is necessary 
and the adjudicators should lift the corporate veil in such cases, others are of the opinion 
that a strict interpretation of the laws is more advisable.750 It is submitted that the latter 
opinion, while less popular, is the better approach. As long as the laws of incorporation are 
adhered to, the investor is well within its rights to channelize its investment in a manner that 
lowers it tax liability.751 If the host state requires that the holding company of the foreign 
investor should be incorporated in its territory, it should be specifically mentioned in its 
domestic tax laws, investment contracts or IIAs.752 In the Yukos awards, the job of the 
tribunals was made easy by the evident high-handedness of the Russian tax authorities. 
Various legal doctrines were conjured out of thin air and were applied to Yukos exclusively 
and retrospectively. The tribunal was, thus, able to navigate this territory relatively easily. 
However, if in a tax-related investment dispute the use of shell companies and channelizing 
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foreign investment through low tax regions occupies centre stage, the tribunal will have to 
engage with ITL more comprehensively. 
The issue of tax evasion was also briefly discussed in the Sergei Paushok award. The tribunal, 
in this case, effectively endorsed the argument of the respondent state that discriminatory 
taxation is permissible if it targets the comparatively greater tax evasion opportunities 
available in a particular industry. The issue related to Mongolia’s imposition of the windfall 
profits tax on the gold mining industry but not imposing the same on the copper industry. In 
its observations on the issue, the tribunal quoted with approval the argument of the 
respondent that the distinction between the two industries, in one part, related ‘to greater 
opportunities for tax evasion existing in the gold mining industry.’753 The difficulty with this 
argument is the often indistinguishable difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion.754 
While the latter is considered to be unlawful, the former is generally considered to be lawful 
– though it may, at times, be considered to be in violation of the spirit of the law. If one 
accepts this distinction, then a few obvious questions follow. If an investor is accused of tax 
evasion, should the host state initiate legal proceedings under its domestic tax laws or 
subject the foreign investor to additional tax liability, even though it may be discriminatory? 
Or should the state pursue both the alternatives simultaneously? Or, in a different situation – 
if a host state discovers that a foreign investor has been evading taxes over the past one 
decade, would it be possible to impose retrospective tax liability on the investor? The 
permissibility of the above mentioned alternatives for states is unclear and there are no 
certain answers whether they would constitute a violation of the FET standard. 
I would suggest that the issue of tax evasion by an investor can be addressed through various 
means. First, if an investor is accused of tax evasion during the course of investment, the 
tribunals should further develop the scope of the unclean hands doctrine. Second, curbing tax 
evasion should be understood as part of transnational public policy and investor’s obligation 
to pay tax in host state as part of general principles of law in ITL. It is not an issue that 
affects only a single state and hence it is possible to view as part of shared responsibility of 
the states. Third, preventing tax evasion should be understood as a legitimate public purpose.
755 In fact, tribunals have shown an inclination to test public purpose in tax-related 
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investment disputes.756 Thus, states can justify imposing additional taxes, subjecting foreign 
investors to additional tax assessments as means to serve the public purpose of tax 
compliance. The tribunals can of course evaluate the proportionality of the tax obligations 
imposed on the investor with the avowed public purpose of curbing tax evasion. 
IV. TAXATION AS A UNIQUE CATEGORY 
Tribunals in interpreting and applying the concept of fair and equitable treatment in tax- 
related investment disputes have not expressly endorsed taxation as a separate category. In 
addressing the arguments on fair and equitable treatment, tribunals have never expressly 
articulated that taxation is different from other measures used by the state to regulate 
investment. This is a contrast to the approach of the same tribunals when they address 
arguments related to expropriation where tribunals have repeatedly shown an inclination to 
consider it as a separate category and have endorsed a higher threshold for expropriation by 
taxation. 
There are only a few hints that in comparison to a state’s non-tax measures, tribunals are 
marginally more vary of intruding in the taxation powers of a state. For instance, in the Total 
award, the tribunal interpreted the phrase ‘investor shall be compensated for any restriction 
or duty’ as to not include the import taxes imposed by the host state. The hesitancy of the 
tribunal to interpret the term restriction or even duty to include a tax that affected the 
export capacity of the investor can be attributed to the deference accorded to the taxation 
powers of a state.757 In the Sergei Paushok award, the tribunal observed that in the absence 
of a tax stabilisation agreement between the host state and an investor, a ‘clear 
demonstration’ of breach of an international obligation is required.758 This statement was 
made in the context of a radical change in the taxation of the gold mining industry. Here 
again, the ‘clear demonstration’ demanded by the tribunal was indicative of a more strenuous 
FET standard. These examples are however not determinative and the arguments are weak 
and insufficient to show any tendency on the part of the tribunals to interpret fair and 
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equitable treatment restrictively in tax-related investment disputes. At the same time, in 
some awards, the tribunals have provided a wide leeway to the states.759 
While addressing arguments on the FET standard, the tribunals in tax-related investment 
disputes have also referred to the rationale or purpose of the state’s measure. In the 
Mamidoil award, it was observed ‘the Tribunal has no authority to replace the State’s policy 
rationale by its own.’760 The tribunal observed that the legal system of the state can be 
outdated and oriented to favour the generation of tax revenues. But, that ‘is a problem to be 
addressed in the reform of tax policy. If the State defines reasonableness of the tax law by 
the maximization of revenue, it is entitled to do so.’761 A similar margin of appreciation has 
been recognised by the tribunals in the Feldman and the Bogdanov awards. 
In the latter, the tribunal upheld the imposition of an environmental tax and recognised that 
that protection of environment is a legitimate aim, the environmental charges have an 
objective and reasonable justification and the nexus between the environment charges and 
the protection of environment was proved.762 In a similar fashion, the tribunal in Feldman 
referred to public purpose.763 The tribunal recognised that cigarette smuggling was a 
significant problem for Mexico and it was a rational public purpose of state policy to curb grey 
market exports and illegal re-exportation of the cigarettes. The tribunal further stated that 
even if there was no evidence to link the claimant with the smuggling, the state was justified 
in its actions for ‘Mexican authorities feel they have greater control’ over cigarette producers 
who export (due to licensing agreements) than over independent re-sellers.764 However, even 
by referring to the above tribunals such as Mamidoil, Feldman, Bogdanov awards, it is 
difficult to suggest that tax is a separate category in relation to the FET standard. 
This approach of the tribunals creates an inconsistent position - in the context of 
expropriation claims taxation is evolving as a separate category, but in the context of the FET 
standard, tax-related disputes are being treated like any other category of disputes. This has 
implications for jurisprudence in tax-related investment disputes. 
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To begin with, a higher threshold for expropriation is being prescribed in tax-related 
investment disputes while it is not the case for the FET standard. Thus, while in expropriation 
a large amount to deference is shown to taxation measures of a state; the same argument is 
difficult to make in the context of the FET standard. Investors in tax-related investment 
disputes could use this differentiation to frequently present their claims under the FET 
standard in order to increase their prospects of success in the arbitration. In fact, some 
tribunals have indicated that the threshold for the FET standard is lower as compared to 
expropriation. In El Paso award, the tribunal observed: 
Regulations that reduce the profitability of an investment but do not shut it 
down completely and leave the investor in control will generally not qualify as 
indirect expropriations even though they might give rise to liability of other 
standards of treatment, such as national treatment or fair and equitable 
treatment.765 
Admittedly, it is possible to suggest that expropriation per se is comparatively a more 
exacting standard as compared to the FET standard.766 In other words, certain tax measures 
that may not be considered as expropriation may violate the FET standard. My aim here is to 
suggest that in tax-related investment disputes the threshold for violation of the FET standard 
should be higher in comparison to non-tax related investment disputes; similar to the 
approach of the tribunals when addressing arguments on expropriation. 
Further, prescribing higher threshold for taxation measures in so far as expropriation is 
concerned but not for the FET standard reflects a certain conceptual confusion. As mentioned 
in Chapter 4 above, at the heart of the distinction between taxation and other state measures 
is the fact that - taxation powers, even when exercised as a manifestation of regulatory 
powers of a state involve an involuntary transfer. States, in the absence of any international 
obligation to the contrary, have a right to determine their levels of taxation in accordance 
with their goals of redistribution of wealth or other similar goals. In fact, states have argued 
that  they  have  broad  regulatory  powers  regarding  taxation  and  it  is  an  area  that  has 
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traditionally been the most exacting of investor expectations and thus subject to a high 
requirement of reasonableness with respect to an investor’s expectations.767 
However, tribunals have either found the argument to be unnecessary or marginal to the 
dispute or have simply sidestepped the issue. At best, tribunals have framed the issue in a 
manner and that allows them to avoid addressing the issue of taxation and FET standard. In 
either case, this approach of the tribunals results in placing tax-related investment disputes 
in an uncertain category. While the tribunals give the states a greater degree of leeway in 
‘expropriation by taxation’ arguments – the inability to extend it to fair and equitable 
treatment standards reflects uncertainty and contributes to lack of consistency in the 
jurisprudence on tax-related investment disputes.768 The argument that FET standards have a 
lower threshold of state liability as compared to expropriation does not explain this 
inconsistent approach either.769 
Thus, the differing approach to the expropriation and the FET standard suggests: first, that 
there is some intelligible differentia between the two standards; second, tribunals are not 
maintaining a bright line divide between the tax-related investment disputes and other 
disputes, in so far as the FET standard is concerned. The former is defensible though arguably 
could be better articulated; the latter approach suggests tribunals are on a slippery slope 
especially in comparison to their approach to expropriation. For the FET standard, the nature 
of taxation is being effectively rendered analogous to the other non-tax laws without 
adequate examination of the factors that lend uniqueness to tax-related investment disputes. 
In my view, instead of treating taxation as only a nominally different category of law, the 
tribunals need to acknowledge that the nature of taxation justifies a higher threshold for 
determining the violation of the FET standard. In arbitral awards, there needs to be a greater 
reliance on the nature of tax, existence of tax treaties and presence of tax carve outs to 
justify the uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes, 
The tribunal in the PSEG award summarised the importance of the FET standard in investor- 
state arbitration as follows: 
Because the role of fair and equitable treatment changes from case to case, it 
is sometimes not as precise as would be desirable. Yet, it clearly allows for 
justice to be done in the absence of the more traditional breaches of 
767 
Sergei Paushok award, supra note 469, at para 261. 
768 
See EnCana award, supra note 211. 
769 
See Thomas Wälde, Abba Kolo, supra note 560. 
 179
international law standards. This role has resulted in the concept of fair and 
equitable treatment acquiring a standing on its own, separate and distinct from 
that of other standards, albeit many times closely related to them, and thus 
ensuring that the protection granted to the investment is fully safeguarded.770 
The tribunal in the above cited paragraph not only underlines the importance of the FET 
standard but its ability to be in close relation to other standards and yet maintain its distinct 
identity. This aspect of the FET standard needs to be appreciated in greater detail in tax- 
related investment disputes. Tribunals need not develop the FET standard independently for 
tax-related investment disputes, but they need to adopt a differentiated approach. It is 
nobody’s case that taxation measures of a state be treated with unjustifiable deference, but 
a principled approach towards tax-related investment disputes, especially in arguments 
relating to the FET standard is absent. This needs correction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The applicability of the FET standard to tax-related investment disputes has few limits. One 
of the issues that I refer to is the tribunal’s limited engagement with ITL in tax-related 
investment disputes. Admittedly, some of the arguments and issues in these disputes need to 
be analysed within the framework of IIL itself. However, on numerous occasions, the tribunals 
have not recognised the wide scope of some of the arguments made by either the claimant or 
the respondent state. Tribunals need to look beyond IIL and take due account of general 
principles of ITL. Applying these general principles could change how tribunals approach tax 
evasion by the investor. 
Another issue is the categorisation of tax-related investment disputes.771 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, tribunals such as in the EnCana award, have recognised that for the expropriation 
standard tax constitutes a unique category;772 but when it comes to the FET standard the 
tribunals have not unambiguously endorsed that tax-related investment disputes constitute a 
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separate category. The resulting uncertainty makes it easier for investors to challenge state 
taxation measures under the FET, and increase the chances of regulatory chill.773 
Tribunals are more likely to find that the host state has breached the FET standard rather 
than the expropriation standard. The fact of physical dispossession of an investor is not as 
important for the FET standard as it is for expropriation.774 One could explain this difference 
in two ways: first, a difference in the nature of both the substantive obligations – 
expropriation and the FET standard; second, no express endorsement of tax as a separate 
category for the FET standard. Both, in my view, are equally valid factors. While the former, 
in my view, is defensible. The latter, on the other hand, reflects a conceptual confusion. The 
selective recognition of the uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes results in placing 
these disputes in an uncertain category. An express endorsement of tax in so far as the FET 
standard could result in correcting this inconsistent approach of the tribunals. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NON-DISCRIMINATION STANDARD IN TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax carve outs usually exclude the applicability of the non-discrimination standard to a state’s 
taxation measures. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, the wording of tax carve outs differs in 
various IIAs and their scope consequently varies.775 The Non-discrimination standard is 
applicable to states’ taxation measures in only a limited number of IIAs and only a few 
investment tribunals have applied the non-discrimination standard in tax-related investment 
disputes. Nonetheless, I explore the arguments raised by the parties and the nature of state 
actions questioned.776 It will provide insight into the emerging jurisprudence on tax-related 
investment disputes insofar as the non-discrimination standard is concerned. 
Non-discrimination standard can be considered by tribunals as a standalone obligation even 
though non-discrimination is now understood to be one of the elements of the FET standard.
777 Additionally, some IIAs have a separate provision that requires states not to implement 
arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory measures.778 The overlap of non- discrimination with 
the FET standard can create jurisdictional issues in tax-related investment disputes.779 
If, due to the tax carve out, the obligation of non-discrimination is not applicable to a state’s 
taxation measures – can tribunals address non-discrimination as part of the FET standard? As I 
discuss in Section II below, there is no clear answer to this question. But, I do suggest that 
tribunals can address non-discrimination claims as part of the FET standard if they clearly 
articulate the scope of their jurisdiction. 
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Additionally, non-discrimination is also found in almost all tax treaties.780 It is applicable to 
the few specific situations mentioned in the treaty itself. I examine if the concept of non- 
discrimination as developed under ITL can usefully inform the interpretation of non- 
discrimination when applied to tax-related investment disputes. 
To examine the aforementioned issues, this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section II, I 
examine the issue of jurisdictional ambiguity when tribunals address the non-discrimination 
obligation. Due to tax carve outs and exceptions contained in IIAs, tribunals may lack 
jurisdiction to entertain non-discrimination claims. Thereafter, I discuss the inconsistent 
approach of tribunals in identifying ‘like circumstances’ or ‘like situations.’ I conclude the 
Section by examining the meaning of discriminatory taxation as understood by tribunals and 
the relevance of a state’s policy objectives in determining discriminatory treatment. Section 
III looks at the evolving relationship between environment and taxes with a specific focus on 
environmental taxes. I rely on the Bogdanov award to discuss the criteria employed to 
distinguish environmental taxes from non-tax related environmental measures and the 
implications of the distinction. Section IV highlights the disciplinary bias in tax-related 
investment disputes. I argue that in interpreting the non-discrimination obligation, tribunals 
rely unduly on the jurisprudence in international trade law while completely ignoring the 
meaning of non-discrimination as developed and understood in ITL. Section V concludes. 
II. APPLYING THE NON-DISCRIMINATION STANDARD TO TAX-RELATED INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
This Section discusses the application of the non-discrimination standard in tax-related 
investment disputes by examining the observations of arbitral tribunals in the relevant 
awards. The aim is to understand how tribunals understand the concept and apply it. Claims 
on non-discrimination usually involve a three-step analysis: first, determining if investors are 
in like circumstances; second, whether the treatment accorded to foreign investor is less 
favourable to other investors and third and finally, whether the host state intended to 
discriminate.781 I (largely) rely on this three-step analysis to elaborate on non-discrimination 
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See, for instance, Art 23 UK-Sweden tax treaty (1983). One of the aspects of non-discrimination in 
ITL usually involves determining if similarly situated investors have been discriminated by tax 
authorities. See Section IV  below for details. 
781 
See Rudolf Dolzer, Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 200; see also the Archer Daniels award, supra note 566, at 187 (where the tribunal 
considered if the host state’s tax intended to discriminate between the Mexican sugar producers and 
the US-based HFCS producers). 
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standard as applied in tax-related investment disputes. To begin with, I examine the 
sometimes ambiguous jurisdiction over non-discrimination claims in a tax-related investment 
dispute. 
A. The Non-Discrimination Standard and Jurisdiction 
In Chapter 3, I discussed that the question of jurisdiction in tax-related investment disputes 
has special relevance due to tax carve outs and tax veto. In so far as the non-discrimination 
standard is concerned, the question of jurisdiction can arise in three ways: first, if due to tax 
carve outs both the non-discrimination standard and the FET standard are not applicable to a 
state’s taxation measures, the tribunal lacks jurisdiction as a rule.782 
Second, where the non-discrimination standard is not applicable to taxation measures, but 
the FET standard is applicable – can the tribunal address non-discrimination as part of the FET 
standard?783 In the Toto award, the claimant signed a contract to execute a highway project in 
Lebanon. After completing the project, Toto filed claims for costs due to change in custom 
duties, faulty design information and change in regulatory framework.784 Eventually, it filed a 
claim before an investor-state tribunal alleging breach of contract and violation of state 
obligations under the relevant IIA. One of the claims was that the state violated the FET 
standard. The tribunal observed that the IIA required Lebanon to treat Toto’s investment not 
less favourably than investments of its own nationals or of investors of third countries. 
The interesting part of the award, for the purpose of our discussion was that the tribunal 
discussed the national treatment standard as part of the FET standard without considering its 
jurisdiction to address claims relating to custom duties.785 This can be problematic from a 
jurisdictional standpoint. In the Toto award, the question of change in custom duties was not 
central to the dispute and the jurisdictional question did not acquire prominence. But, it may 
arise in future disputes.786 In my view, if tribunal has jurisdiction to address the FET standard, 
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See, for example, Nigeria-Singapore BIT (2016); also see Table 2 above. 
783 
However, non-discrimination in itself is not always sufficient to establish a breach of the FET 
standard. See, for example, RosInvest award, supra note 299, at paras553-557 (where the tribunal 
observed that the treatment by the host state to the claimant was quite different from the treatment 
accorded to its competitors and other comparable taxpayers and no convincing reasons were shown for 
this differentiation. The tribunal, however, added that if it is doubtful it is sufficient to find a breach of 
the FET standard). 
784 
Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A v Republic of Lebanon ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12 (Award, 7 June 2012). 
785 
Ibid, at paras 151-167; This issue was never argued before the tribunal either. See Toto Costruzioni 
Generali 
S.p.A v Republic of Lebanon ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12(Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009). 
786 
Also see Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd, et al v United States of America (UNCITRAL, 
Award, 12 January 2011) paras 123-124; 158-172(where the tribunal addressed the argument on non-
discrimination by bifurcating 
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it can address arguments on non-discrimination; but tribunals need to articulate their 
jurisdiction more carefully. 
Third, the jurisdiction issue becomes more complex when one considers tax carve outs and 
general exceptions in IIAs together. For instance, in CETA, the non-discrimination standard is 
not applicable to taxation measures.787 At the same time, a state is allowed to pursue its 
public welfare objective of protecting the environment – as long as the measures to protect 
the environment are non-discriminatory.788 One of the implications of both these provisions is 
that an investor can challenge an environmental tax as non-discriminatory and initiate 
arbitral proceedings.789 In my view, the tribunal in such a case will have jurisdiction to 
entertain the non-discrimination claim. Thus, while a cursory reading of several IIAs such as 
the CETA may suggest that non-discrimination standard is inapplicable to tax measures; a 
careful reading suggests that the exclusion of tax measures may not be across the board and 
for all cases. 
B. The Elusive Meaning of Discriminatory Taxation 
This sub-section is further divided into three sections to understand the scope and meaning of 
non-discrimination standard as applied in tax-related investment disputes. 
1. Inconsistency in Identifying ‘Like Circumstances’ for Discriminatory Taxation 
The issue of national treatment and non-discrimination occupied central place in the United 
Parcel Service award.790 United Parcel Service (UPS) alleged that Canada had conferred 
numerous advantages to Canada Post such as: exempting Canada Post from penalties and 
fines for late or non-payment of duties or taxes, failing to collect duties and taxes on large 
volumes of packets imported by Canada Post, exempting Canada Post from the goods and 
services tax on a certain handling fee that it charged among others. These exemptions and 
advantages were not provided to UPS and it filed a claim alleging that Canada by extending 
the above mentioned benefits to Canada Post had violated its national treatment obligation 
under the Article 1102 of the NAFTA. The tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument by 
 
the tax-related arguments and the non-tax related arguments. It only made observations on the latter 
since it did not have jurisdiction over the former). 
787 
See Art 28.7(1) and Art 28.7(4), CETA, supra note 301. 
788 
Supra note 297; Methanex award, supra note 390 at para 7 (the tribunal observed that a non-
discriminatory regulation which is enacted in accordance with due process and affects a foreign 
investor or investment is not deemed to be expropriation or compensable). 
789 
For a detailed discussion on environment tax see Section III below. 
790 
United Parcel Services of America, Inc v Government of Canada (Award on Merits, 11 June 2007). 
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holding that inherent differences between postal services and courier services meant that 
both were not ‘in like circumstances.’791 The tribunal made several distinctions between UPS 
(a courier service) and Canada Post (a postal service). The differences were their differing 
objectives, transport and delivery systems, and the fact that courier services generally had 
contractual relationship with its clients while postal services did not. In effect, the tribunal 
held that the different characteristics of the claimant and Canada Post meant that they were 
not in like circumstances and thus Canada had not violated its national treatment obligation 
and there was no discrimination between UPS and Canada Post. 
The above-mentioned comparison was selective in its comparison of UPS and Canada Post.792 
This is an important observation especially if one considers that even though Canada Post was 
a postal service, the tribunal failed to address the specific point that it was exempt from 
paying duties for its courier services, while UPS had to pay the same duty when offering its 
courier services.793 At the same time, the tribunal framed the term ‘like circumstances’ in 
very precise and narrow terms: 
It is not sufficient for a complaining investor to show that the investor or 
investment is in the same economic sector as, or competes with, an investor or 
investment of the NAFTA Party charged with violating its national treatment 
obligation. Sharing the same economic sector may be evidence that two 
businesses are in like circumstances. So, too, being in competition, even if 
businesses might be classified in different economic sectors, may be evidence 
of like circumstances. Yet, neither showing is conclusive of like circumstances.
794 
Thus, despite a narrow definition of like circumstances, the tribunal overlooked an important 
aspect as mentioned above. 
A  narrow  definition  of  like  circumstances  was  also  adopted  by  the  NAFTA  tribunal  in 
Feldman.795  In  Feldman,  the  tribunal  distinguished  between  resellers  and  exporters  of 
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Ibid, at para 102. 
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Andrew D. Mitchell, et al., Non-Discrimination and the Role of Regulatory Purpose in International 
Trade and Investment Law (Elgar International 2016) 86 (highlights the need to define investment by 
particular business of the entity rather than the entire business). 
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See generally Nykomb award, supra note 529, at para 99. 
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Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, 24 November 2007, at para 16. 
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See S.D. Myers, Inc v Government of Canada (UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000) (where 
the tribunal observed that the phrase ‘in like circumstances’ should be interpreted keeping in mind the 
‘overall legal context’. The tribunal elaborated that the phrase ‘in like circumstances’ usually refers to 
investments in the same sector of 
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cigarettes. The tribunal held that all the foreign-owned and domestic firms that were in the 
business of reselling/exporting cigarettes were in like circumstances. But, it added that 
producers of cigarettes who are also exporters are excluded from the comparison and cannot 
be said to be in like circumstances. The tribunal said that there was a rational decision for 
treating producers and resellers differently – protecting intellectual property rights, 
prohibiting gray market sales and for better control over tax revenues. The latter reason was 
an important factor in the decision of the tribunal.796 A comparison of the approaches of the 
tribunal in the United Parcel Service award and the Feldman award shows that both the 
tribunals defined like circumstances narrowly. 
On the other hand, the tribunal in the Occidental award adopted a very broad definition of 
like circumstances. Occidental claimed that denying it VAT refunds was a breach of national 
treatment because other companies such as exporters of flowers, seafood were still entitled 
to VAT refunds. The tribunal, in a questionable analysis, observed that the purpose of national 
treatment is to protect investors as compared to local producers. This objective, the tribunal 
observed, cannot be achieved by addressing ‘exclusively the sector in which that particular 
activity is undertaken.’797 The tribunal further added that no exporter should be put at a 
disadvantage as compared to other exporters.798 The tribunal interpreted the term like 
situation very broadly by comparing different and unrelated sectors. The tribunal, it appears 
seems ‘to have conflated national treatment with any kind of disadvantageous distinction, 
unrelated to nationality-based discrimination.’799 
In the El Paso award as well, the comparison was between two different sectors – the banking 
sector and the oil and gas sector. The claimant belonging to the latter claimed that the 
banking sector was mainly Argentine owned and the oil and gas sector mainly foreign owned. 
The claimant alleged that both the sectors were not treated similarly since the withholding 
tax was imposed only on the oil and gas companies. Thus, there was a de facto discrimination 
 
the economy); Also see Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9 (Award, 27 October 2006)(the dispute revolved around payments made 
by respondent to certain companies. The tribunal held that all the companies in cotton trading were 
not in like situations. The state owed money to companies incorporated before 1994 due to government 
control of cotton prices. The policy changed after 1994 and thus companies incorporated after 1994 
were not in like situation with companies incorporated before 1994). 
796 
Feldman award, supra note 562, at paras 170-172. 
797  
Occidental award, supra note 211, at para 173. 
798  
Occidental award, supra note 211, at para 175. 
799 
Andrew Newcombe, Lluis Paradell, supra note 771, at 169. 
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by the respondent state which violated the national treatment obligation under the BIT. The 
tribunal observed that: 
It was thus reasonable for the Government to institute a tax on the unexpected 
profits made by the oil and gas companies to re-balance the situation of the 
banking sector. Far from being discriminatory, this measure aimed at equalising 
the playground of the different economic actors, by distributing more equitably 
the burden of the country’s economic crisis among all those affected.800 
The tribunal further added that the imposition of the taxes only on one sector was 
reasonable, not discriminatory and was made with the intent to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of each sector with the general economic situation. It was one of the rare 
instances where the comparison across different sectors of the economy was necessary to 
explain the lawfulness of the measures adopted by the state – in this case, the imposition of 
withholding and windfall taxes by the state. 
The allegation of discriminatory treatment was made in the Jan Oostergetel award as well.801 
The claimant, in this case, alleged that the bankruptcy proceedings against it were a pretext 
to acquire its assets by the ‘financial mafia’ through illegitimate court proceedings. Further, 
the claimant alleged that tax authorities forcibly collected tax arrears from it in violation of 
the assurances that there was no deadline to pay the tax arrears. The claimant alleged that 
actions of the court and tax authorities were in violation of the FET standard and constituted 
expropriation. 
In the Jan Oostergetel award, the tribunal identified a state’s obligation to not adopt 
arbitrary or discriminatory measures as part of the FET standard. However, in this case, the 
text of the IIA in question supported this stance.802 The tribunal concluded that it ‘finds no 
evidence of a discriminatory application of tax penalties, not to mention that the Claimants 
assertions about discrimination are unpersuasive in light of long-standing ministerial policy of 
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El Paso award, supra note 440, at para 314. 
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Article 3.1 of the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT (1991) provides that: ‘Each Contracting Party shall ensure 
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Republic of Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005 ) (in both the 
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tolerance for tax arrears.’803 Further, the tribunal stated that the tax authorities of the 
respondent had requested bankruptcy against of numerous companies before requesting that 
bankruptcy proceedings be initiated against the claimant. There was no analysis if the other 
companies were in like circumstances, but just a broad-brush comparison of the claimant with 
other companies. The tribunal concluded that the claimant was unable to disprove that it was 
the sole target of the tax authority and thus it was unable to establish discriminatory 
treatment by the respondent.804 
The tribunal concluded that the respondent state by collecting tax arrears did not violate the 
claimant’s legitimate expectations.805 In the award, there is considerable overlapping 
between the non-discrimination analysis and the arguments related to FET/legitimate 
expectations. This is partially attributable to the wide scope of the provision which the 
tribunal was required to interpret. At the same time, it is possible to argue that the tribunal 
did not adequately separate and distinguish the two obligations of non-discrimination and 
legitimate expectations of the investor. While the tribunal was correct in its conclusions, a 
more careful delimitation would have been beneficial to understand the application of the 
non-discrimination obligation in tax-related investment disputes. 
2. No Precise Definition of Discriminatory Taxation 
The question of discriminatory taxation was also raised in the Cargill award.806 In this dispute, 
Mexico’s Impuesto Especial Sobre Producci6n y Servicios (IEPS) tax imposed a 20% tax on soft 
drinks that contained sweeteners other than cane sugar. The purpose of this tax, the investor 
alleged, was to restrict access of HFCS producers (US corporations) to the Mexican market. 
The tax was imposed in the backdrop of Mexico’s attempt to resolve the issue of restricted 
access to Mexican sugar in the US market. The tax applied to all products that contained 
sweeteners other than cane sugar, which meant that the presence of any HFCS in a beverage 
was sufficient to trigger the tax. The contention of the claimant was that the tax was 
discriminatory in effect because, while HFCS was produced and distributed entirely by US- 
owned companies, cane sugar was produced by Mexican-owned companies. The claimant 
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The argument of discriminatory treatment was raised in the context of denial of national treatment, 
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award. Also see Matthew Davie, ‘Taxation-Based Investment Treaty Claims’ (2015) J Int’l Dispute 
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argued that because of the tax, the use of HFCS became prohibitively expensive for Mexican 
beverage producers and there was a substantial drop in HFCS sales in Mexico and Mexican 
bottling plants cancelled HFCS orders. In addition to the imposition of tax, Mexico established 
new import requirements – the importers who did not have a permit to import HFCS were 
subjected to much greater tariff rates as compared to the permit holders. Claimants were 
denied the permits each time they applied and were not informed of the reasons of refusal or 
the qualifications needed to obtain a permit. 
The claimants argued that through the above described measures, Mexico violated its 
obligation to provide national treatment under Article 1102 of the NAFTA. The respondent 
relied on three reasons to argue that the claimant was not in like circumstances with 
domestic sugar producers. The tribunal rejected all three arguments. The tribunal noted that 
the first two arguments of the respondent – that the claimant was engaged in distribution of a 
variety of products and that the sugar industry is more regulated as compared to the HFCS 
market - are irrelevant to determine if claimant as supplier of HFCS is in ‘like circumstances’ 
with domestic suppliers of cane sugar. 
The respondent’s third argument was that the sugar industry is in dire economic straits and 
not in like circumstances with an economically healthy industry of the HFCS even though the 
products are substitutable. The respondent was trying to distinguish the two industries to 
underline the point that both industries were not in ‘like circumstances.’ The tribunal 
observed that the issue is if the difference in the economic circumstances is relevant to the 
measure taken i.e. imposition of a tax. If the measure was taken to benefit the sugar 
industry, then the cane sugar and HFCS industry would not have been in ‘like circumstances’, 
but: 
It is not a case of a measure providing an advantage to an industry in dire 
economic circumstances that is not available to a more economically healthy 
industry. It is a measure taken to disadvantage an industry that was in healthy 
economic circumstances, and which had the effect of driving the industry out 
of the market.807 
In view of the above observations, the tribunal found that suppliers of cane sugar were in like 
circumstances with suppliers of HFCS.808 The tribunal also concluded that there is no doubt 
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Cargill Inc award, supra note 566, at para 208. 
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that the claimant received less favourable treatment - in intent and effect – due it’s to 
nationality and that there was a violation of the national treatment obligation under the 
NAFTA.809 
In the PSEG award, the tribunal dismissed the claimant’s argument of being discriminated 
against due to respondent’s repeated changes in its laws. The tribunal summarily observed 
that the claimant had not been singled out in a discriminatory manner. The tribunal 
concluded: ‘The changes in macroeconomic policy that would have occurred concerned the 
economy as a whole. The question of foreign investment being particularly intense in the 
energy sector is a separate matter unrelated to the claim on discrimination. This heading of 
liability is accordingly dismissed.’810 
While both the PSEG and the Cargill awards contain a detailed and well-reasoned analysis, 
they are not helpful in determining the meaning of discriminatory taxation. While 
discriminatory taxation did not form the core of arguments in the PSEG award, the tribunal in 
Cargill award focused more on the effects of the tax than in examining the term 
‘discriminatory tax’ per se. The exact elements of discriminatory taxation remain uncertain. 
To begin with, a more consistent approach to like circumstances could be a starting point. 
Also, tribunals could also adopt an approach whereby the terms discriminatory and arbitrary 
taxation are defined more clearly and preferably as distinct concepts. The tribunal in the 
Valores award provided the most puzzling analysis of the term ‘arbitrary or discriminatory’. 
The tribunal in Valores framed a specific question – Were the tax levies on Yukos beginning in 
December 2003 arbitrary or discriminatory?811 This question was then further sub-divided into 
five distinct categories and the tribunal’s analysis continued over several pages.812 In this 
section of the award, the tribunal did not answer the question. At various places in the 
award, the tribunal emphasised that it was only seeking answer to one question – whether the 
cumulative effect of all the acts of the state constituted a breach of the BIT?813 In its focus on 
answering one question, the tribunal missed various opportunities to find if the abusive tax 
809 
Also see Corn Products award, supra note 566, at paras 109-143 (containing a similar analysis of non- 
discrimination in respect of the same facts); Also see Archer Daniels award, supra note 566, at paras 
183-213 (where the tribunal held that the intent and effect of the tax measures revealed its 
discriminatory nature. The intent was to protect the domestic sugar industry of Mexico and its effect 
was the US producers of HFCS received less favorable treatment than accorded to Mexican sugar 
producers. For these reasons the tax imposed by Mexico violated the national treatment obligation). 
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PSEG award, supra note 684, at para 262. 
811 
Valores award, supra note 299, at para 46. 
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Ibid, at paras 46-86. 
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administrative practices of Russia violated the FET standard and more specifically the 
obligation of non-discriminatory treatment imposed by the relevant IIA. The tribunal’s 
inability to address the issue of non-discrimination is more confounding because it specifically 
framed a question on arbitrary and discriminatory treatment but left it unanswered. 
In Mamidoil, an award under the ECT, the claimant argued that state measures to levy import 
tax was unreasonable and discriminatory.814 The claimant argued that levying import taxes on 
the petroleum products based on fictitious amounts in the bill of lading rather than the actual 
amount caused it substantial loss. The tribunal, however, did not accept the claimant’s 
argument that the imposition of import taxes by the state was discriminatory.815 It observed 
that the taxation policy of the state applied to all the importers equally and merely because 
some importers were trying to circumvent it did not render the taxes discriminatory in 
nature. The tribunal essentially directed the claimant to seek a remedy before domestic 
authorities and courts and refused to intervene in the tax policy of the state.816 The tribunal 
endorsed the host state’s argument that it had sovereign power to decide on taxation and was 
not bound by international practice.817 Here again, the award is unhelpful in ascertaining the 
meaning and content of the term discriminatory taxation. 
3. Relevance of Legitimate Purpose in Discriminatory Taxation 
Certain authors have suggested that the issue of whether the investors or investment are like 
or unlike with respect to a particular regulatory treatment can be determined by ascertaining 
the purpose of the regulatory measure in question.818 Others have also argued that the 
regulatory purpose has been inadequately considered in non-discrimination analysis though it 
is indirectly relevant.819 Further, it has been suggested that a state should in general be able 
to escape liability under non-discrimination provision by establishing that the challenged 
measure does not have a significant regulatory purpose of protectionism and that the measure 
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is necessary to achieve and rationally connected to a legitimate objective.820 That said, the 
tribunal in Tza Yap Shum cautioned that the deference is ‘not unlimited’ and that even if 
measure is adopted with a legitimate objective it might still be implemented in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner and make the state liable.821 
The tribunal in the Micula award had to determine if Romania’s withdrawal of tax incentives 
were arbitrary and unreasonable.822 The claim arose from withdrawal and amendment of 
certain tax incentives that Romania had extended in order to encourage investment in certain 
‘disfavoured’ regions. One of claimant’s arguments was that the respondent by withdrawing 
the tax incentives acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. I will summarise the 
conclusions of the tribunal relevant for the purpose of our discussion in this chapter. 
The tribunal observed that Romania was pursuing a rational policy objective – accession to the 
EU and the withdrawal of tax incentives was tailored to meet this objective.823 Thus, ‘there 
was an appropriate correlation between that objective and the measure adopted to achieve 
it.’824 Second, the tribunal did not accept claimant’s argument that Romania could have 
negotiated a transition period for the incentives. The tribunal observed that under the 
circumstances of the accession negotiations, Romania did not, by and large, act unreasonably.
825 
The tribunal held that Romania acted unreasonably only with respect to one aspect. The 
unreasonableness related to Romania’s continuation of its decision that required investors to 
maintain investments for 20 years in return for receiving tax incentives for 10 years. The 
investor’s obligations were to be enforced despite removal of all tax incentives. In tribunal’s 
opinion, Romania should have reduced the investor’s obligations after the removal of tax 
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incentives and its failure to do so was an unreasonable action. Thus, in essence it can be said 
Romania was partially unreasonable in pursuing a legitimate policy objective.826 
In the Feldman award, the tribunal acknowledged the legitimacy of the state’s objective - 
curbing the gray market for cigarettes, but the tribunal found that there was discrimination 
and violation of the national treatment obligation. The tribunal observed that it is not 
necessary to prove that discrimination was necessarily as a result of nationality; but in the 
present case there was “evidence of a nexus between the discrimination and the claimant’s 
status as a foreign investor.”827 The dissenting opinion claimed that the claimant was unable 
to prove discrimination and ‘that the treatment received by both investors has essentially 
been the same.’828 The persuasive value of the dissent notwithstanding, Feldman award does 
demonstrate that the even legitimate objectives can be pursued in a discriminatory manner 
and the tribunals can hold states liable for the same.829 
In Sergei Paushok, the investor argued that Mongolia’s windfall profit tax applied only to the 
gold mining industry.830 It was argued that the tax should have applied to all the sectors.831 
The tribunal observed that the fiscal legislations of states treat various industries differently 
by providing tax breaks or direct subsidies.832 There is nothing in international law or in the 
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IIA which restrained Mongolia from imposing a tax regime on gold mining which was different 
from other industries. The tribunal thus ruled that there was no illegal discrimination under 
the IIA.833 Also, since the rise in gold prices was the reason for Mongolia’s windfall tax – there 
was a defensible justification for imposing the tax only on the gold mining industry and not on 
other industries. 
The observations of the tribunal in Sergei Paushok are similar to the holding in Pope & Talbot.
834 In the latter dispute, the tribunal determined whether domestic and foreign investors were 
in an economically competitive relationship and then examined the rationale of the measure 
itself. The tribunal observed that the investors are not in like circumstances where a measure 
treats a foreign investor less favourably but is related to a legitimate or a rational regulatory 
objective.835 Thus, the observations of the tribunal in Sergei Paushok that the imposition of 
windfall profit tax to address the rise in gold prices is defensible, since the objective of the 
tax was to recover extraordinary profits earned by the investor. Although the observations in 
Pope & Talbot were made in the context of a non-tax measure, they suggest that regulatory 
purpose is relevant for a non-discrimination analysis by an arbitral tribunal. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
Disputes relating to discriminatory taxation are relatively novel in investor-state arbitration. 
No overarching trend that has emerged in the various arbitral awards that have addressed the 
issue of discriminatory taxation. Nonetheless, four aspects about the non-discrimination 
jurisprudence in tax-related investment disputes are problematic. 
The first aspect concerns jurisdiction. Many IIAs carve out national treatment and this 
standard is not applicable to the state’s taxation measures. Thus, if a tribunal is addressing a 
national treatment claim, this raises the issue of whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to 
 
detriment of others, there is no discrimination); Also see Total award, supra note 18, at para 434 
(where the claimant challenged the imposition of export taxes as discriminatory. The tribunal observed 
that the taxes were part of general fiscal legislation that were generally applicable and thus there was 
no discrimination against the investor). 
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Ibid, at para 310. 
834 
See Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada (UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 
April 2001) (the tribunal observed that differential treatment would violate national treatment 
obligation unless there was a reasonable nexus with a rational policy. In this case, the measures 
undertaken by Canada – to allocate quotas in exporting softwood lumber - were to remove the threat 
of trade sanctions by the United States. Since the measures affected the claimant in the same manner 
as it affected Canadian companies, the measures were held to be legitimate, non-discriminatory, and 
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Also see GAMI Investments, Inc. v United Mexican States (UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 November 2004). 
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entertain the claim in the first place. The El Paso award served as an illustration in Chapter 
3.
836 
Secondly, again from a jurisprudential viewpoint –tribunals do not always precisely identify if 
they are addressing non-discrimination claims under the FET standard or under the national 
treatment obligation. For example, I highlighted the approach of the tribunal in the Toto 
award where the national treatment obligation was discussed under the heading of the FET 
standard. It is important that tribunals draw the distinction between these two separate to 
clearly establish their jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, despite the observations of many tribunals, much remains in flux as to the elements 
necessary for a tax measure to amount to discriminatory taxation. Tribunals and the literature 
have recognised nationality-based discrimination as illicit, but as mentioned above tribunals 
have identified like circumstances inconsistently; and also while all tribunals have recognised 
the legitimacy of policy goals as a relevant factor, the exact role of state’s goals in the 
analysis is unclear. 
Also, neither is the tribunals’ understanding of arbitrary and discriminatory taxation clear. For 
instance, in the Valores award, the tribunal addressed the argument of arbitrary taxation 
along with discriminatory taxation. Similarly, the tribunal in the Toto award defined the two 
terms by considering them as synonymous with each other.837 Other tribunals such as in the 
Link Trading award, by contrast, discussed the issue of abusive taxation separately.838 While 
the overlap may also be a function of the way certain provisions of the treaties are drafted, 
at the conceptual level there is little clarity about how tribunals understand abusive, 
discriminatory taxation. Is abusive taxation different from discriminatory taxation? If yes, 
how? Do they overlap? If yes, how and under which circumstances? 
To answer these questions, the Burlington award provides guidance. I discussed in Chapter 4, 
the Burlington tribunal observed that for a tax to be expropriatory, it needs to be confiscatory 
and discriminatory. The tribunal treated both the concepts as distinct, and 
 
836 
See Chapter 3 above where I point out that in El Paso award, tribunal analyzes the argument of 
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The tribunal defined an unreasonable or discriminatory measure as (i) a measure that inflicts 
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838 
See Link Trading award, supra note 422. 
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further elaborated that the discriminatory character of tax should be treated as secondary. 
However, a neat distinction between arbitrary and discriminatory measures may not always be 
possible. For example, in the Yukos awards, the claimant’s investment was targeted for an 
arbitrary reason (from a legal perspective) and was subjected to harsh treatment as 
compared to any other investment.839 In such a scenario, the state’s measures can be both 
arbitrary and discriminatory. Nonetheless, despite the possibility of overlap in some 
situations, there is scope for tribunals to better articulate their understanding of arbitrary 
and discriminatory taxation. 
In my view, an abusive tax will ordinarily target a single investor or investment. In order to 
arrive at a finding of expropriation, a comparison with other investors may not always be 
necessary. On the other hand, in order to determine if tax is discriminatory, some comparison 
with other investors is necessary. Without comparing the claimant with any other investor, the 
question of whether the tax is discriminatory in character and whether the investor has been 
subjected to a harsher tax liability cannot be answered. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
In this Section, I focus on one particular aspect of environment regulation – environment 
taxes. With the help of the Bogdanov award, I examine the issue of environment taxes, and 
how the tribunal handled the claimant’s allegations of discrimination. I also examine the 
implications of identifying an environment tax as a tax measure and not as an environmental 
measure, and the criteria to draw such distinction. 
There is a certain tension between foreign investment protection and regulatory space of a 
host state in so far as it concerns environmental regulation.840 The goals of environment 
protection and foreign investment protection do not always complement each other.841 A few 
states, in order to attract foreign investment, are willing to lower their environmental 
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See, for example, Methanex award, supra note 390 (where the decision of California State of US to 
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health); S.D. Myers award, supra note 795. 
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standards which may include prescribing lower penalties for pollution.842 The desire to attract 
investment at times leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental regulation. Thus, 
commentators have suggested that certain minimum environmental standards should apply to 
all states especially those extending tax incentives for attracting foreign investment.843 In this 
way, it is claimed, the tax and environmental policies of the states can be mutually 
reinforcing.844 At the same time, there are a few states that take measures to safeguard the 
environment and encourage sustainable activities. One such measure is an environmental tax 
which was central to the Bogdanov award. 
In the Bogdanov award, claimants owned and controlled two companies in Moldova. One of 
the companies was incorporated in the free economic zone and the other outside the zone. 
The two companies entered into an agreement whereby the company in the free economic 
zone could import raw materials, send it to the other company for processing (production of 
paints and varnishes), receive the finished goods in the free economic zone and sell it in 
Moldova and abroad. The structure allowed the company in the free economic zone to not pay 
any custom duties or VAT (except administrative charges) at any stage of the operations. 
Thereafter, Moldova introduced environmental charges which were paid by both companies – 
the charge was calculated as a percentage cost of the raw materials. However, later the 
environmental charge was amended to be applied on percentage cost of finished goods i.e. 
paints and varnishes. Thus, it increased the cost significantly since the cost of finished goods 
was much higher. The claimant contended that the charge was a concealed custom duty or 
VAT and in violation of the stabilisation clause and the FET standard. 
The tribunal first referred to the stabilisation clause and observed that environmental charges 
are not custom duties or VAT and hence are not within the scope of stabilisation clause and 
thus there is no violation of legitimate expectations.845 Further, the tribunal observed that 
there was no discrimination against the claimant. For the purposes of its analysis, the tribunal 
compared the claimant with other entities in the economic zone which imported raw 
materials and produced finished goods. The tribunal concluded that they were all treated 
equally. The tribunal further stated that the reason for imposition of charges can be diverse 
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See, for example, Shyam Divan, Armin Rosencranz, Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases, 
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Bogdanov award, supra note 463, at para 205. 
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and the claimant’s assertion that the charge was discriminatorily and disproportionately 
applied to them is incorrect and thus correctly rejected the claimant’s arguments.846 
However, the respondent state only gave one reason for the imposition of the charge – the 
protection of environment. The tribunal’s reference to ‘diverse’ reasons was, in the context 
of the award, incorrect. 
One aspect that was central to the Bogdanov award was the question whether an 
environmental tax should be understood as a tax or as a state regulatory measure. This 
distinction is important, because as shown above in Chapter 4, in so far as expropriation is 
concerned, tax-related investment disputes form a separate category. Chapter 4 specifically 
argues that the threshold of expropriation by taxation is higher in comparison to other state 
regulatory measures. Thus, the regulatory space available to a state to impose an 
environment tax is likely to be greater as compared to a non-tax related environmental 
measure. This leads to a few questions. What are the criteria to distinguish an environmental 
tax from other taxes? Are tax incentives that are meant to encourage environment friendly 
businesses/business practices, tax measures or environmental measures? What are the 
implications that follow from these distinctions? 
To begin with, the tribunal may need to determine if an environmental tax is not a concealed 
duty or an indirect way of increasing the tax liability of the investor. For instance, in the 
Bogdanov award, the argument of the claimant was that the environmental tax was an 
indirect way to impose a custom duty or VAT. The tribunal rejected this argument by looking 
at the purpose of the tax – the protection of environment. As long as the primary purpose of 
the tax is the protection of environment, it should qualify as an environmental tax. At the 
same time, an environmental tax may have incidental effects such as regulating trade and 
commerce. But, if the state is able to show that the dominant intent was to safeguard the 
environment and that the regulation of trade was not the dominating reason, then the 
measure should qualify as an environmental tax.847 
Apart from levying taxes, states can also provide tax incentives for encouraging adoption of 
environment friendly business practices. For instance, by reducing or suspending taxation of 
solar energy producers.848 Here, the question may arise if the tax incentive is an 
environmental measure or a tax measure? It is difficult to say if tax incentives for 
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Ibid, at paras 242-246. 
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See Charanne B.V.award, supra note 690. 
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environmental friendly activities should be classified as tax measures or environmental 
measures. The exact classification may depend on the facts of the case and the nature of 
incentives offered. Nonetheless, even when distinguishing a tax incentive from an 
environmental measure, the purpose of tax incentives offers guidance to tribunals. If the 
purpose is to attract more foreign investment in the particular sector and environmental 
protection is only secondary, the measure may be understood as a taxation measure and vice- 
versa. 
The implications of classifying a state’s measure as an environment tax instead of a non-tax 
environmental measure is that: first, it becomes a tax-related investment dispute subject to 
procedural requirements of tax veto;849 second, it would ordinarily limit the state’s 
substantive obligations due to tax carve outs;850 third, as mentioned above, tribunals would 
accord greater deference to state’s measures at least in so far as expropriation is concerned;
851 Additionally, if a state’s measure is understood as an environmental measure, it may fall 
under an exception under certain IIAs such as CETA (as long as it is not discriminatory). 
However, if it understood as a tax measure, it may not fall under the purview of exception. As 
this section showed, qualifying a state measure as a tax or as a non-tax measure has 
important implications for jurisdiction and the extent of deference to be accorded to the 
state’s measure. 
IV. RELIANCE ON WTO LAW RATHER THAN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW IN TAX-RELATED 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
In this Section, I suggest that in the arbitral awards on tax-related investment disputes, the 
concept of non-discrimination is almost always argued and adjudicated by reference to 
international trade law.852 It is undeniable that the body of jurisprudence developed by WTO 
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Arbitral tribunals interpreting the national treatment obligation in the NAFTA have routinely 
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arbitral tribunal compared the text of the national treatment provision in the BIT with the text of the 
national treatment provision in the WTO. The arbitral tribunal concluded that “like situations” were 
not the 
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Panels over the past few decades offers a rich repository of knowledge. When WTO 
adjudicating bodies address a claim of non-discrimination, they scrutinize whether trade 
measures discriminate between like products, like services or service suppliers.853 When an 
investor brings a claim of non-discrimination in investor-state arbitration, it usually involves 
identifying investors who are in like situations or like circumstances. Thus, it is 
understandable if tribunals refer to the concept of non-discrimination as understood and 
developed in international trade law. It certainly helps in illuminating the discussion in the 
context of IIL.854 However, the practice of relying exclusively only on international trade law 
in adjudicating tax-related investment disputes is not appropriate.855 
I suggest that tribunals should engage with the non-discrimination standard as understood 
and developed in ITL. In my view, there is scope to improve tribunals’ understanding of non- 
discriminatory taxation as applied in tax-related investment disputes – and ITL could play an 
important role in the improvement.856 
A. Non-Discrimination in International Tax Law 
The concept of non-discrimination is an integral part of almost every international tax treaty 
and the signatory states are required to adhere to it.857 Existing non-discrimination provisions 
in tax treaties encapsulate a capital import neutrality policy: the underlying objective is to 
ensure that in some economic areas, where an investment is made the state treats resident 
and non-resident investors similarly.858 The aim of the non-discrimination provision in tax 
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treaties is to protect taxpayers domiciled in another state and also to protect foreign capital 
in a state.859 Hugh Ault and Jacques Sasseville have observed that non-discrimination 
provisions of tax treaties cover a limited range of situations while IIAs include more general 
provisions prohibiting discriminatory treatment.860 The former seeks to eliminate 
discrimination in certain specific instances. For instance, it specifically mentions that there 
shall be no discrimination against stateless persons, permanent establishments and taxes on 
interest and royalties.861 
The OECD has further stated that the broader rules of non-discrimination that are found in 
other international conventions have little relevance for the interpretation and application of 
non-discrimination standard under ITL.862 In turn, I suggest that the arbitral tribunals in tax- 
related investment disputes can rely on non-discrimination standard as developed in ITL. This 
would, for example, allow space to examine the existence of general principles of law in ITL; 
which in turn would lead to outcomes backed by better reasoning. 
Tax treaties require states not to discriminate on the basis of nationality and residents who 
are ‘in the same circumstances’.863 The scope and meaning of ‘in the same circumstances’ in 
ITL can inform the analysis of tribunals in tax-related investment disputes. As discussed above 
in Section II, tribunals inconsistently identify ‘like situations’ in tax-related investment 
disputes. There is room for more coherence and certainty in the approach of arbitral tribunals 
and one of the contributions of the jurisprudence in ITL can be to contribute to a consistent 
approach of arbitral tribunals in tax-related investment disputes.864 However, on the contrary, 
one finds that the tribunals do not refer to ITL in their awards. This is an unfortunate trend. I 
discuss the lack of reference to ITL in the following paragraphs and suggest that it should be 
corrected. 
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B. Lack of Reference to International Tax Law 
In so far as non-discrimination is concerned, a major limitation in the awards of tax-related 
investment disputes is tribunals have thus far never referred to ITL in interpreting and 
applying the non-discrimination standard in tax-related investment disputes. 
In Occidental award, the BIT provided for national treatment in ‘like situations’. The claimant 
argued that by denying it VAT refunds, the host state had breached its obligation of national 
treatment; this is because other companies involved in export of other products were 
receiving VAT refunds. The tribunal held that Ecuador was liable for violation of national 
treatment standard. The tribunal’s decision relied on two major elements: first, it rejected 
the narrow definition of ‘in like situations’ and held that it cannot be restricted to companies 
involved in the same sector of activity; secondly, and more crucially the tribunal observed 
that it did not consider the practice concerning ‘like products’ developed within the GATT/
WTO particularly pertinent.865 The first element has been discussed above. The latter element 
was an instance of disciplinary bias. Even though the tribunal articulated the limited 
relevance of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the tribunal stopped short of stating if the tax 
jurisprudence or the concept of non-discrimination as understood under tax treaties and ITL is 
more pertinent in tax-related investment disputes. Since the purpose of national treatment is 
to ensure parity between foreign investors and local producers, the tribunal could have used 
this opportunity to consider if the non-discrimination standard as understood in ITL was 
relevant and perhaps necessary to be considered in tax-related investment disputes. 
In the Duke Energy award, the tribunal held that regardless of the existence of the stability 
agreement or its interpretation, Peru had violated norms of international law. The tribunal 
managed to avoid referring to either IIL or ITL. With respect to the former, the tribunal 
avoided a discussion on the international minimum standard by calling it a ‘thorny issue’;866 
thereby refusing to address the argument of the claimant that Peru had violated its obligation 
under international customary law. With respect to ITL – like most other tribunals, it did not 
refer to the existence or any general principles of ITL.867 Instead, in order to address the 
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liability of Peru for changing the interpretation of its tax laws, the tribunal turned to the 
principle of estoppel under international law. 
The above discussion shows that tribunals in tax-related investment disputes have not even 
acknowledged that ITL can be of assistance or helpful in adjudicating tax-related investment 
disputes. The bias against ITL can be attributed to various factors – the lack of an 
institutionalised dispute settlement body and a consequent lack of jurisprudence (apart from 
one developed by domestic courts), the development of ITL as a largely self-sufficient 
discipline with minimal interaction with general international law and a perception that ITL is 
for and by specialists and occupies a limited and closed space. The onus is on both the 
claimants and the tribunals to broaden their arguments and reasoning. Incorporating ITL in 
tax-related investment disputes would indicate the willingness of tribunals to engage with 
other sub-disciplines other than international trade law; it would also allow for a more 
measured consideration of certain aspects like non-discrimination in ITL and their relevance 
to investor-state arbitration. This could influence outcomes of the disputes; whether it would 
be in a desirable way or otherwise would depend on the manner and extent to which tribunals 
engage with ITL. 
While the entire body of jurisprudence on non-discrimination in ITL may not be of relevance 
in tax-related investment related disputes, the concept of non-discrimination as elaborated in 
the commentaries of the Model Conventions can be useful in understanding the non- 
discrimination standard in the context of taxation.868 For instance, Article 21(5)(b)(ii) of the 
ECT provides that if an issue pertains to the question that a tax constitutes an expropriation 
or whether a tax alleged to constitute an expropriation is discriminatory, it shall be referred 
to the competent authorities of the state and: 
Where non-discrimination issues are concerned, the Competent Tax Authorities 
shall apply the non-discrimination provisions of the relevant tax convention or, 
if there is no non-discrimination provision in the relevant tax convention 
applicable to the tax or no such tax convention is in force between the 
Contracting Parties concerned, they shall apply the non-discrimination 
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principles under the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.869 
Even though the provision is silent on the need to approach the competent authorities when 
violation of the FET standard or non-discrimination standard is alleged, it would be unusual 
for adjudicating bodies to be able to refer to ITL for expropriation claims but not where other 
standards are involved. Also, the ECT expressly provides that the competent authorities refer 
to the OECD Model. Outside the ECT, there is room for the argument that the tribunals can 
rely on either the UN or the OECD Model. Since the UN Model reflects the views of developing 
states, taking into account its provisions too would prevent allegations of bias in favour of the 
developed states.870 However, tribunals and the parties to the dispute have shown little 
inclination to engage with ITL. 
The argument for a greater role for ITL can meet one objection – the limited ability of 
investor-state tribunals to navigate the maze of taxation law – both, international and 
domestic.871 There are two counter arguments: first, the assumption is that tribunals require 
a lesser degree of competence or skill when dealing with environmental law, health law or 
even intellectual property law; second, the assumption that tax law is more complex than any 
of the other branches of law is an unwarranted generalisation. Merely because tax law has a 
certain internal logic of its own (like any other branch of law) does not mean that investor- 
state tribunals could not successfully interpret and apply it to the extent necessary for the 
resolution of tax-related investment disputes. 
C. Taxation Assimilated to Other Measures 
As elaborated in Chapter 4, the nature of tax as a compulsory levy and tax carve outs in IIAs 
contribute to the uniqueness of tax-related investment disputes. To briefly recall, for 
expropriation and the FET standard, some tribunals have endorsed taxation as a unique 
category. One of the important implications of recognising the uniqueness is that tribunals 
have set a high threshold for expropriation by taxation. In contrast, in addressing non- 
discrimination claims, tribunals have not recognised a high threshold for taxation measures. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, the inconsistent approach of tribunals reflects confusion as to 
whether they should treat tax-related investment disputes as a unique category of investment 
disputes. Alternately, if there are reasons as for prescribing a high threshold for expropriation 
by taxation and not for discriminatory taxation, the tribunals need to articulate these more 
clearly.872 In my view, it is possible to suggest that expropriation demands a comparatively 
more exacting standard than non-discrimination. For example, if a particular investor is able 
to run his enterprise profitably even after the imposition of a tax, tribunals presumably have 
a good reason to not arrive at a finding of expropriation. At the same time, if the investor is 
able to show that even though his investment is profitable, it was unfairly targeted and other 
similarly situated investors were not subject to the tax liability – the tribunal could 
reasonably conclude that the state breached its obligation of non-discrimination. 
Rationalising the differences between different kinds of substantive obligations, however, 
would still leave open the question – whether there should be a high threshold for tax 
measures as compared to non-tax measures under the non-discrimination standard? In my 
view, tribunals should require a higher threshold for non-discrimination in tax-related 
investment disputes than in investment disputes more generally. 
However, the approach of tribunals to non-discrimination, thus far, does not reflect the above 
distinction. I suggest that adopting the above distinction could reflect the uniqueness of tax-
related investment disputes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The jurisprudence on discriminatory taxation in investor-state arbitration remains in flux. 
First, the scope of jurisdiction and the exact meaning and content of non-discriminatory 
taxation are unclear. I suggest that going forward, if states do not desire taxation measures 
to be subject to non-discrimination obligation, the best approach is to exclude the 
applicability of both - the FET standard and the non-discrimination obligation. If only the 
latter is excluded, in my view, tribunals have jurisdiction to examine non-discrimination as 
part of the FET standard. 
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Second, tribunals could interpret ‘like situations’ and ‘like circumstances’ more consistently. 
At times, the like situation is interpreted widely while it is interpreted too narrowly in other 
awards. This has contributed to different articulations of what constitutes a discriminatory 
taxation. In my view, it is prudent to compare investors within the same industry unless there 
is a compelling reason to do otherwise. 
One common element of the awards discussed in this chapter is their selective reliance on 
certain disciplines of international law. I point out that almost all the arbitral awards have 
relied only on the jurisprudence in international trade law to interpret the meaning of non- 
discrimination. While at one level this approach indicates a willingness to consider other sub- 
disciplines of international law, at another level only referring to international trade law 
while excluding ITL reflects a limitation in the approach of the tribunals. For example, 
tribunals have not considered the meaning of the term non-discrimination under ITL. This is 
even though certain IIAs like the ECT encourage tribunals to refer to tax treaties. At the same 
time, an appreciation of ITL would involve engagement with general principles of law; which, 
in my view, could inform tribunal’s understanding of the extent to which international law 
enables and a state’s authority to impose taxes. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the above discussion, one plausible conclusion is that ITL has had and continues to 
have limited interaction with general international law. This can be attributed to several 
reasons – the lack of customary norms in ITL, the OECD’s viewing of ITL as a self-contained 
discipline, lack of a centralised dispute settlement body, the nature of tax law itself which 
predominantly requires reliance on specific provisions. Additionally, it also needs to be 
mentioned that international lawyers have not paid adequate attention to ITL. Furthermore, 
as I discuss in Chapters 3-6, investor-state tribunals have also not meaningfully engaged with, 
relied on or otherwise referred to ITL while adjudicating tax-related investment disputes. 
Thus, from the days of the League – which laid the foundations of the ITL – ITL continues to 
evolve in relative isolation with minimal interaction with other sub-disciplines of international 
economic law. 
One possible way of nudging for a greater interaction between ITL and general international 
law is by acknowledging the principles contained in tax treaties as general principles of law. I 
argue in Chapter 1 that the widespread presence of certain principles in tax treaties such as 
non-discrimination, suggests that some principles in tax treaties have acquired the nature of 
general principles of law. States could partially rely on these principles to bring counterclaims 
in tax-related investment disputes as suggested in Chapter 3. Investor-state tribunals, in turn, 
should examine the general principles of law in their reasoning while adjudicating tax-related 
investment disputes as suggested in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
Additionally, a sweeping view of the jurisprudence on tax-related investment disputes reveals 
an uncertainty – an uncertainty if tax-related investment disputes really constitute a separate 
category in IIL. As discussed above, the requirement of tax veto, the presence of tax carve 
outs, the nature of tax which compulsorily reduces profits, sovereignty of states – all 
cumulatively do point towards acknowledgment of tax-related investment disputes as a 
separate category of investment disputes. Tribunals have been most forthright (though not 
unanimous) in acknowledging tax as a separate category when addressing arguments on 
expropriation. However, when addressing arguments on the FET standard, the tribunals have 
been ambiguous in their views of whether tax-related investment disputes constitute a 
separate category. In turn, in addressing arguments on non-discrimination there is little 
acknowledgment of the distinctiveness of tax-related investment disputes. These anomalies 
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need to be addressed to bring greater coherence to the jurisprudence on tax-related 
investment disputes. 
Further, there is certainly room for reconsidering and revaluating the role of states in 
international tax disputes. As I point out in Chapter 2, in both – tax treaties and IIAs – one sees 
that states play a more dominant role as compared to the taxpayers and investors 
respectively. While the nature of the MAP allows the states to marginalise the taxpayer in 
dispute resolution, the ability of a successful tax veto to prevent arbitration claims from 
proceeding further grants immense powers to states under IIAs. Combined with the almost 
opaque nature of both remedies, tax veto and the MAP have limitations that need to be 
addressed. I suggest that to adequately balance the role of taxpayer/investor and that of 
states, state-state arbitration should be considered as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism. I will be an improvement over the current state dominated and opaque dispute 
resolution mechanism – especially in tax treaties. 
Finally, a look at the taxonomy of the arbitral awards in Annexure-1 would reveal that the 
frequency of tax-related investment disputes has increased in the past one decade. This could 
be due to several reasons such as states increasingly using tax laws and tax administration to 
regulate trade,873 and investment or investors increasingly realising the efficacy of investor- 
state arbitration. However, on examining the emerging jurisprudence on tax-related 
investment disputes in the thesis above, I would like to conclude by observing that: first, 
international tax dispute resolution – both under tax treaties and IIAs needs to be re- 
evaluated; second, the interface of ITL with other sub-disciplines of international law needs 
more attention – by tribunals, states, lawyers and scholars.874 
 
873 
See Yariv Brauner, ‘International Trade and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, But Not 
Reconciled’ (2005) 
25 Virginia Tax Rev 251, at 253 (suggesting that due to globalization and increasing powers of free trade 
agreements, tax measures are one of the few remaining measures that states can use to serve their 
domestic interests or serve protectionist purposes). 
874 
See Julien Chaisse, ‘International Investment Law and Taxation: From Coexistence to Cooperation’ 
January  2016, ICTSD and World Economic Forum, at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/16071201/pdf/
10_am2- 5_chaisse.pdf 
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duti
es
No 
exprop
riation 
since 
there is
- The 
cha
nge
s 
we
re 
applic
able
Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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(2002) no 
proof 
that 
the 
measur
e 
deprive
d the 
investo
r of its 
investm
ent
genera
lly and 
claima
nt was 
treate
d no 
less 
favour
ably
Mamidoil v 
Albania 
(2015)
Greece - 
Albani
a BIT 
(1991)
Import 
taxes on 
petroleum 
products
No     
exprop
riation 
since 
the 
claima
nt 
remain
ed 
entitle
d to 
use, 
possess
, 
control 
and 
dispose 
the 
propert
y
No   
violat
ion 
of 
the 
FET 
stand
ard. 
The 
legal 
fram
ewor
k was 
stabl
e and 
no 
legiti
mate 
expe
ctati
o ns 
were 
denie
d
There 
was 
rationa
l 
differe
ntiatio 
n 
which 
did not 
amount 
to      
discrim
inatio n
Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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Marvin 
Feldman 
v Mexico 
(2002)
NAFT
A
Denial of 
tax rebates 
to cigarette 
exporters
No     
expropr
iation 
since 
the 
investm
ent was 
at all 
times 
under
- Eviden
ce of 
de 
facto 
discri
minati
o n 
which 
has 
nexus 
with 
the
‘[T]ax law 
and policy 
changes 
are 
intended 
to be 
given 
relatively 
broad 
leeway 
under 
NAFTA, 
even
 252
the 
comple
te 
control 
of the 
investo
r
clai
man
t’s 
stat
us 
as a 
forei
gn 
inve
stor
if their 
effect is to 
make 
impractical 
for certain 
business 
activities to 
continue.’ 
(para 116).
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Micula v 
Romania 
(2013)
Swed
en - 
Roma
nia 
BIT 
(2002
)
Withdraw
al of 
tax 
incent
ives
- Unrea
sona 
ble 
for 
the 
host 
state 
to 
insist 
the 
invest
or’s 
maint
ain 
their 
invest
ment 
s 
even 
after 
withd
rawal 
of tax 
incen
tives. 
A 
viola
t i o n 
o f 
t h e 
F E T 
s t a n
dard
- Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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Murphy v 
Ecuador
US - 
Ecuador 
BIT
Imposition 
of
- The - Not 
addressed 
by
(2016) (1993) Windfall 
Profit Tax
wind
fall
the tribunal
profit 
tax
viola
ted
the
invest
or’s
legiti
mate
expect
atio
ns as 
it
chan
ged
the 
very
natur
e of
the
contr
act
betw
een
the
inves
tor
and 
the
host 
state
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Occidental v 
Ecuador 
(2004)
US - 
Ecua
dor 
BIT 
(199
3)
Retrospect
ive denial 
of VAT 
refunds
No     
exprop
riation 
as 
there 
was no
Legal 
fram
ewor
k was 
chan
ged 
in
Claima
nt 
receiv
ed less 
favour
able 
treatm
ent
Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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depriva
tion
an than
of the 
use or
impor
tant
accord
ed to
reason
ably
mann
er
nationa
l
expect
ed
witho
ut
compa
nies
econo
mic
provi
ding
and 
there
benefit 
of
clarit
y
was 
violatio
n
the result
ing
of the
invest
ment
in obligati
on of
violat
ion
non-
of the 
FET
discrim
inatio
stand
ard
n
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Occiden
tal (II) v 
Ecuador 
(2012)
US - 
Ecua
dor 
BIT 
(199
3)
Imposition 
of Windfall 
Profits Tax 
and 
issuance of 
caducidad 
decree
Taking 
claima
nt’s 
invest
ment 
by 
means 
of an     
admini
strativ 
e 
sanctio
n was a 
measur
e 
tantam
ount to      
exprop
riation
Cadu
dicad 
decre
e was 
a 
dispr
oport
i 
onate 
respo
nse 
to 
alleg
ed 
wron
gdoin 
g by 
claim
ant 
was 
violat
ed
- Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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the 
FET 
sta
nda
rd
Perenco v 
Ecuador 
(2014)
France - 
Ecuad
or BIT 
(1994)
Imposition 
of Windfall 
Profits Tax 
with a tax 
rate of 50% 
eventually 
increased 
to 99%
Interve
ntion 
to 
operate 
oil 
blocks 
after 
suspens
ion of 
operati
ons by 
claiman
t 
constit
uted 
expropr
iation
Wind
fall 
profit 
tax 
at 
99% 
was 
dispr
oport
i onal 
to 
state 
objec
tive 
and 
is a 
violat
ion of 
the 
FET 
stand
ard
- Not 
addres
sed by 
the 
tribuna
l
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Señor Tza 
Yap Shum v 
Peru 
(2011)
China - 
Peru 
BIT 
(199
4)
Imposition 
of back 
taxes and 
fines after 
a tax audit
The 
interi
m 
meas
ures 
of the 
state 
were 
arbitr
ary, 
taken 
on 
basis 
of 
insuff
icient 
legal 
and 
factual
- - The 
tribunal 
noted that 
the state is 
not liable 
for any 
losses 
resulting 
from the 
good faith 
application 
of tax laws 
and 
regulations. 
This 
deference, 
the 
tribunal 
added, is
 254
justific
ation 
and  
constit
uted an 
indirec
t 
exprop
riation 
of the 
invest
ment
reflected 
in public 
internatio
nal law
 255
Sergei 
Paushok 
v 
Mongoli
a 
(2011)
Russi
an 
Feder
ation 
– 
Mong
olia 
BIT 
(1995
)
Impositi
on of 
Windfall 
Profits Tax
No     
exprop
riation 
as the 
investo
r was 
able to 
keep 
its 
enterpr
ise 
afloat 
either 
by 
taking 
steps 
to 
reduce 
the 
impact 
of the 
tax or 
becaus
e of 
past 
profits
The 
tax 
did 
not 
alter 
stabil
ity of 
legal 
fram
ewor
k or 
violat
e 
speci
fic 
expe
ctati
o ns 
and 
there
by 
did 
not 
violat
e the 
FET 
stand
ard
The 
tax 
burden 
impose
d on 
claima
nts 
was no 
differe
nt 
than 
other 
gold 
produc
ers 
and 
there 
was no 
discri
minati
o n
Tribunal 
endorsed 
the 
argument 
that in 
area of 
taxation 
states 
jealously 
guard their 
sovereignty 
and enjoy 
a wide 
discretion 
to enact 
tax laws
Toto v 
Lebanon
Italy - 
Lebanon
Change in 
custom
No violation of any of its 
obligations under
Not 
addressed 
by
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(2012) BIT 
(1997)
duties the IIA the tribunal
Yukos 
Awar
ds 
(2010
-2014
)
ECT; 
Spain - 
Russian 
Federat
ion BIT 
(1990); 
UK - 
Russian 
Federat
ion BIT 
(1989)
Discriminat
ory and 
retrospectiv
e tax 
assessment; 
seizure and 
auctioning 
of assets 
due to non- 
payment of 
taxes
All 
actions 
- 
interpr
etatio 
n of tax 
laws, 
arbitrar
y tax 
assess
ments, 
auction
s of 
assets – 
cumula
tively 
constit
ute 
expropr
iation
- - The 
tribunal 
observed 
that states 
have a 
considerabl
e margin of 
discretion 
in enacting 
and 
enforcing 
tax laws, 
but it does 
not mean 
that they 
are not 
obliged to 
comply 
with an 
internation
al 
treaty
(Valores 
Award)
The 
tribunal 
noted that 
states have 
a 
considerabl
e latitude 
in 
imposing 
and
 257
 258
enforcing 
their 
taxation 
laws even 
if it results 
in 
substantial 
deprivatio
n without 
compensat
ion 
(RosInvest 
Award)
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